

REINTERPRETING NIETZSCHE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXTISTS' APPROACH

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Abstrak

Gagasan utama dari filsafat Nietzsche umumnya dirumuskan secara komprehensif oleh para kontentualis melalui konsep-konsep kunci seperti the will to power, the eternal return, dan the overman. Sayangnya, rumusan ambisius semacam itu kerap bersifat sewenang-wenang dan tidak memiliki justifikasi tekstual yang rigor. Untuk mengatasi kelemahan tersebut, kalangan tekstualis cenderung memprioritaskan pendekatan historis-kontekstual dalam menafsirkan teks-teks Nietzsche. Keunikan pendekatan tekstualis secara umum terletak pada analisis genetis dan analisis literer terhadap edisi kritis teks-teks Nietzsche yang telah disusun oleh Colli/Montinari. Karena itu, artikel ini pertama-tama menyajikan topografi singkat mengenai edisi kritis, khususnya peran KGW IX dalam analisis genetis. Selanjutnya, corak analisis genetis dan literer yang diterapkan pada aforisme BGE § 36 menjadi contoh kasus untuk memperlihatkan perbedaan tafsiran dengan kalangan kontentualis. Jika kontentualis cenderung menafsirkan hipotesis kehendak menuju kuasa sebagai esensi realitas, maka tekstualis justru memperlihatkan kreativitas Nietzsche sebagai penulis aforisme yang membuat parodi, ironi, dan satir terhadap kausalitas-kehendak serta tuntutan moral di dalam penjelasan ilmiah. Bagi tekstualis, prinsip the will to power di dalam aforisme BGE § 36 dibingkai dalam gaya bahasa pengandaian sehingga proposisi will to power juga bersifat tidak nyata.

Kata kunci: Friedrich Nietzsche, edisi kritis Colli/Montinari, eKGWB, KGWIX, Contentists, Textists, Kehendak Menuju Kuasa (BGE § 36), frasa pengandaian, parodi.

Abstract

The core of Nietzsche's philosophy is typically articulated comprehensively by contentists through key concepts such as the will to power, the eternal return, and the overman. Unfortunately, such goals are frequently arbitrary and lack rigorous textual support. Textists, on the other hand, tend to prioritize a historical-contextual approach in interpreting Nietzsche's texts in order to overcome this weakness. The textists' approach is distinguished by the genetic and literary analysis of the critical editions of Nietzsche's texts compiled by Colli/Montinari. As a result, this article begins with a brief topography of the critical editions, focusing on the role of KGW IX in genetic analysis. Furthermore, the style of genetic and literary analysis applied to aphorism 36 of BGE becomes a case study to demonstrate how the interpretation differs from that of the contentists. Textists show Nietzsche's creativity as the author of the aphorism that makes parody, irony, and satire of will-causality and moral demands in scientific explanations, whereas contentists interpret the will to power hypothesis as the essence of reality. For textists, the principle of the will to power in BGE 36 is framed in suppositional language, implying that the proposition of the will to power is also unreal.

Keywords: Friedrich Nietzsche, Colli/Montinari's critical editions, eKGWB, KGW IX, Contentists, Textists, Will to Power (BGE § 36), suppositional phrase, parody.

INTRODUCTION

Since the second half of the twentieth century, the reception and discussion of Nietzsche's philosophy has been geographically classified into four major regions: Germany, France, Italy, and Anglo-American countries (Reckermann, 2003). Regardless of each region's interpretation, there is at least one dominant tendency in interpreting Nietzsche's thought, namely the attempt to formulate Nietzsche's philosophy comprehensively through his key vocabulary, such as the will to power (*Wille zur Macht*), the eternal return of the same (*ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen*), and the overman (*Übermensch*). Unfortunately, this trend of philosophical

interpretation obscures other prominent themes in Nietzsche's texts, such as reflections on art, politics, economics, culture, history, science, society, or education.

Furthermore, the tendency to formulate Nietzsche's philosophy comprehensively resulted in a lengthy discussion of the *Nachlass* problem. Simply put, the *Nachlass* problem is the tension between how far Nietzsche's posthumous texts can be used in relation to Nietzsche's own published texts. In the Anglo-American context, there are at least two philological approaches to *Nachlass*: lumpers and splitters. Whereas lumpers do not question the use of *Nachlass*, splitters distinguished strongly between published texts and *Nachlass*. The *Nachlass* debate is further complicated by the fact that there is no agreement on the textual requirements for defining *Nachlass* (Parkhurst, 2020).

In this context, it is necessary to reconsider the "contentists" approach, which seeks to formulate Nietzsche's philosophy through the keywords the will to power, the eternal return, and the overman, which actually appear more in *Nachlass* than in Nietzsche's own published texts. The historical-contextual "textists" approach, which has flourished among German Nietzsche scholars in the last two decades, is one approach that can bridge the *Nachlass* problem.

If this is the case, what kind of alternative does the textist approach provide? To answer this question, it is first necessary to briefly describe the evolution of critical editions of Nietzsche's manuscripts pioneered by Giorgio Colli (1917-1979) andazzino Montinari (1928-1986). A brief topography of critical editions can serve as both a general landscape as well as a specific working tool for considering the contentists' approach's flaws, particularly the problem of textual justification, which frequently arises when formulating the main core of Nietzsche's thought. Given that Nietzsche's texts are generally ambiguous, vague, and frequently contradictory, the issue of justification is critical. As a result, the textists, who rely on a rigorous and historical-contextual reading of Nietzsche's manuscripts, can overcome the contentists' fundamental weakness. The textists' main strategy is to reconstruct Nietzsche's

philosophical style in relation to a specific aphorism, which is then compared with, for example, his working notes (*Arbeitshefte*), notebooks (*Notizbücher*), working sheets (*Mappen löser Blätter*), letters, as well as his print-ready manuscripts (*Druckmanuskripte*) from a relatively similar time period. This method is known as genetic analysis because it follows the flow, creativity, and dynamics of Nietzsche's thought process as recorded in his manuscripts on a specific issue.

Furthermore, literary analysis allows textists to differentiate subtle differences between Nietzsche as a writer and the philosophical themes he addressed. Thus, the key ideas recorded in Nietzsche's texts do not necessarily represent Nietzsche's own philosophical beliefs or views. This is because the various literary styles used by Nietzsche frequently present open-ended and non-final conclusions. To demonstrate the peculiarities of literary style, the aphorism 36 from *Beyond Good and Evil* (BGE) is a relevant case in point.

As a result, the peculiarities of the textists raised in this article will be addressed in two parts. To begin, I will discuss the most recent developments in the Colli/Montinari critical editions of Nietzsche's manuscripts. Second, by providing a historical-contextual interpretation that differs from the contentists' tendency.

CRITICAL EDITIONS OF NIETZSCHE'S MANUSCRIPTS

Colli and Montinari began work on a critical edition of the Nietzsche manuscripts in the Goethe-Schiller Archive in Weimar around 1960. Despite its flaws, the Colli/Montinari's edition is the best edition of Nietzsche's collected works available to date. The management of the posthumous manuscripts, which are arranged chronologically rather than thematically, is the strength of their edition. As a result, Colli and Montinari were able to demonstrate text forgeries and deletions were made by Nietzsche's own sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, particularly concerning Nietzsche's letters and the late-period fragments that were later recorded as *The Will to Power* (WP).

Colli/Montinari's critical editions in German are classified into two types, canon (*Kritische Gesamtausgabe*) and study (*Kritische Studienausgabe*). The canon version contains approximately 65 volumes of critical editions and is notated as KGW, which refers to Nietzsche's works, and KGB to his letters, whereas the study version contains 23 volumes of critical editions and is notated as KSA as well as KSB. While the KGW edition includes philological manuscripts, poetry, essays, and lecture texts aimed at a narrower audience, the KSA edition is aimed at a broader audience. Therefore, the KSA contains only Nietzsche's philosophical works and their anthologized fragments from 1869 to 1889, including 13 volumes and two volumes of Colli/Montinari's critical notes. The Stanford University publishing house has also published several English-language editions of the KSA spearheaded by Ernst Behler and Bernd Magnus—planned to be published in 19 volumes—to reach a wider audience. Not only that, technological advances have enabled the digitization of Nietzsche's manuscripts (eKGWB) pioneered by Paolo D'Iorio on the Nietzsche Source website (<http://www.nietzschesource.org/>) while faithfully referencing the Colli/Montinari's critical editions. Aside from making Nietzsche's texts more accessible, the eKGWB edition is more “up to date” and practical in terms of correcting editing errors found in the printed edition (book) (D'Iorio, n.d.).

Even now, the critical edition of Nietzsche's Manuscript is continually being updated on regular basis. At least 6600 errors (4600 in the works and 2000 in the letters) have been identified, the majority of which are minor, such as omissions in the use of italics or the establishment of a new paragraph (D'Iorio, 2010: 71). However, there are also some fatal errors, such as the incorrect comma placement or even the incorrect word usage, which alters the sentence structure and meaning. As a result, the baton of work on a critical edition of the *Gesamtausgabe* continues to this day, with a new transcription initiated by Marie-Luise Haase and Michael Kohlenbach and published specifically in KGW IX, correcting KGW

VII and VIII, which contain Nietzsche's fragments from 1885 to 1889 (De Gruyter, n.d.).

In this article, the case of Nietzsche's working notes in compiling *Beyond Good and Evil* (BGE) serves as a simple illustration of KSA IX's utility. BGE was first published in 1886 and included nine subject matters (*Hauptstück*) according to the table of contents of KSA 5 (or KGW VI.2) (Figure 1).

Inhaltsverzeichnis	
Vorbemerkung	7
Jenseits von Gut und Böse	9
Vorrede	11
Erstes Hauptstück: von den Vorurtheilen der Philosophen (1-23)	15
Zweites Hauptstück: der freie Geist (24-44)	41
Drittes Hauptstück: das religiöse Wesen (45-62)	65
Viertes Hauptstück: Sprüche und Zwischenspiele (63-185)	85
Fünftes Hauptstück: zur Naturgeschichte der Moral (186-203)	105
Sechstes Hauptstück: wir Gelehrten (204-213)	129
Siebentes Hauptstück: unsere Tugenden (214-239)	151
Achstes Hauptstück: Völker und Vaterländer (240-256)	179
Neuntes Hauptstück: was ist vornehm? (257-296)	205
Aus hohen Bergen. Nachgesang	241
Zur Genealogie der Moral	245
Vorrede	247
Erste Abhandlung: „Gut und Böse“, „Gut und Schlecht“	257

Fig. 1. Table of Contents of the BGE in KSA 5 (Nietzsche, 1999: 423)

In this regard, the BGE's working draft can be found in Nietzsche's collection of workbooks (*Arbeitshefte*) from 1884-1889, specifically manuscript W I 8. Colli/Montinari organized it into a more detailed numbering system based on year, group, and specific number for easy tracking. The subject draft in our case is thus NF-1885, 2[50], as reproduced by D'Iorio (Figure 2).




Fig. 2. Digital reproduction of manuscript W I 8 pp. 158 based on KGW VIII, 2[50] (Friedrich Nietzsche, 1885b)




Fig. 3. Nietzsche's Manuscript W I 8 Handwritten Version and Transcription by Marie-Luise Haase and Michael Kohlenbach based on KGW IX (Nietzsche, 2005: 159)

As seen in Figure 2, Nietzsche initially organized the BGE into ten subject matters, with one additional subject matter number nine entitled "Masks" (9. *Masken*). A comparison with the handwritten version of Nietzsche's W I 8 manuscript, on the other hand, reveals at least two elements that are important in the genetic analysis (Figure 3). *First*, the eleventh item, "The Attempters. Philosophers of

the Future" (11. *Die Versucher. Philosophen der Zukunft*), was deleted by Nietzsche himself. *Second*, subject number 5 was originally titled "Hints of a Moral Psychologist" (5. Fingerzeige eines Moral-Psychologen) before being renamed "On the Natural History of Morals" (5. *Zur Naturgeschichte der Moral*).

A simple comparison between the printed BGE text and this BGE working manuscript—which is transcribed differently in KGW VIII and IX—can help textists reconstruct Nietzsche's dynamic working process. This reconstruction is known as genetic analysis because it traces the historical-literary origins of the development of ideas, words, and concepts in Nietzsche's repertoire of thought. The initial motivation for organizing the BGE into nine subject matters can be deduced from Nietzsche's letter to Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche on August 15, 1885, which was to re-edit the book *Human, All Too Human* (HH)—which also consisted of nine subject matters—in a new way (Nietzsche, 1885a). As a result, it is possible to argue that the BGE was originally analogous to the HH. However, Nietzsche discovered that the BGE manuscript evolved as a form of commentary on an earlier work, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Z) (Sommer, 2016: 10). This is supported by the historico-critical findings indicating that the BGE's working manuscript material is largely derived from Z. This dynamic exemplifies Nietzsche's commitment to emphasize continuity in his works. However, readers should be aware that Nietzsche's definition of coherence and consistency has a negative connotation. To put it in another way, Nietzsche is accustomed to expressing the evolution of a thought in a novel, even contradictory, literary style. Therefore, readers who are unfamiliar with Nietzsche's writing style are easily lost in the mazes of contradictory texts, failing to recognize the uniqueness of coherence characterized by multiperspectivalism.

Thus, a critical edition of Nietzsche's manuscripts can provide a historical and literary landscape of Nietzsche's fragmentary and provocative thought movements. Without a doubt, researchers can never directly access Nietzsche's thought process and claim to understand the core of Nietzsche's ideas. In this case, a critical

edition of Nietzsche's manuscripts serves as a fundamental working tool for reconstructing a topic discussed by Nietzsche that is closely related to the variety of his literary stylistic presentations: parody, irony, satire, litotes, generalization, dithyramb, soliloquy, analogy, metaphor, mini-essay, and others. When confronted with the richness of Nietzsche's philosophical style, researchers must be faithful to the text by deciphering it word for word and placing it in its proper historical and literary context. Therefore, understanding Nietzsche's thought textually necessitates at least a basic mastery of critical editions of Nietzsche's manuscripts, including for Indonesian readers of Nietzsche and his philosophical ecosystem—philosophy campuses and their academic communities, publishers and their translated philosophy texts, the general public and their discussion studies.

Of course, each reader brings a unique perspective to his or her interpretation of Nietzsche, whether it is a biographical-philosophical reconstruction, historical-critical commentary, or historical-philosophical interpretation. Such differences are entirely natural and productive insofar as each reader considers his or her own reading as well as the validity of his or her interpretive claims. Otherwise, the reader will be easily carried away by the contentists' approach, which aims to simplify Nietzsche's thought and labels him as a metaphysician, psychologist-genealogist, protonaturalist, atheist, mystic, postmodernist, and so on. In such circumstances, it is necessary to pose an intriguing question, "What kind of Nietzsche does the interpreter actually want to present?" This nosiness could be attributed to Nietzsche's own anticipation that, "Whoever thought he had understood something of me, had made up something out of me after his own image (Nietzsche, 1988: 300)."

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TEXTISTS APPROACH

Contentists reach more "coherent" conclusions when interpreting Nietzsche's texts than textists. This means that the reader will eventually construct a systematically common thread to explain Nietzsche's philosophy after grappling with a series of

enigmatic Nietzsche texts. In general, Nietzsche's philosophy can be identified by the concepts of the will to power, the eternal return, and the overman, as well as the theme of God's death.

Textists, on the other hand, never associate Nietzsche with the certainty of a particular position (Sommer, 2019: 104). For example, in the book *The Gay Science* (GS), paragraph 125 about the madman proclaiming the death of God is frequently used to argue that Nietzsche is either proclaiming or teaching the death of God. However, textists argue that Nietzsche was neither proclaiming nor teaching the death of God. Only the narrator, the madman, and the people in the marketplace are revealed by a textual examination of the aphorism. There is no doubt that Nietzsche wrote the aphorism. However, Nietzsche narrating a drama about God's death does not necessarily imply that Nietzsche, as a philosopher, is proclaiming or teaching God's death. As a result, the textists' approach to analysis does not rush to identify a provocative position written by Nietzsche in a specific aphorism as his philosophical position.

To comprehend the textists' position, it is necessary to describe Nietzsche's philosophical style in the history of Western philosophy. It is common in the academic tradition to associate a particular proposition with a certain philosopher as long as it is supported by authoritative texts. A researcher's statement, "Hegel argues that the true is the whole," for example, is the researcher's reconstructive attempt at imposing Hegelian notion of truth on Hegel as the speaking subject. Such a reconstruction is only valid if the philosopher intended it, explained it systematically, and stated it as a final proposition in his philosophical tracts. However, such a reconstruction would fall into the trap of Nietzsche's textual labyrinths precisely because Nietzsche himself criticized the tendency of thinkers to reduce everything to a comprehensive system.

In this context, Nietzsche sees the desire or need for a dogmatic system is a sign of a lack of candor, honesty, and integrity (Nietzsche, 1988: 63). Instead, Nietzsche calls into question a philosophy's final authority by situating it in a specific historical

context that is always constrained by the complexities of a limited space-time, including the philosopher's limited personal perspective. As a result, the textists' approach always places Nietzsche in a certain historical-literary context, just as Nietzsche uses philosophers as a magnifying glass to present a certain polemic that is never final, but rather ambiguous. It is not surprising, then, that readers find, for example, the figure of Socrates appears in Nietzsche's texts as both a monster and a liberator.

The same can be said for Nietzsche's description of the will to power. Contentists tend to associate the will to power as Nietzsche's main theory or doctrine. For example, Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's will to power as an attempt to formulate total reality (Heidegger, 1989: 10). That is why Heidegger considers Nietzsche to be the last metaphysician. In contrast to Heidegger, naturalist interpreters sympathetic to Nietzsche—particularly Anglo-American scholars today—would interpret the will to power as a scientific hypothesis to explain physio-biological changes in the universe and their impact on ethical life. For them, Nietzsche is a protonaturalist who provides a scientific, paradigmatic view of the world (Dellinger, 2013: 185). In addition to the two interpretive tendencies discussed above, Wibowo's interpretation of "Kehendak Kuasa" (Will-Power)—his translation of the *Wille zur Macht*—deserves mention for interpreting it as the nonmetaphysical, noncausal essence of movement in life (Wibowo, 2017: 297-298). Similarly, it is widely assumed among Indonesian interpreters that the will to power is closely related to Nietzsche's other central idea, the *Übermensch*—often inaccurately translated as "*manusia unggul*" (Superman)—which is regarded as one of the distinguishing features of Nietzsche's philosophy (Munir, 2011: 138-142). Thus, the reception of Nietzsche and his thought for Indonesian readers today is still influenced by the contentists interpretations that were popular in the second half of the 20th century.

When confronted with such contentist interpretations, textists would first locate the will to power within the text and its context. The theory of the will to power is generally based on the aphorism

36 of BGE or the fragment 1885, 38[12]—or the better-known aphorism 1067 of the book WP, which was actually compiled by Nietzsche's sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche (Figure 4). Textists will instead examine both insofar as BGE § 36 is the primary text and NL 1885, 38[12] is Nietzsche's working record that demonstrates his thinking and writing praxis through scribbles, inserts, and corrections—which are essentially two versions based on manuscripts W I 3 (Figure 5) and Mp XVI (Figure 6). Furthermore, the thinkers who drew Nietzsche's attention during the period, such as Otto Liebmann, Wilhelm Roux, Maximilian Drossbach, Kuno Fischer, Ludwig Noirés, and Paul Heinrich Widemann, must be contextualized (Sommer, 2016: 272-286). Why is it significant? Because the ideas of these thinkers influenced Nietzsche's thought process, which was then expanded upon in his texts.




Fig. 4. Extract from NL 1885, 38[12] based on *Der Wille zur Macht* 1884/88: *Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe* (Nietzsche, Förster-Nietzsche, 1906, p. 229).

– Und wißt ihr auch, was mir die Welt ist? Soll ich sie euch im Spiegel zeigen?

2 Diese Welt: ein Ungeheuer von Kraft, ohne Anfang, ohne Ende, eine feste^{eiserne} Größe von Kraft
 4 ^{weiche} die nicht größer, nicht kleiner wird, die sich nicht verbraucht, sondern nur ^{wandelt} umsetzt^{ver.}

6 als Ganzes unveränderlich groß, ein Haushalt ohne Einbußen/u Ausgaben, aber
 8 ebenso ohne Zuwachs, ^{ohne} u. Einnahmen, vom „Nichts“ umschlossen als von seiner
 10 Grenze, ^{nichts Verschwindendes Verschwendetes} nichts unendlich Ausgedehntes, sondern als bestimmte Kraft einem
 12 bestimmten Raume^s eingelegt, und nicht einem Raume, der irgendwo „leer“ ist, son-
 14 dern ^{selber} weder voll, noch leer, vielmehr als Kraft überall, als Spiel von Kräften,
 16 hier sich häufend, dort sich mindernd, ein Meer in sich ^{selber} stür- ^{u Kraftwellen}
 18 mender u. fluthender Kräfte, ewig sich wandelnd, ewig zurücklaufend, als
 20 mit ungeheuren Jahren der Wiederkehr, mit einer Ebbe u. Fluth der
 22 Gestaltungen, aus den einfachsten in die vielfältigsten hinaustreibend,
 24 aus den stillsten kältesten einförmigsten ^{fort} in die glühendsten, wildesten,
 26 ^{S auf W} viel ^{selber} sich ^{dann wieder} widersprechendsten, und ebenso ^{wieder} aus der Fülle ^{heim} zurückkehrend zum
 28 Einfachen, aus dem Spiel des Kampf Widersprüche ^{zurück bis zur} in die Lust des
 30 Einklangs, sich-selber bejahend noch in dieser Gleichheit seiner Jahre,
 32 ^{seiner-Ebben-u-Fluthen} sich-selber-segnend als das, was ewig ^{und an sich selber} wiederkommt, ^{keine Müdigkeit} u. kein Müde-
 34 u Sattwerden, ^S an sich selber kennt – : diese meine dionysische Welt
 36 des Schaffens, u. Zerstörens, ^{Sich selber ewig} wer ^{Sich ewig} hat sie gleich mir diese Welt der
 38 ^{doppelten} großen Wollüste ^{von} der Zeugung u. ^{u Tod,} des Todes, ohne Ziel, wenn nicht im
 40 ^{ein im} Glück ^{diese Welt} des Kreises ein Ziel liegt, ohne Willen, wenn nicht ^{der Ring sich} in dem
 42 ^{immer selber will guten Willen} Zurückkehren zum Ringe ^{ist}
 44 ^S hat, nicht ^{alten} auf seiner eigenen ^{von Vernunft u. Narrheit,}
 46 [:] Bahn zu bleiben u sich um sich zu drehen – ^{immer} wer ^{u nur um sich} hält dieser Welt des
 48 ^{großen} Dionysischen Spiegels, wie ich sie schaute, seine Seele entgegen,
 50 ^{eigenen} seinen Spiegel dem Spiegel, ^{Dionysos-} sein ^{eigene} Gleichniß ^{eigenes} sein ^{Sphinx-} Geheimniß dem Dionysos
 52 ^g Geheimniß,?

Fig. 5. Extract NL 1885, 38[12] based on Manuscript W I 3 (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 159) Transcribed by Marie-Luise Haase and Michael Kohlenbach.

◇ Und wißt ihr auch, was mir die Welt ist? Soll ich sie euch ^{meinem} in Spiegel zeigen?

Diese Welt: ein Ungeheuer von Kraft, ohne Anfang, ohne Ende, eine feste, eherne Größe von Kraft, welche nicht größer nicht kleiner wird, die sich nicht verbraucht sondern nur verwandelt, als Ganzes unveränderlich groß, ein Haushalt ohne Ausgaben und Einbußen, aber ebenso ohne Zuwachs, ohne Einnahmen, von „Nichts“ umschlossen als von seiner Gränze, nichts Verschwimmendes, Verschwundenes, nichts Unendlich-Ausgedehntes, sondern als bestimmte Kraft einem bestimmten Raume eingelegt, und nicht einem Raume, der irgendwo „leer“ ^{wäre} ist, ~~sondern~~ ^{zugegen Eins und Vieles, und zugleich} weder voll noch leer, vielmehr als Kraft überall, als Spiel von Kräften und Kraftwellen, hier sich häufend dort sich mindernd, ein Meer in sich selber stürmender und fluthender Kräfte, ewig sich wandelnd, ewig zurücklaufend, mit ungeheuren Jahren der Wiederkehr, mit einer Ebbe und Fluth ^{selber} der Gestaltungen, aus den einfachsten in die vielfältigsten hinaustreibend, aus dem Stillsten, ^{Starrsten Kältesten hinaus} kältesten, Einförmigsten, fort in das Glühendste, Wildeste, Sich-selber-widersprechendste, und dann wieder aus der Fülle heimkehrend zum Einfachen, aus dem Spiel der Widersprüche zurück bis zur Lust des Einklangs, sich selber bejahend noch in dieser Gleichheit seiner Jahre, sich selber segnend als das, was ewig wiederkommt, ^{muß als ein Werden, das} was an sich selber kein Sättwerden, keine Müdigkeit, ^{kennt, keinen Übermaß,} kennt -: diese meine donysische Welt des Sich-Ewig-Schaffens, ^{-sich selber- des Ewig -selber-} Sich-ewig-Zerstörens, diese Geheimniß-Welt der doppelten Wollüste, von Zeugung und Tod, dieß mein „Jenseits von Gut und Böse“, ohne Ziel, wenn nicht im Glück des Kreises ein Ziel liegt, ohne Willen, wenn nicht ein Ring ^{zu sich selber hat} guten Willens ist, ^{Behnen und} auf eigener alter Bahn sich immer um sich und nur um sich zu drehen, diese meine Welt – wer ist hell genug dazu, sie zu schauen ohne sich Blindheit zu wünschen? stark genug, diesem Spiegel seine Seele entgegen zu halten? Seinen eignen Spiegel dem Donos-Spiegel? Seine eigne Lösung dem Donos-Räthsel? Und wer es vermöchte, müßte er dann nicht noch mehr thun? Dem „Ring der Ringe“ sich selber anverloben? Mit dem Gelobniß der ^{Mircemächtlichsten} ^{Wille zur Macht – und nichts außerdem!}

Fig. 6. Extract NL 1885, 38[12] based on Manuskript Mp XVI (Nietzsche, 2020, p. 32) Transcribed by Marie-Luise Haase and Michael Kohlenbach.

The textists will then examine the peculiarities of literary form as well as Nietzsche's choice of diction line by line. The use of a style that connotes supposition (or *Konjunktiv II* verbs in German grammar) is dominant in the context of BGE § 36. This means that the author of the aphorism frames the theme of will to power in an unreal context—or, in terms of a particular thought experiment. The aphorism 36 of BGE will be presented in three text fragments based on Walter Kaufmann's translation (1989), but I will also include the original language and a general commentary on it to provide a basic understanding of how textists work. The citation of Nietzsche's texts in this article adheres to the scholarly conventions commonly used in Nietzsche studies in the following order: the critical edition used and its volume number, page number, and line number. The edition

used in this article is *Kritische Studienausgabe* volume 5 which contains the text of BGE § 36 starting from page 54 line 18 to page 55 line 34, so the order of reference is written as follows: KSA 5, 54, 18 - 55, 34. Here is the first fragment of the BGE § 36:

“Suppose nothing else were “given” as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any “reality” besides the reality of our drives—for thinking is merely a relation of these drives to each other: is it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question whether this “given” would not be *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or “material”) world? I mean, not as a deception, as “mere appearance,” an “idea” (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our affect—as a more primitive form of the world of affects in which everything still lies contained in a powerful unity before it undergoes ramifications and developments in the organic process (and, as is only fair, also becomes tenderer and weaker)—as a kind of instinctive life in which all organic functions are still synthetically intertwined along with self-regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion, an metabolism—as a *pre-form* of life. (Nietzsche, 1989) [*Gesetzt, dass nichts Anderes als real „gegeben“ ist als unsre Welt der Begierden und Leidenschaften, dass wir zu keiner anderen „Realität“ hinab oder hinauf können als gerade zur Realität unsrer Triebe— denn Denken ist nur ein Verhalten dieser Triebe zu einander—: ist es nicht erlaubt, den Versuch zu machen und die Frage zu fragen, ob dies Gegeben nicht ausreicht, um aus Seines-Gleichen auch die sogenannte mechanistische (oder „materielle“) Welt zu verstehen? Ich meine nicht als eine Täuschung, einen „Schein“, eine „Vorstellung“ (im Berkeley’schen und Schopenhauerischen Sinne), sondern als vom gleichen Realitäts-Range, welchen unser Affekt selbst hat,—als eine primitivere Form der Welt der Affekte, in der noch Alles in mächtiger Einheit beschlossen liegt, was sich dann im organischen Prozesse abzweigt und ausgestaltet (auch, wie billig, verzärtelt und abschwächt—), als eine Art von Triebleben, in dem noch sämtliche organische Funktionen, mit Selbst-Regulierung,*

Assimilation, Ernährung, Ausscheidung, Stoffwechsel, synthetisch gebunden in einander sind,—als eine Vorform des Lebens?]" (KSA 5, 54, 19 – 55, 5) (Nietzsche, 1999)

The author of the aphorism appears to be acting as an experimenter in the first fragment of the BGE § 36. This description is supported by the use of the word "experiment" (*Versuch*) four times throughout the aphorism. Because most experiments necessitate the use of an object, the object presented in this aphorism is a thesis about the only reality of desire that humans have been given.

The word "given" (*gegeben*) in quotation marks also plays an important role in emphasizing the idea that the world of desire is absolute for people who believe in their superiority and accept the givenness of this reality without questioning it. This viewpoint, however, does not fit the free spirit (*der freie Geist*), which is the title of the BGE's second subject matter (KSA 5, 41, 2) and covers aphorisms 24 to 44, so the author of the aphorism instead questions the great gap between the world of desire and the world of matter. The author, Nietzsche, expands on the topic with his references to Berkeley, Schopenhauer, and the organic/inorganic dimension. Nietzsche's reading of Wilhelm Roux's *Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus* (1881) inspired the elaboration of biological terms such as assimilation, nutrition, excretion, and metabolism to demonstrate a hypothesized mechanism of self-governance at the ontological level, namely the life-drive (*Triebleben*), which bridges the gap between the inorganic and the organic (Sommer, 2016: 280-281).

In addition, the second fragment of the BGE § 36 is as follows:

"In the end not only is it permitted to make this experiment: the conscience of *method* demands it. Not to assume several kinds of casuality until the experiment of making do with a single one has been pushed to its utmost limit (to the point of nonsense, if I may say so)—that is a moral of method which one may not shirk today—it follows "from ist definition," as a mathematician would say. The question is in the end whether

we really recognize the will as *efficient*, whether we believe in the causality of the will: if we do—and at bottom our faith in this is nothing less than our faith in causality itself—then we have to make the experiment of positing the causality of the will hypothetically as the only one. “Will,” of course, can affect only “will”—and not “matter” (not “nerves” for example). In short, one has to risk the hypothesis whether will does not affect will wherever “effects” are recognized—and whether all mechanical occurrences are not, insofar as a force is active in them, will force, effects of will. (Nietzsche, 1989) [*Zuletzt ist es nicht nur erlaubt, diesen Versuch zu machen: es ist, vom Gewissen der Methode aus, geboten. Nicht mehrere Arten von Causalität annehmen, so lange nicht der Versuch, mit einer einzigen auszureichen, bis an seine äusserste Grenze getrieben ist (—bis zum Unsinn, mit Verlaub zu sagen): das ist eine Moral der Methode, der man sich heute nicht entziehen darf;—es folgt „aus ihrer Definition“, wie ein Mathematiker sagen würde. Die Frage ist zuletzt, ob wir den Willen wirklich als wirkend anerkennen, ob wir an die Causalität des Willens glauben: thun wir das—und im Grunde ist der Glaube daran eben unser Glaube an Causalität selbst—, so müssen wir den Versuch machen, die Willens-Causalität hypothetisch als die einzige zu setzen. „Wille“ kann natürlich nur auf „Wille“ wirken—und nicht auf „Stoffe“ (nicht auf „Nerven“ zum Beispiel—): genug, man muss die Hypothese wagen, ob nicht überall, wo „Wirkungen“ anerkannt werden, Wille auf Wille wirkt—und ob nicht alles mechanische Geschehen, insofern eine Kraft darin thätig wird, eben Willenskraft, Willens-Wirkung ist]” (KSA 5, 55, 5-23) (Nietzsche, 1999)*

In the second fragment of the aphorism BGE § 36, the author is confronted with a kind of methodical demand operating in his thought experiment. It's worth noting that the author uses the word "conscience" (*Gewissen*) as a personification of a method, implying a moral obligation to explain the origin of the thesis about the world of desire in a rational and comprehensive manner—a concept that reappears as "the moral of the method" (*eine Moral der Methode*). Just as most scientific experiments use causal procedures in explaining

their results, the validity of the reality of desire must be exhaustively explained by volitional causality.

The author subtly seems to provoke his readers to question the origins of the preference for an ultimate explanation over explanations derived from diverse perspectives by describing it "to the point of nonsense" (*bis zum Unsinn*). This priority appears to be the result of a scientific-moralistic bias that favors coherent-systematic explanations over fragmentary ones. Nietzsche then formulates this subtle provocation in a question that attempts to cast doubt on the ultimate explanation of the will while inviting the reader to reconsider the causal superiority of the will. This reflection implies a scientific approach that is inextricably linked to belief in the principle of causality (*Glaube an Causalität selbst*). In addition to Schopenhauer, the reflection on the will is based on Maximilian Drossbach's theories in *Ueber die scheinbaren und die wirklichen Ursachen* (1884), particularly on will-power (*Willenskraft*) (Sommer, 2016: 282-283).

It is also important to note the grammatical shift from indicative to unreal situation (*Konjunktiv II*) in the final fragment of the BGE § 36:

“Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of *one* basic form of the will—namely, of the will to power, as *my* proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment—it is *one* problem—then one would have gained the right to determine *all* efficient force univocally as—*will to power*. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its “intelligible character”—it would be “will to power” and nothing else. (Nietzsche, 1989) [*Gesetzt endlich, dass es gelänge, unser gesamntes Triebleben als die Ausgestaltung und Verzweigung Einer Grundform des Willens zu erklären— nämlich des Willens zur Macht, wie es mein Satz ist —; gesetzt, dass man alle organischen Funktionen auf diesen Willen zur Macht*

zurückführen könnte und in ihm auch die Lösung des Problems der Zeugung und Ernährung—es ist Ein Problem—fände, so hätte man damit sich das Recht verschafft, alle wirkende Kraft eindeutig zu bestimmen als: Wille zur Macht. Die Welt von innen gesehen, die Welt auf ihren „intelligiblen Charakter“ hin bestimmt und bezeichnet—sie wäre eben „Wille zur Macht“ und nichts ausserdem.—]“ (KSA 5, 55, 23-34) (Nietzsche, 1999)

Through the double occurrence of a suppositional phrase ("*gesetzt [...], dass [...]*"), the author again invites the reader to assume the metaphysical claim of will to power, as if the explanation of volitional causality formulated as "will to power" were superior and comprehensive. However, the astute reader will detect a satirical tone in this final piece regarding the tautological workings of scientific argumentation, which can be stated as follows: if everything can be specified as (*als*) will to power, then everything could be (*wäre*) will to power. Not only that, the formulation of the will to power is also referred to by the author as his signature proposition (*wie es mein Satz ist*). The author's italicization of the word "*mein*" emphasizes the irony and parody of himself as a hypothesis-maker operating under the demands of the scientific method, which is nothing more than his own subjective prejudice.

In contrast to the 1885 fragment 38[12], which depicts an attempt to conflate the will to power hypothesis and the eternal return hypothesis, Nietzsche uses the will to power proposition in the aphorism BGE 36 as an agonistic instrument to oppose the Schopenhauerian theory of will without establishing itself as a new substitute theory. The agonistic motive, combined with the aphorist's literary play, is consistent with the BGE book's project as "*Vorspiel*," which has meaning connotations such as simulation, pretension, persuasion, and seduction (Dellinger, 2013: 167). Moreover, in this section, Nietzsche adopts and expands on the concept of "intelligible character" as an allusion to Paul Heinrich Widemann's critique of the duality of Kantian intellectual and empirical dimensions in *Erkennen und Sein* (1885) (Sommer, 2016:

284). The aphorist's reference suggests irony in the claim of the superiority of the will to power, which is unable to prove the validity of its thesis empirically as scientific experiments in general.

Overall, the validity of the will to power hypothesis in BGE § 36 necessitates two hypothetical premises. First and foremost, the word desire and passion were the only true reality that was given. Second, only volitional-causality could explain the world. However, the hypothetical premise is not a reality in and of itself. As a result, the claim that "Nietzsche"—represented in this aphorism by the narrator "I"—is revealing the essence of reality to the reader through the will to power lacks textual support. Even if Nietzsche truly proposes the will to power as the essence of the world, the tone of speech in this fragment contains self-parody or self-irony precisely because Nietzsche has criticized the absurdity of moralistic demands for a comprehensive explanation of causality, which includes his will to power hypothesis.

Of course, the notion of will to power is not limited to the aphorism 36 of BGE. However, a similar analysis or disciplinary approach must be applied to other aphorisms that address the same theme. It is not surprising, then, that a textists' approach to reading necessitates historico-genetic analysis in order to present both textual and contextual comments. On the one hand, the textists' emphasis on context can be read as an attempt to relativize what interpreters claim to be the core of "Nietzsche's philosophy." It does, however, intend to provide a proportional reading in order to comprehend Nietzsche's enigmatic texts. Thus, textists criticize contentists' interpretations of the wholeness of Nietzsche's philosophy precisely because Nietzsche himself had no ambition to offer a particular system of philosophy, but rather to leave behind a philosophical praxis (Sommer, 2019: 109-110).

CONCLUSION

The textists offer a historical-contextual way of reading Nietzsche's texts than the contentists. Unlike contentists, who tend to formulate Nietzsche's philosophy through key concepts such as

the will to power, the eternal return of the same, and the overman, textists first postpone such speculations in order to conduct a genetic and literary analysis. The textist's approach is genetic in that it compares Nietzsche's manuscripts from the time period in question, including fragments of Nietzsche's working notes, letters related to the theme of the aphorism under consideration, and the development of contemporary ideas in his era that influenced Nietzsche's thought process. Apart from being genetic, the textists' analysis is also literary because it demonstrates Nietzsche's seriousness and creativity in expressing his ideas through various forms of writing styles, such as parody, irony, satire, litotes, generalization, dithyramb, soliloquy, analogy, metaphor, or mini-essay.

The genetic and literary style that characterizes the textists' approach to Nietzsche's texts—and which has emerged as a new trend in the German context in the last two decades—requires a fundamental understanding of the critical editions of Nietzsche's manuscripts compiled by Colli/Montinari. This is due to the fact that critical editions of KGW/B, KSA/B, and eKGWB are helpful in providing a responsible historical and literary landscape for Nietzsche's generally fragmentary and provocative texts. As such, critical editions are the fundamental working tool that researchers require to reconstruct Nietzsche's subject matter genetically and literarily.

The aphorism 36 of BGE presented here becomes a case study of how the hypothesis of the will to power is reconstructed to demonstrate how the textists work in greater detail. While contentists see the aphorism as proof that Nietzsche is offering some kind of essence of reality, whether metaphysical, naturalistic, or psychological, textists dismiss such speculations. There is no textually sufficient evidence in the aphorism that "Nietzsche" is promoting the doctrine of will to power, according to textists. On the contrary, Nietzsche, as the author of the aphorism 36 of BGE, demonstrates irony, parody, and satire of the Schopenhauerian theory of the will as well as moralistic claims in a scientific

methodical explanation through the principle of the will to power. Furthermore, the discussion of the will to power in this aphorism is framed in an unreal situation through the use of suppositional language, which conditions the will to power hypothesis to be unreal as well.

Textists, as opposed to contentists, tend to reconstruct Nietzsche's texts historically and genetically. Nonetheless, the textists rekindle fruitful debates about the so-called "philosophy of Nietzsche," including for readers and researchers involved in the development of Indonesia's philosophical ecosystem.

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