

The Role of Civil Society Organizations in The Formulation of Presidential Regulation Number 7/2021 on Eradicating Extremism and Terrorism in Indonesia (Case of the Wahid Foundation, the C-SAVE, and the Inklusif Foundation)

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ABSTRACT

In January 2021, President Joko Widodo signed the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism (Presidential Regulation Number 7/2021). The increasing threats of violent extremism and terrorism make ratification of this policy urgent. The policy seeks to coordinate government and stakeholders against terrorism in Indonesia. The policy formulation demonstrates the resolve to engage the entire government and society. One of them is the roles of civil society organizations (CSOs). This study aims to describe the roles of the Wahid Foundation, C-SAVE, and Inklusif Foundation in formulating Presidential Regulation Number 7/2021. This qualitative study uses Arnstein's ladder participation as its conceptual framework. This study showed that the Wahid Foundation and the government are partners. In comparison, the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation contribute to

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the level of tokenism. The Inklusif Foundation is only in the consultation or deliberation phase. However, despite the three CSOs having distinct work foci and levels of involvement, they have all contributed to the impetus behind the promulgation of this policy.

Keywords: *Participation; Policy Formulation; Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Extremism*

Introduction

Civil society has become a crucial and increasingly important subject of concentration in modern development studies. The phrase 'civil society' has several meanings. According to Azis A. A (2016), scholars, social activists, and development professionals, civil society is a collection of various interest groups and social organizations that are strong enough to provide people with a certain amount of autonomy and protect them from states' authoritarian and

hegemonic tendencies. In contrast to markets and liberal states, civil society highlights the value of independent social life (Krieger, 2001). Citing Hegel's viewpoint, Blackburn (2008) views civil society as a social organization between the family and the state. One could counter that such generalizations about civic society lack specificity. The presented definitions demonstrate the lack of agreement among researchers on the theory and design of civil society.

In public policy theory, citizen involvement is an essential procedure that allows ordinary people to impact the government's choices. For a sizable amount of time, this practice has been a crucial component of the democratic decision-making process as a group that will be directly touched by the policies developed. According to Conyers (1994), the community should



be in charge of creating public policy since it has the most in-depth understanding of its own needs and conditions.

In Indonesia, the general public's participation in formulating policy is mandated under Law No. 12 of 2011's Article 96, subsection 1. To receive feedback from the community, a variety of techniques can be used, including public hearings, work visits, outreach seminars, and discussion workshops. Based on the terms of Law Nuber 12 of 2011, the term 'community' refers to people or collectives (civil society) with a vested interest in the subject matter of the proposed legislation under consideration. Civil society aspires to achieve autonomy by forming social and political groups, associations, or groupings, including social

and religious groups, non-governmental organizations, civil society groups, and group interests.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) play a significant role in some issues in Indonesia, for instance, in the fight against violent extremism. Sumpter (2017) explained that over the past five years, Indonesia has seen considerable improvements in the documentation and analysis of civil society organizations' efforts to reduce violent extremism. He classified CSO activity into three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary. According to Milla (2020), there are five key areas where CSOs are crucial in preventing the development of violent extremism. These are education, social media, deradicalization, policies, and other sectors (economy, sociocultural, and politics). Presidential Regulation Number



7 of 2021 (hereinafter referred to as the National Action Plan on Preventing Countering Violent Extremism - NAP on PCVE) has been developed to involve civil society organizations in the prevention of violent extremism. This policy's primary goal is to safeguard citizens' rights to security from the dangers of violent extremist ideas that lead to terrorist activities.

The NAP on PCVE was issued in 2017. The National Counterterrorism Agency (the BNPT), which promotes the 'whole government and society' approach, also emphasizes the importance of societal and governmental participation in developing this strategy. The BNPT collaborates with civil society organizations during the first three stages of the policymaking process. Although CSOs have only had a small influence over policymaking in Indonesia, it can be said

that the involvement of CSOs in the creation of Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 is a significant advancement. The involvement of CSOs demonstrates the government's commitment to openness and transparency concerning sensitive and private national security issues to the general public. In other words, the role of CSOs is immense in the creation of NAP on PCVE.

CSOs must participate per NAP on PCVE as imposed by the United Nations. Among the CSOs that were directly or indirectly involved in the design of the PCVE study, three CSOs played a critical role in the advocacy process related to the study. Various articles and interviews have conveyed this information. The Wahid Foundation's report (2021), titled *Strategi Luar-Dalam: Wahid Foundation dan Advokasi Kebijakan Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan*



di Indonesia, highlights the organization's crucial role in observing the advocacy of CSOs using three different strategies: public lobbying, the inside-out strategy, and indirect pressure. According to numerous pieces of literature and interviews, the three CSOs are actively and extensively involved in overseeing the advocacy of this policy,

The three CSOs (Wahid Foundation, C-SAVE, and Inkulsif Foundation) are involved in promoting the implementation of PCVE policies in Indonesia regarding institutional programs. In doing so, the CSOs carry out specific activities with their unique strategies to achieve distinctive impact and positioning in the NAP on the PCVE. The current study demonstrates a paucity of research on CSOs' input into policy creation, particularly concerning violent extremism in Indonesia. This article aims to fill this gap. following Hadi,

O.H. (2010), this study aims to determine the CSOs' challenges in carrying out their duties in light of organizational capability, character development, and the enabling environment (external variables). This focus enables the formulation of policy recommendations and gives a thorough understanding of the profile of civil society development and its crucial role in furthering democracy. The findings on the role of CSOs, agenda setting, and empowerment of CSOs in forming policies can help prevent and combat violent extremism. The primary focus of this study is the engagement of CSOs in formulating Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The development and implementation of the National Action Plan for Preventing and

Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism (the NAP on PCVE), as stipulated by Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 in Indonesia, involved a complex and multi-phase procedures, rather than an immediate execution. Agenda-setting has been recognized as a complex phenomenon. The process is critical and strategic in the public policy domain. The contested subject is the allocation of space to interpret public problems and priorities on the public agenda. The factors that impact the process include the development of a democratic system of governance, and the four critical aspects are the governmental system's disposition, the governance conduct, how self-rule is implemented, community involvement, and public participation (Wahab, 2015; Kimber, 1974).

In the agenda-setting stage, various actors are involved. According to Anderson in Winarno (2012), the policy formulation process involves official and unofficial actors. Therefore, the BNPT and The Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam) are involved in this scenario. Currently, the non-state actors, specifically Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), are not viewed as a threat to the state's power.

CSOs do not aim to gain political positions that resemble political parties (Beitinger-Lee, 2009). According to Medizabal (2006), CSOs' functions are representation, advocacy, technical input, capacity building, services, and social functions. CSOs exert their influence on public policy at various levels of governance, both national and local. CSOs and individuals



can express and communicate advocacy issues to policymakers and build dialogic relationships with the government.

The ladder of citizen participation shows the levels of participation and can be a useful tool in the context of

this discussion. This research employs a revised rendition of Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation as a theoretical framework.

Arnstein's conceptual framework outlines three tiers of involvement: the absence




Figure 1. A Ladder Citizen Participation by Sherry Arnstein (1969)





of participation, symbolic representation, and active citizen empowerment. The three categories encompass eight levels, as follows:

- a. The non-participation classification has two tiers: manipulation and therapy. The aim of this level is not to enable the engagement of communities in either the planning or execution stages but to present a chance for individuals in authoritative positions to disseminate knowledge and information to the broader populace.
- b. The tokenism category has three tiers: informing, consulting, and placation. The unidirectional flow of information at the informative level constrains citizens' capacity to influence decision-making. In addition, the consultation is limited to a specific cohort of individuals

formally invited to offer their perspectives. The wider populace's perspectives may not be adequately taken into account. At the placation stage, individuals are allowed to counsel, but the final power to make decisions still lies in the hands of stakeholders rather than the general public.

- c. The classification of citizen power has three tiers: partnership, delegation, and citizen control. At the partnership level, a cooperative endeavor is undertaken by the public and the government to fulfill obligations by creating policy councils, planning committees, and conflict resolution mechanisms. This stage involves a joint endeavor between the governing authorities and the populace to develop policies. Citizens are



dominant in decision-making for specific plans or programs at the delegation level. They are afforded increased agency in developing preliminary policies. At the citizen control, which is the highest level, individuals may execute decisions on specific plans or programs that the government has authorized. According to Arnstein's viewpoint, this level is rare but achievable. The government can facilitate this by adopting geographical or institutional improvements, such as allocating power to institutions in specific policy areas.

METHODS

This study employs a qualitative methodology with a political approach, with data collected through interviews. The

stages are determining research strategy and techniques, subjects to be researched, data collection instruments (interview and interview questions), and data analysis. The research framework helps focus the study area and answer all research questions and objectives. This model is adapted from Carpentier (2016) by changing the research setting.

Overviews of Wahid Foundation, C-Save, and Inklusif Foundation

The Wahid Foundation, established in 2004, emerged from an aspiration to institutionalize the humanitarian ideals and perspectives of Abdurrahman Wahid, a former president of Indonesia. This occurred during the aftermath of the Bali Bombings and the 9/11 attacks in the United States. During its establishment, the Wahid Foundation did not engage




Figure 2. An analytical model for the study of the CSOs' participatory process in the political approach.



in policy-related matters. Instead, it focused on providing alternative perspectives and counteracting the emergence of religious-based extremism in Indonesia. Taqwa, a Research and Advocacy Officer at the Wahid Foundation (2022), explained that the organization has focused on various initiatives, including alternatives and counter-narratives, research, surveys, and policy advocacy. One of the organization's primary programs since 2017 has been formulating and implementing the NAP on PCVE.

The Inklusif Foundation is an organization established by activists who advocate for freedom of religion and belief. The organization's primary focus is promoting diversity and researching the state of freedom of religion and belief in Indonesia. Compared to the C-SAVE and the Wahid Foundation, the Inklusif Foundation is the most recently established

organization. However, it frequently participates in formal and informal discussions with other CSOs regarding the NAP on PCVE. Ferdhi, Program Manager of the Inklusif Foundation (2022), emphasized that the Inklusif Foundation has committed to participating in diverse public hearings with the government. However, he restricted the involvement of the institution because it did not accord with the program's priority. According to Ferdhi (2022), the organization's objective is solely to promote the government's efforts in facilitating the optimal participation of civil society in implementing the NAP on PCVE. The balance of partnership initiatives can be achieved by ensuring the participation of civil society in the NAP on PCVE.

The C-SAVE, or Civil Society Against Violent Extremism, was established in 2016. The primary objective of this organization is

to foster concordance, promote enterprise, and conduct research to avert severe violence in the community. Additionally, the organization endeavors to assist governmental efforts, execute rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives, and formulate constructive and alternative discourses to promote peaceful coexistence. Masruroh, the Program Manager for the C-SAVE (2022), stated that the institution advocates for the active engagement of CSOs in diverse policies about terrorism, such as Law No. 5 of 2018 on terrorism, as well as government regulations associated with terrorism, such as the NAP on PCVE. Thus far, the C-SAVE has provided aid to the government in shaping counterterrorism policy and facilitating numerous training sessions, discussions, and dialogues.

Findings and Discussion

The Role of the C-SAVE, the Wahid Foundation, and the Inklusif Foundation in the Formulation of Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021

The phrase 'violent extremism' and its related terms, such as 'preventing' and 'countering extremism,' have become commonplace in the discussions between civil society organizations and the government in Indonesia. Despite variations in terminology usage, multiple interest groups and stakeholders concur that violent extremism is a serious concern. The term post-9/11 terrorism remains relevant within the context of Indonesia. Since its reform, Indonesia has encountered terrorist actions perpetrated by extremist groups



with jihadist ideologies. The occurrence of bombings at religious establishments, hotels in Jakarta, and other regions, including the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, highlights the significance of acknowledging the local context of extremism amid their global implications. In the past decade, terrorist actions by individuals, which may also involve the participation of women and children, have been on the rise.

In this context, the prevention and management of violent extremism cannot solely rely on formal and institutional mechanisms. Implementing these endeavors necessitates a multidisciplinary approach that entails the participation of community stakeholders. Hence, the participation of CSOs is salient. In Indonesia, the responsibility for countermeasures has been assumed by the state, while

CSOs have taken a more proactive role in prevention efforts. This is achieved through the implementation of programs aligned with the priorities of each organization and partnerships with ministries and government agencies. BNPT (2018) shows that nearly 40 CSOs have been actively engaged, either directly or indirectly, in preventing violent extremism in Indonesia until 2018.

The impetus for enhancing the participation of CSOs in Indonesia stemmed from the predominant use of a 'hard' approach, commonly referred to as the 'war on terror,' for addressing terrorism. This approach was influenced by the worldwide campaign against terrorism, as exemplified by several foreign policies of the United States. The UN Security Council resolution on 'a world against violence and violent extremism' introduces a novel



approach that advocates for using terms and approaches to prevent and counter violent extremism (PCVE). This efficacy of the prevention posits that prioritizing a persuasive approach and emphasizing prevention prior to the occurrence of acts of terror is more effective, which can be achieved by encouraging the participation of non-state actors.

The participation of CSOs in community policy in addressing violent extremism is as essential as other policy communities, which consist of government agencies, pressure groups, media people, and individuals, including academics interested in influencing a particular policy area. (Pross, 1995). This collaboration is also essential in initiating policy formulation that balances the government's interests and the community's

needs. CSOs can disseminate information that can impact the actions and decisions of government officials.

The preparation of the NAP on PCVE that leads to terrorism acknowledges the substantial role of CSOs. This involvement is structured in a hierarchical continuum. The Wahid Foundation, the C-SAVE, and the Inklusif Foundation utilized diverse advocacy mediums to oversee the policymaking. One of them is in the research report: *Strategi Luar-Dalam, Wahid Foundation dan Advokasi Kebijakan Pencegahan Ekstrimisme Kekerasan di Indonesia* (2021), which explains the NAP on PCVE advocacy activities by CSOs and media (M. Djafar and Taqwa, 2019; Kompas.com, 2020; Okezone.com, 2020). Regarding policy, the C-SAVE has also produced a policy paper on the involvement



of CSOs in addressing terrorism. This study suggests that CSOs can stipulated in the revision of the terrorism law (Malik, no date).

The three CSOs exhibit distinct characteristics and functions based on their respective areas of engagement and efforts in formulating the NAP on PCVE. Nevertheless, their works intersect with each other. The collaborative efforts among the CSOs, as evidenced by the three CSOs under investigation, facilitate the establishment of a pliable partnership that is integrated and adjustable in a sequence of policy advocacy.

Challenges

One of the challenges in implementing prevention and response measures to violence-based extremism is the perceived inadequacy of the government's efforts to foster partnerships with civil society. In this context, there is an imbalance between

the government and the CSOs due to the power dynamics. The government holds a position of authority, while CSOs are relegated to a secondary role in the policy formulation process. Masruroh, a program manager of the C-SAVE Foundation (2022), asserts that one of the challenges is the government's apprehension regarding the disclosure of sensitive matters about state security. According to Masruroh (2022), the Indonesian government must reassess its approach toward involving CSOs in counterterrorism efforts and developing comprehensive and effective strategies. The role of CSOs in counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia is crucial, given the CSOs' wide range in addressing specific areas of concern. For instance, the Wahid Foundation has developed advocacy



strategies to proactively address terrorism, particularly concerning Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021.

The Wahid Foundation has initiated a program named Prioritas-Go, formulated with a long-term perspective and endeavors, which one of the focuses is to incentivize the government in promulgating regulations and policies preventing terrorism. These measures aim to advance the NAP on PCVE from conceptualization to execution. Tawqa, the Research and Advocacy Officer of the Wahid Foundation (2022), believes that the program provides a more comprehensive approach. The Wahid Foundation's involvement in the policy formulation process has influenced the substance of the NAP on PCVE and its advocacy efforts. This includes engaging in lobbying activities

with other governmental entities, resulting in the status of NAP on PCVE rising to a presidential regulation.

The diverse range of activities undertaken by the Wahid Foundation underscores the organization's noteworthy contribution towards promoting advocacy for the NAP on PCVE. The Wahid Foundation is engaged in advocating for the dissemination of the NAP on PCVE for five reasons. *First*, this policy is more proactive than punitive measures. *Second*, The policy proposal PCVE is a secondary measure that underscores various governmental departments' degree of intervention and tactics. *Thirdly*, it offers an opportunity for the participation of civil society. *Fourth*, the point pertains to the NAP on PCVE, which aligns with global instruments by specifically targeting violent extremism. *Fifth*, the involvement of the Wahid



Foundation in the preparation process, as expressed by the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), indicates a prospect to propose ideas and solutions drawing from the foundation's extensive studies and experiences.

The Wahid Foundation further enhances its assistance for the NAP on PCVE through different means, for example, by adopting a unique strategy towards religious institutions such as NU, PGI, MATAKIN, MLKI, and Ahmadiyah to endorse the NAP on PCVE. Additionally, the organization conducts online and offline campaigns, organizes discussions with policy experts, and releases publications that have been reviewed by academics. The Wahid Foundation also advocates for formulating the NAP on PCVE globally. One of the advocations was that the Wahid Foundations' researchers have contributed

to the literature on the NAP on PCVE advocacy in Indonesia. This written work was published by the Hedayah in 2021, which is a globally recognized think tank that focuses on preventing and addressing violent extremism. Besides, the representative of the BNPT and the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam) stated that the Wahid Foundation's contribution has been instrumental in supporting the government's efforts in formulating regulations. Andhika Chrisnayudhanto and Alfrida Heanthy assert that the Wahid Foundation played a pivotal role during its inception by serving as an intermediary between the government's objectives and the civil society's concerns in initiatives aimed at averting and managing instances of violent extremism. Pribadi Setiono



shared a comparable perspective, emphasizing the significance of this collaboration between the government and civil society.

Comparing the roles of the three CSOs

Drawing upon Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation, it can be inferred that the C-SAVE and Wahid Foundation have attained citizen control owing to their active and extensive engagement in formulating the NAP on PCVE. The engagement includes the operationalization of the NAP on PCVE through the establishment of a thematic working group after the ratification of the NAP on PCVE, which accommodates the participation of the CSOs. The role above has surpassed the delegated authority phase, allowing the CSOs to be involved in programmatic strategies for executing the NAP on PCVE without any governmental

interference, specifically from BNPT. It is indicated that the C-SAVE has attained the placation phase. At this juncture, their duty entails providing counsel on formulating policy drafts. By contrast, the Wahid Foundation has taken a collaborative role, with the government to assume accountability via partnership, planning committees, and mechanisms aimed at preventing terrorist actions.

The Wahid Foundation and the government collaborate to develop policies and promote the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam) as the primary coordinating entity responsible for political and security matters. Other collaborative efforts between the government and the Wahid Foundation include convening meetings, engaging subject matter experts to aid in developing and refining this



policy draft, facilitating dialogues with civil society organizations to incorporate feedback, and ultimately, ratifying and executing the NAP on PCVE. The Wahid Foundation also facilitates an inclusive platform for the CSOs to express their dissenting views on ratifying the NAP on PCVE to BNPT. The forum promotes public transparency and enables the participation of CSOs that are not engaged in advocacy.

The Wahid Foundation achieved and used delegated power by engaging in lobbying and coordination with the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security, Mahfud MD, to expedite the ratification of the NAP on PCVE. This lobbying effort was conducted autonomously by an independent institution, without the involvement or instigation of the BNPT.

In contrast, the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation are involved in the tokenism stage. This indicates that despite having distinct levels of engagement, both institutions frequently offer advice and recommendations to the government during the development of the NAP on PCVE. At this juncture, the C-SAVE assumes a placation role, as it offers counsel to the government concerning the subject matter, as evidenced by its participation in select meetings and membership. Meanwhile, the Inklusif Foundation is in the preliminary phase of consultation or deliberation, as per the outcomes of the interviews. This phase is extended to select residents or institutions invited to provide their viewpoints. Nonetheless, there is no assurance that the viewpoints of the public are taken into account at this stage. The Inklusif Foundation's role limitations are



primarily shaped by institutional priorities and resources, which do not prioritize the NAP on PCVE. Nonetheless, through the

engagement facilitated by the C-SAVE, the Inklusif Foundation and the creation of opportunities,

A Ladder Participation of the C-SAVE, the Wahid Foundation, and the Inklusif Foundation on formulating the NAP on PCVE




Figure 3. Ladder Participation of the C-SAVE, the Wahid Foundation, and the Inklusif Foundation in Formulating the NAP on PCVE



advocating dialogues with the government in anticipation of the NAP on PCVE's draft. Despite variations in their respective areas of emphasis and degrees of engagement, the three civil society organizations have collectively played a role in driving the promulgation of the policy, albeit in various degrees.

Challenges from the Presidential Regulations

The NAP on PCVE is a comprehensive interpretation of the Law on Terrorism Number 5 of 2018, is inherently accompanied by but it has advantages and disadvantages. Likewise, this policy has also been subject to criticism. The critiques can be categorized into three. Initially, the concerns pertain to the potential for community engagement initiatives, such as community policing programs, to generate discriminatory practices, social unrest, and even

hostilities. The advantages and disadvantages of implementing the NAP on PCVE have been disseminated through media outlets, with particular emphasis on the efficiency of this measure in a broader societal context. Some apprehensions relate to the lack of a clear definition of extremism, which leads to suspicion towards certain groups. There is also a highlight that the policy fails to incorporate a gender perspective.

The advantages and disadvantages associated with the formulation and endorsement of the NAP on PCVE reflect the public's reactions and demonstrate how the engagement of the CSOs in the NAP on PCVE evolves following the CSOs' priorities, apprehensions, and advocacy approaches. Therefore, this function has the potential to expand across tiers and levels of

engagement, ensuring that CSOs are consistently involved in policy development with their respective roles and perspectives.

We conclude that the procedure is suitable for the bureaucratic system of Indonesia, which is unprepared to collaborate with civil society organizations in devising national security policies, such as the NAP on PCVE. The efficacy of CSOs' involvement in policy formulation can be enhanced by implementing an advocacy strategy that facilitates active collaboration between CSOs and the government from an internal perspective. However, specific individuals must serve as watchdogs, overseeing policies from an external standpoint through constructive criticism and alternative perspectives. In other words, the engagement of the CSOs should be accompanied by active oversight from external stakeholders.

The Role of Policy Advocacy

The formulation of public policy requires a minimum of five phases. Agenda setting refers to the initial phase of problem-solving, wherein issues that impact the public are identified for potential solutions. Policy formulation and decision-making processes involve government authorities selecting a specific course of action from various policy options after engaging in dialogues and discussions. Following this, the chosen policy is implemented and evaluated, with termination being a possible outcome. At this stage, the government will undertake a policy evaluation within a specified timeframe. Within the framework of Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021, not all CSOs are engaged in each stage.



The involvement of the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation pertained to specific programs, discussions, and dialogues that fell outside the purview of their respective institutions. The participation of individuals in this policymaking is a voluntary endeavor facilitated by the Wahid Foundation and the government through various organized activities. Through interviews and analysis of the agendas of the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation, it is evident that their work and research primarily focus on implementing the NAP on PCVE rather than its formulation. However, the C-SAVE initiative successfully catalyzed the East Java Provincial Government's formulation of a governor's regulation to mitigate violent extremism.

On the other hand, most of the Inklusif Foundation is only in activities organized by the Wahid Foundation and the

BNPT. On certain occasions, the Inklusif Foundation assisted in preparing the implementation report of presidential regulation number 7 of 2021 in the first year. However, these two institutions also participated in formulating presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021. Meanwhile, based on various publications related to the preparation of the NAP on PCVE, the Wahid Foundation was involved in framing the issue to accelerate the issuance of the NAP on PCVE. One of the framings of the issue is to publish research results related to violent extremism that leads to terrorism, which urged the government to ratify the NAP on PCVE.

From a technical standpoint, examining the Wahid Foundation's involvement reveals that it has played a significant role in various stages of policy formulation. In the initial phase, the Wahid Foundation undertook

measures to enhance and guarantee the participation of civil society in the formulation of the draught policy document. In order to execute the plan, the Wahid Foundation convened a meeting with Suhardi Alius, the Head of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), on 28 October 2017. The outcome of the meeting was BNPT's acceptance and endorsement of the proposed collaboration plan with the Wahid Foundation, aimed at jointly formulating the NAP on PCVE. The meeting was reconvened on 29 November 2017 to provide further updates and progress on the previous collaborative endeavor. The workshop on 5-6 December 2017 was organized by the Wahid Foundation and the BNPT. In order to enhance backing from various ministries and agencies, the Wahid Foundation proactively organized a meeting with the Coordinating Ministry

for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam) to communicate the advancements and significance of ratifying the regulation. The hearing discussion on 16 January 2020 sought the participation of the BNPT and direct assistance from Mahfud MD as the Minister of the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. Hence, the regulation gained approval from the relevant ministries and institutions. This illustrates the significance of the Wahid Foundation's role in expediting the drafting and ratification of the NAP on PCVE.

From 2020 to 2021, the Wahid Foundation actively participated in multiple follow-up meetings alongside the BNPT and civil society. These meetings served as a platform for disseminating information about the NAP on PCVE to the broader community through engaging in various discussions and seminars. The



Wahid Foundation additionally supports the development of various strategic documents aimed at aiding ministries and agencies in effectively implementing the NAP on PCVE at the regional level.

These processes demonstrate that a systematic, programmatic, and structured approach characterizes the role of the Wahid Foundation in policy advocacy. The organization has actively engaged in academic endeavors related to the PCVE from 2017 to 2021. This involvement includes publishing approximately 20 books and articles on the subject nationally and internationally. Additionally, they have participated in over 40 lobbying and coordination meetings with government officials and religious and non-religious community organizations. Furthermore, they have organized and participated in more than 30 seminars,

dialogues, and discussions aimed at promoting the ratification of the NAP on PCVE in public spaces. Notably, they have contributed significantly to the drafting process as a member of the drafting teams responsible for compiling the prevention pillars. The approach employed by the Wahid Foundation, known as the 'from the outside and within' advocacy approach, delineates a robust and long-lasting partnership that actively pursues its objectives. This approach distinguishes itself from the advocacy strategies implemented by other CSOs. The involvement of the Wahid Foundation in the drafting process and engagement in joint activities has established its position as a critical partner of the government in implementing policies. In contrast, the inside-out strategy endeavors to implement an advocacy mechanism wherein the Wahid Foundation

assists the government and fosters a coalition of CSOs while expanding networks and conducting public campaigns.

Challenges in Policy Advocacy

There is limited engagement




Figure 4. The Wahid Foundation advocacy milestone (Dja'far, 2021)

With the various activities to assist the government, the Wahid Foundation thus conducts advocacy that revolves around three main aspects: lobbying and coordination, inside-out advocacy, and indirect pressure through various media both within and outside the networks.

from the CSOs in advocating for the NAP on PCVE in the context of policy advocacy. The findings of this study, based on data provided by the BNPT, indicate that while there are approximately 40 organizations expressing concerns regarding violence-based extremism, only a maximum of ten have actively engaged in advocacy efforts since the inception of this issue. In addition to the selection of organizational objectives,



the limited participation of the CSOs in policy advocacy is likely influenced by the requisite competencies and skills in advocacy aligned with the chosen policy cycle. In addition to financial resources, effective policy advocacy necessitates acquiring lobbying expertise, establishing networks with government stakeholders, engaging in legal proceedings, undertaking research endeavors, and actively participating in media platforms. The Maarif Institute and the Indika Foundation are two organizations that exemplify this scenario, as they prioritize educational efforts aimed at preventing violent extremism rather than engaging in policy advocacy. The C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation also encountered these challenges. For example, the C-SAVE initiative lacked a dedicated program addressing the institution's initial policy development phase.

Many of the organization's resources were allocated to an alternative advocacy initiative. The C-SAVE advocacy has significantly modified existing counterterrorism legislation, particularly in redefining the concept of terrorism and reevaluating the responsibilities of the BNPT. The C-SAVE, through its networks, presented a proposed definition of terrorism.

In addition to the challenges mentioned above, the formulation of Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021 was responded to with apprehensions regarding the efficacy of post-approval implementation. According to Syauqillah, the Head of the Terrorism Study Programme at the University of Indonesia and leader of the Indonesia Ulema Council's Committee for Countering Extremism and Terrorism, a major obstacle during the policy formulation process was the apprehension

expressed by the public regarding the budget allocation. The development and approval of policies directly impact the state's financial requirements regarding their implementation in practice. Syauqillah referenced various policies that encountered obstacles in their implementation due to budgetary constraints without explicitly specifying the nature of these policies. The hindered implementation was primarily due to the program's absence from the government's national priority program.

Among the CSOs examined in this study, the Wahid Foundation emerged as the most prominent in its role within power dynamics. This prominence can be attributed to several factors. The NAP on PCVE advocacy, implemented by the Wahid Foundation, is an officially mandated initiative incorporated into the organization's activity plan and receives

adequate financial backing. The condition facilitated the Wahid Foundation's advocacy work sustainably. Furthermore, the Wahid Foundation has implemented additional initiatives to promote the advancement of regulatory advocacy performance. Consequently, the NAP on PCVE has emerged as a focal point in its ongoing initiatives. Simultaneously, the aforementioned ministries are engaged in the NAP's ongoing formulation process on PCVE. One of the programs offered by the Wahid Foundation is the Peace Village and Peace School, which entails collaboration with the Ministry of Villages and the Ministry of Women and Children's Empowerment. These programs enable the Wahid Foundation to facilitate the introduction and promotion of support for formulating the NAP on PCVE. These endeavors are primarily directed toward engaging with



governmental bodies, including ministries and agencies, and influencing policies. Additionally, the organization collaborates with civil society organizations, educational institutions such as universities, diverse media outlets, the private sector, and religious organizations.

Besides, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs significantly resolves bureaucratic impasses among various ministries and agencies. Consequently, it emerges as the predominant locus of power dynamics concerning the BNPT. The BNPT, the primary sector responsible for drafting the NAP on PCVE, must acknowledge the significant role played by the coordinating ministry. Revising and expediting improvements to the regulation can be effectively pursued without major hindrances until it is approved by the president, owing to

the initiation by the Kemenko Polhukam. Unfortunately, this study could not obtain interview data from a representative from the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs.

Regarding the funding sources of the CSOs, the Wahid Foundation has successfully obtained financial support from the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice 2 (AIPJ2) project for five years, from 2017 to 2022. This funding aims to facilitate the organization's active promotion of policies that seek to reduce the prevalence of violent extremism in Indonesia. The Prio Go Programme was initiated by the Wahid Foundation, supported by the AIPJ 2, which aims to assist the government in the execution of the NAP on PCVE. Besides, support is evident from multiple countries, including the United Arab Emirates and the Ministry of Education and Culture.



Nevertheless, it is crucial to acknowledge that this assistance is not directly associated with the advocacy efforts of the NAP on PCVE.

In contrast to the Wahid Foundation, the Inklusif Foundation does not have a specific initiative to promote the NAP on PCVE. The Inklusif Foundation obtains financial assistance from the Asia Foundation and the International NGO Forum on Indonesia Development (INFID) to support its initiatives that fall beyond the purview of the NAP on PCVE. Likewise, the C-SAVE Foundation obtained financial support from Australia to develop Presidential Regulation Number 77 of 2019 concerning safeguarding personnel involved in the implementation of the NAP on PCVE. The primary focus of this policy is to emphasize the prevention of crimes associated with terrorism while ensuring the

safety of individuals involved in the investigative, prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional processes. The normative relationship between Presidential Regulation Number 77 of 2019 and the NAP on PCVE leads to the involvement of the C-SAVE in advocating for the NAP on PCVE. However, it is worth noting that the involvement of C-SAVE in advocating for the NAP on PCVE is lower than in advocating for Presidential Regulation number 77 of 2019 and the terrorism law.

In conclusion, the analysis reveals that not all three CSOs have a distinct agenda-setting component within their NAP on PCVE advocacy. As mentioned previously, the only CSO with agenda-setting is the Wahid Foundation. However, despite the absence of a formalized and methodical agenda-setting mechanism, the involvement of the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation has significantly



influenced the development of the NAP on PCVE. Within the framework of the Carpentier analysis model, power dynamics exist between the Wahid Foundation, the BNPT, and, to some extent, the Kemenko Polhukam. These power

Table 3. Comparison of three CSOs in agenda setting (policy advocacy)

The CSOs	The agenda-setting (Policy Advocacy)
The C-SAVE, The Inklusif Foundation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No specific allies are involved or purposeful in agenda-setting for legalizing the NAP on PCVE, especially in the context of specific programs, special activities, discussions, and dialogues that are not their institutions' agenda. 2. Their involvement in the policymaking process of the NAP on PCVE is a voluntary initiative as support to encourage the emergence of questions about the legitimacy of power in society. 3. Their work and research are driven more by the aspect implementation of the NAP on PCVE.
The Wahid Foundation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Published research results related to violent extremism that leads to terrorism (as framing issue); approximately 20 national and international publications of books and articles related to the NAP on PCVE during 2017-2021. 2. Around 40 lobbying and coordinating meetings with government and community organizations to support the government agenda in the context of ratifying the NAP on PCVE. 3. About 30 seminars, dialogues, and discussions for mainstreaming the ratification of the NAP on PCVE.

dynamics are characterized by a balance across domains and are upheld by considering the position of the institution, which differs according to its roles as a government entity and civil society organization. However, it should be noted that the power dynamics within the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation are not characterized by dominance.

Conclusion

Perspectives about the term 'violent extremism' and its different derivatives, as well as 'preventing and countering extremism,' vary. However, several interest groups concur that acts of violent extremism are an alarming concern. Preventing and controlling violent extremism cannot be accomplished solely through a formal and institutional process in the state arena. In Indonesia, CSOs are taking a more active role in preventative efforts,

either through implementing programs based on individual organizations' goals or through collaborations with ministries and government organizations. In order to prevent violent extremism, some CSOs must be involved in community policy that collaborates other stakeholders. This is important to bridge the gap in policy development by balancing the interests of the government and the community.

Based on Arnstein's Ladder Participation, the C-SAVE and Wahid Foundation are in the citizen control stage of the NAP on PCVE formulation. Their involvement goes beyond only advocating for CSOs, which includes helping to execute the NAP on PCVE through the thematic working group established after the NAP on PCVE was ratified. This level has also gone beyond the delegated authority stage, which allows CSOs to choose which program



plans to use for implementing the NAP on PCVE without requiring the government's involvement, especially the BNPT. The C-SAVE participated in the placement step of the policymaking process. The Wahid Foundation is in the partnership stage, in which the organization and the government collaborate to develop policies and carry out advocacy. As part of public transparency, the Wahid Foundation also created an open venue for CSOs, not engaged in lobbying but disagree with the ratification of the NAP on PCVE to voice their opinions to BNPT. Meanwhile, the Inklusif Foundation was at the consultation or deliberation stage, where only invited residents or institutions were allowed to voice their opinions. However, the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation's intense involvement contribute to the sustainability of the civil society's involvement in the discussion.

Although they have various areas of interest and levels of commitment, their contribution helped accelerate the creation of the policy.

Regarding agenda-setting (policy advocacy), only two of the three CSOs, namely the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation, have no agenda-setting in the NAP on PCVE advocacy specifically. Although they lacked an organized and systematic agenda-setting process, the C-SAVE and Inklusif Foundation's involvement continues to influence the ratification of the NAP on PCVE.

Securing financial resources becomes an obstacle encountered by the Wahid Foundation, the C-SAVE, and the Inklusif Foundation for their contribution to the formulation of the NAP on PCEV. The Wahid Foundation has been granted financial assistance from the Australia-Indonesia Partnership

Project for Justice 2 (AIPJ2) for a duration of five years, spanning from 2017 to 2022, specifically allocated for the Prio Go initiative. This program not only focuses on preparing the RAN PE but also includes campaigning for its implementation and providing support for the Wahid Foundation's other programs. Therefore, the allocation of funding to support the preparation of the the NAP on PCVE is limited. Meanwhile, the Inklusif Foundation obtains financial assistance from the Asia Foundation and the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID) to support its initiatives that are outside the scope of the NAP on PCVE. Therefore, the promotion of the NAP on PCVE is not the main concern of this organization. Lastly, the C-SAVE Foundation received financial support from Australia to draft Presidential Regulation Number

77 of 2019 concerning the security of personnel involved in implementing the NAP on PCVE. The normative relationship between Presidential Regulation Number 77 of 2019 and the NAP on PCVE led to the C-SAVE Foundation's involvement in the NAP on PCVE advocacy. However, the C-SAVE's level of involvement in advocating for the NAP on PCVE is lower than its involvement in advocating for Presidential Regulation Number 77 of 2019 and the Terrorism Law.

In conclusion, the results of this research showed that the involvement of the Wahid Foundation, the C-SAVE, and the Inklusif Foundation in the formulation of Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 is a significant advancement and is satisfactory. Even though the three CSOs have different agenda-setting components in the NAP on PCVE advocacy, they



have had a significant influence on the development of the NAP in PCVE. Within the framework of Carpentier's analytical model, power dynamics are apparent between the Wahid Foundation, BNPT, and, to a certain extent, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. These power dynamics are characterized by a balance in various domains and are enforced by considering the position of each institution, which varies due to their respective roles as government institutions and civil society organizations. However, it should be noted that the power dynamics in the C-SAVE and the Inklusif Foundation are not characterized by domination.





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