

# THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAM (SSN) IN SUDAGARAN VILLAGE, CENTRAL JAVA

Erwan Agus Purwanto

## ABSTRAK

*Krisis ekonomi yang melanda Indonesia sejak pertengahan tahun 1997 telah menimbulkan dampak yang serius terhadap berbagai aspek kehidupan masyarakat, baik ekonomi, sosial maupun politik. Akibat krisis tersebut menurut Biro Pusat Statistik ( BPS) lebih dari 13 juta pekerja menjadi pengangguran karena terkena PHK. Akan tetapi yang lebih mengawatirkan lagi, sejak krisis ekonomi melanda Indonesia jumlah penduduk miskin di Indonesia mengalami kenaikan secara drastis dari 'hanya' 27 juta pada tahun 1996 menjadi lebih dari 80 juta pada tahun 1998. Meningkatnya jumlah penduduk miskin tersebut kemudian menjadi pemicu munculnya berbagai problem sosial ekonomi yang lain yang lebih kompleks seperti anak putus sekolah, malnutrisi, berkembangnya penyakit infeksi dan lain-lain.*

*Untuk menyelamatkan bangsa Indonesia dari keterpurukan yang lebih parah (mencegah terjadinya the lost generation) maka Pemerintah Indonesia dengan bantuan IMF dan Bank Dunia kemudian meluncurkan program Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS) . Sayangnya, sebagaimana ditunjukkan dalam tulisan ini, implementasi program JPS ternyata belum berhasil mencapai tujuan yang diharapkan. Studi kasus yang diangkat dalam tulisan ini pada akhirnya juga semakin memperkuat berbagai temuan serupa yang telah dilakukan oleh para peneliti sebelumnya yang mengungkapkan bahwa kelemahan institusional yang ada pada pihak pelaksana, kurangnya informasi yang dimiliki oleh kelompok penerima, dan rendahnya dukungan masyarakat terhadap pelaksanaan program merupakan salah satu faktor penyebab kegagalan implementasi program JPS.*

**Kata Kunci:** Dampak Krismon, Program JPS.

## INTRODUCTION

With every boom, the apologists for capitalism claim that the tendency towards crisis that has plagued the capitalist system since its very beginning has finally been overcome. When the boom breaks, economists fall over one another to provide particularistic explanations of the

crash. The crisis of the early nineties was as a result of the incautious lending of the eighties. The crisis of the early eighties was as a result of excessive state spending in the late seventies. The crisis of the seventies was the result of the oil price hike and the inflationary financing of the Vietnam war...the crisis of the thirties was as a result of inappropriate

banking policies...Every crisis has a different cause, all of which boil down to human failure, none of which are attributed to the capitalist system itself. And yet the crisis has recurred periodically for the past two hundred years (Clarke 1994: pp1).

The above description can be found again when the economic crisis hit Asian countries in the mid of 1997. Experts say that the Asian crisis was caused by different conditions compared with that in Latin American countries, which was due to bad macro economic policies and foreign borrowing by their governments. Prior to the crisis, the macro economic "fundamentals" of Asian Countries looked fine. The countries in trouble had had low inflation rate budget surpluses or small deficits, and stable foreign reserves. They had been growing fast. East and South East Asia accounted for a quarter of the world output, but half of the world's growth over the 1990 and almost two-third of the world's capital spending. However, huge debts (high debt/equity) that have become special characteristics of Asian corporations since Asian government undertook radical financial deregulation played a main role in accelerating the crisis. The Asian governments' policy to remove or to loosen controls on companies and foreign borrowings, but without adequate bank supervision has violated one of the stable conditions of the Asian high-debt model. In turn, it led to set up a crisis (INFID 1999).

However, regardless of the causes of the crisis and whatever theoretical explanation that can be given to that incidence, the same effect always turn

out, that is, the severity of the livelihood of the population of the country, particularly the poor ones.

Among the Asian countries hit by the economic crisis, Indonesia was identified as the most severely hit by the crisis. As the 1998 annual World Bank (1998) observed:

Indonesia is in deep crisis. A country that achieved decades of rapid growth, stability, and poverty reduction, is now near economic collapse...No country in recent history, let alone one the size of Indonesia, has ever suffered such a dramatic reversal of fortune.

What has made Indonesia in such a condition as described by the World Bank above? The combination of external and internal factors is the answer to the question. The contagion effect of the free fall of the Thai Bath combined with the internal factors such external debt and capital mobility, poor macroeconomic management, poor financial regulation, the KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism), among others, have to be blamed as the causes of the crisis (Hill, 1999).

Immediate effects of the crisis were macro economic indicators. Currency depreciation, from Rp 2,682 to the US\$ in August to the lowest ever level almost Rp 15,000/US \$ 1, has caused continuing capital flight especially from the private sector, banking rush and the deterioration of capital markets. In December 1997 the inflation rate started to rise. In 1998, the inflation rate reached 77%, the highest inflation level during the *Orde*

*Baru.* Another economic indicator, such as the economic growth for the whole year was -14%, doubled than that of Malaysia and Thailand. This was due to the decrease in government revenue, especially from export of non-oil sectors (INFID 1999; Hill 1999).

As a consequence of the above indicators, hundreds of companies' (particularly those which had debts in US \$ went bankrupt). Millions of people (BPS estimated around 13.8 million) lost their jobs, and at the same time, the price of basic necessities rose dramatically during 1998 due to scarcity of imported goods. Therefore, the increasing disparity between income on one hand and the price of basic necessities on the other, has weakened the purchasing power parity of the people towards their household needs such as food, clothing, housing, education, health, among others. Another impact of the crisis, is that the total number of poor people have risen to more than 80 millions in 1998 as compared to "only" 27 millions in 1996.

The Government of Indonesia (GOI), with the support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), has done all efforts to prevent the economic crisis go deeper by intervening in the market through sets of policy packages. One of those policy packages, besides restructuring of the financial sector and structural reform, is the implementation of the Social Safety Net (SSN) program. This program is aimed to overcome the impact of the economic crisis, particularly the most vulnerable

groups of the society, by providing them basic needs (goods and services) i.e. food, health service, education.

Unfortunately, the good will of the GOI is not always meeting the objectives as determined before. The results of monitoring and rapid assessments of the implementation of SSN program, which have been conducted by the Non Government Organizations (NGOs) and other research institutions, show that there are a lot of deviations in the implementation of SSN program. For example, INFID, in its briefing paper for the annual lobby 1999, reports several evidences of the deviation of the implementation of SSN program as follows:

Golkar party was indicated to have misused the SSN program in the form of PDM-DKE fund, a part of the Employment Creation Program, to be implemented by Bappenas and the Farming Credit (KUT)<sup>1</sup> fund. The domination of the Indonesian bureaucracy by members of Golkar Party, from the president, ministers down to village heads, gave rise to a claim in different levels of the bureaucracy on government programs and funds as being owned by Golkar. Besides Golkar party, PDR<sup>2</sup> party, where the Minister of Cooperatives was one of the initiators, was also indicated to have misused KUT funds. The Urban Poor Consortium (one of the NGOs in

<sup>1</sup> KUT (Kredit Usaha tani)

<sup>2</sup> PDR (Partai Daulat Rakyat)

Indonesia) found out that PDR misused the KUT fund in 12 various regions in Indonesia such as in Ponorogo, Malang, Jombang (East Java), Yogyakarta, Klaten (Central Java), and several districts in South Sulawesi...the SSN program has failed to reach its rightful targets as a result of poor planning, corruption, poor design, poor implementation and poor monitoring (INFID 1999).

From a rapid assessment in 13 *kelurahan* or *desa* in 16 districts of 4 provinces SMERU also found some deviations in the implementation of PDM-DKE. Those deviations were:

- (1). The Project selection at village level was done by the Village Activity Implementation Teams (TPKd/k)<sup>3</sup> that generally consisted only of village officials; little input was solicited or received from poor communities in the village.
- (2). Projects selected usually did not directly target the poor: economic projects usually targeted established entrepreneurs, while infrastructure projects were not targeted to poor neighborhoods, and usually contained only a small amount of funds for unskilled labor input where they might participate (SMERU march-April 1999).

Those monitoring results also corroborate with other findings found by the society, which have been published widely in the (local or national) newspaper<sup>4</sup>. For example *Suara Merdeka* (April 12, 2000), reported that a school principal in Tegal District, Central Java, misused the JPS fund for *Program Makanan Tambahan Anak Sekolah* (PMTAS, Food Supplement for Student program) the amount of Rp. 6 millions to fund the wedding party of his daughter.

The survey conducted by Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistic also comes to the same conclusion that there were a lot of deviations in the implementation of SSN programs, especially during the fiscal year 1998/1999 (Monitoring dan Evaluasi oleh Tim Pengendali Jaring Pengaman Sosial 1999). Table-1 below shows that, from various SSN programs, due to poor socialization, only Cheap Food Stuffs or *Operasi Pasar Khusus* (OPK, Special Market Operation) are widely known by the poor community. The rest of the programs are only known by a limited number of the poor community, therefore, most of the poor community did not receive the benefit of the implementation of SSN in their villages.

<sup>3</sup> TPKd/k= Tim Pelaksana Kegiatan (JPS) tingkat desa/kecamatan

<sup>4</sup> To see only part of the news of the deviation of the implementation of SSN program please visit <http://www.jps.or.id/informasi> or <http://www.smeru.or.id>.

**Table 1. The effectiveness of the implementation of the SSN program based on information level concerning SSN and their benefits in particular for the poor**

Program	Information of SSN (%)	Benefit of SSN (%)
Basic education	0.78-14.01	1.26-17.30
Cheap food stuff	7.57-45.47	7.83-90.66
Free Medical Care	0.26-07.56	0.26-08.37
Pregnancy Care	2.10-03.49	0.69-0.70
Food Supplement for mothers	0.84-02.77	0.56-0.69
Food Supplement for Babies	2.09-05.46	0-2.23
Working Capital for Small- Scale	2.10-20.64	0.26-7.67
Labor Intensive Works	0.84-29.57	0.84-26.64

N=1200 households

Source: Central Agency of Statistic (BPS), Survey on the Implementation of Jaring Pengaman Sosial, February 1999.

The general picture of the implementation of SSN program at the national level as described above attracts me to conduct a case study to see a little bit deeper the implementation of the SSN program at the village level. This paper is intended to describe the implementation of SSN programs in Sudagaran village. Particular concern will be paid towards looking at some issues such as the sense of justness, conflict, ignorance, and social-jealousy among others as the impact of the implementation of the SSN program in that village.

## THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAM

As it is mentioned in the document of the program, the SSN program is intended to overcome the

impact of the economic crisis by giving protection to the most vulnerable groups in the society such as the poor people, unemployed, and other people who are identified by the *Pokmas*<sup>5</sup> as an illegible person (households) to receive the aids. Furthermore, the SSN program will be targeted into the *kelurahan* (urban village) or the *desa* (rural village), which are the most hit by the crisis as characterized by the following indicators: (1) has a number of poor people or household categorized as *Keluarga Pra Sejahtera*<sup>6</sup> (Pre welfare

<sup>5</sup> *Pokmas* is the abbreviation of *Kelompok Masyarakat* meaning Local Community Group. The *Pokmas* is the organization that has to take responsibility for the implementation of SSN at the village level.

<sup>6</sup> *The Keluarga Pra Sejahtera* are identified by the *Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional*, (BKKBN, the National Agency for Coordination of Family Planning) based on a standard set of

family or poor family); (2) has a number of unemployed people as victims of PHK (laid off); (3) has a number of households who are incapable of fulfilling their food consumption; (4) has a number of people suffering from malnutrition; (5) has a number of school age children vulnerable to drop out of school.

To realize the objectives of the program, the SSN is divided into four strategic programs, namely: (1) food security; (2) employment creation; (3) social protection; and (4) support for small and medium enterprise. To support those activities the GOI received a bailout package from the WB and the IMF with total amount 17.9 trillion rupiah<sup>7</sup> in the fiscal year 1998/1999. For the fiscal year 1999/2000, the WB and the IMF will provide the amount of US\$ 600m to fund the SSN program (Document of the World Bank Report No. P7307-IND 1999).

---

indicators such as quality of food, clothes, housing, using contraception, recreation etc.

<sup>7</sup> Different opinion is stated by the *Tim Pengendali Jaring Pengaman Sosial* (the Social Safety Net Controller Team) that is chaired by Marie Muhammad (former minister of finance during Suharto's Government) about the total amount of the budget for SSN program. They say that the total budget for 'core' SSN program has to be monitored by the *Tim Pengendali Jaring Pengaman Sosial* in the fiscal year 1998/1999 is only 9.3 trillion. The rest of the budget (8.6 trillion) actually is not a specific budget to fund the SSN program, but to fund the programs, which were launched by some departments (Department of Justice, Department of Tourism and Post, Supreme Court), to support the implementation of the SSN program. Those supporting programs are funded with routine budget but labeled as SSN program. Therefore in one occasion Gunawan Sumodiningrat, the deputy of the Bappenas for economic affairs, said that there was no SSN's fund leak amounting to 8 trillion but only "misallocation".

The food security program is designed to ensure the availability of basic food necessities for the poor people. This program is implemented by GOI through *Operasi Pasar Khusus (OPK, Special Market Operation)*. This operation is better known by recipients as the "Cheap Rice program". Through monthly *OPK*, the less well off households are eligible to buy 20 kg of rice priced at Rp 1000/Kg. The *Kepala Desa* (the village head), with the support of the *Perangkat Desa* (the village apparatus) and the neighborhood organizations (*RT and RW*), is the person responsible for the implementation of the *OPK* in his/her village. Every month the *Kepala Desa* gives a report and hands in the amount of money that he collected from the *OPK* to the *Petugas Lapangan Keluarga Berencana (PLKB, The Field Official of Family Planning)* and the *Kaur Bades* (the head of the Development Affairs in the *kecamatan*). Next, the *PLKB* and the *Kaur Bades* will hand over those reports to the *Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (BKKBN, the National Agency for Coordination of Family Planning)* at the *kabupaten*.

The employment creation program and small and medium size enterprise support are achieved through the implementation of the *Program Pemberdayaan Daerah dalam Mengatasi Dampak Krisis Ekonomi (PDM-DKE, Empowering Regions to Overcome the Impact of the Economic Crisis)*. The objectives of this program are to provide grant and revolving credit funds for the poor and unemployed groups in order to: (1)

improve social and economic infrastructure, while generating temporary employment; (2) finance income generating business. The intended recipients of this program are the rural and urban poor who have lost their jobs and sources of income, and who have insufficient income to meet their daily needs, especially food, education and health expenses (SMERU March-April 1999; Panduan PDM-DKE 1998/1999).

The PDM-DKE was planned by the Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (*Bappenas*, National Planning Body) and was started since mid-March 1998. This program covered all areas of Indonesia, allocating funds to nearly every *kelurahan* and *desa*. Funds allocated ranged from less than Rp. 10 million for a small or relatively wealthy village to over Rp. 1 billion for a large with a high number of registered poor and unemployed (SMERU March-April 1999). As mentioned in the PDM-DKE guideline, the funds that were allocated to each village should be spent into two kinds of activities: (1) the maintenance of social and economic infrastructure, (2) activities of economic development. The first activity is intended to provide job opportunities for the unemployed people by conducting the *program pada karya* (labor intensive program) i.e. maintaining irrigation canals and improving village roads. And the second activity is to provide cheap credit capital for small-scale economic activity in the targeted village (Panduan PDM-Dke 1998/1999).

The social protection program is aimed at maintaining the accessibility

of the poor people towards basic public services, especially health and education (Tim Pengendali JPS 1998). The SSN for health (*JPS-BK, Jaring Pengaman Sosial Bidang Kesehatan*) is realized by giving aid to the poor households to obtain free primary health services from *Puskesmas* and hospitals<sup>8</sup> as well. Besides that, to prevent the worsening incidence of malnutrition, the GOI also implements the program *Pemberian Makanan Tambahan* (the Food Supplement Program) to the children under the age of five, pregnant woman, and breastfeeding mothers. The *Puskesmas* doctor, together with the PLKB and the *Bidan Desa* (the village midwife) under the coordination of the Camat, is the most responsible person as the implementers of the SSN of health program in the *kecamatan* level. At the village level, the village head and the *kepala dusuns* (the hamlet heads) take the responsibility to distribute the *Kartu Sehat* (Health Card, an identity card to obtain free health Service) to the poor households in their villages. Meanwhile, the *Kader Sehat* (health volunteers) and the village midwife take the responsibility to distribute the *makanan tambahan* (food supplement) i.e. milk, eggs, dried fish or other foods to the target groups every month during the *Posyandu*<sup>9</sup> (Integrated

<sup>8</sup> In case one of the patients needs specific treatment, which cannot be given by *Puskesmas*, the recipients of JPS-BK also have an opportunity to obtain free health treatment in hospital including the transportation cost to go to hospital.

<sup>9</sup> *Posyandu* (Integrated Neighborhood Health Service) is conducted monthly by health volunteers in the neighborhood. Usually this activity is held in the house of the Ketua RT (neighborhood head) and led by the village midwife. The main activity of *Posyandu* is weighing the infants and the

Neighborhood Health Service) meeting.

The main objectives of the SSN for education, which was initiated since July 1998, are (1) to protect the drop out ratio of students coming from poor households and (2) to give the *dana bantuan operasional (DBO*, the operational fund aid) to the poor schools to maintain *kegiatan belajar-mengajar* (teaching activity). The first objective of the SSN for education or locally called *program Aku Anak Sekolah*<sup>10</sup> (I am a student program) is achieved by giving out scholarships to students from poor families (*KS, keluarga pra sejahtera*) who have been studying in elementary schools (SD/MI, SLTP/MTs)<sup>11</sup> and secondary school (SM/MA)<sup>12</sup>. After selection by their schools<sup>13</sup>, those students receive

---

children under the age of five to monitor their development. During this session, the infants and the children under the age of five are vaccinated and given food supplements. The mother of the infants and the children under the age of five also monitors their health conditions, mainly whether they already use contraceptives or not. If they do not use contraceptives yet, the PLKB will give suggestions to use it. Strong suggestions to use contraception will be given to the mother who already has more than 2 children. Besides, the village midwife and the PLKB, the wife of the hamlet head and the wife of the village head usually attend this occasion.

<sup>10</sup> The name of this program is picked up from Indonesia's most popular TV drama titled *Si Doel Anak Sekolah* (*Doel a student*), the story of Betawi's boy who successfully gained an engineering title from the University. The main star of this drama, Rano Karno, was appointed by the GOI and the UNICEF to socialize this program.

<sup>11</sup> SD is the abbreviation of Sekolah Dasar, MI= Madrasah Ibtidayah, SLPT= Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama, MTs = Madrasah Tsyanawiyah.

<sup>12</sup> SM = Sekolah Menengah, MA= Madrasah Aliyah.

<sup>13</sup> The school committee has the task to select eligible candidates to receive the scholarship. This committee consists of the school principal, the representative of the student's parents and, the

monthly scholarships amounting to Rp. 10,000, Rp 20,000, and Rp 25, 000 for students in SD, SLTP, and SM respectively. This scholarship is sent directly to the beneficiaries via post office (PT. Pos Indonesia).

## THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SSN PROGRAM IN SUDAGARAN VILLAGE

### 1. The General Impression

One day, at the beginning of May 1999, I met with *Pak Lurah* Sudagaran in his office. It was not my first meeting with him. But during that time it was my first time to have an opportunity to ask him something about the implementation of SSN in his village. Surprisingly, *Pak Lurah* seemed not quite interested with my question. He only said that he has delegated his authority to manage the implementation of the JPS program in his village to his staffs (the *perangkat desas* or the village apparatuses). Since he delegated all of his authority, he said that he knows nothing about the details of the implementation of the JPS program<sup>14</sup>. He only mentioned that the JPS program, which falls directly under his responsibility, consist of two kinds of activities, namely the PDM-DKE and the "*beras murah*" operation. For other programs (SSN for health and SSN for

---

representative from village office. Students who were eligible to receive the scholarship have to fulfill these requirements: (1) Students from poor families, (2) graduated students from SD/SLTP who cannot continue to SM/MA, (3) not a student from an expensive school.

<sup>14</sup> May be also because *Pak Lurah* was not actively in charge at that time. He had been struggling for his second term position when the SSN program was initiated.

education), his office only provides some help to the institutions that have been given the authority to implement those programs i.e. *Puskesmas* and *Sekolah Dasar*. His apparatus, in this case, only helps to distribute *Kartu Sehat*, provide the data Pra KS and KSI.

*Pak Lurah* told me that the PDM-DKE in Sudagaran was used to build the *kolam ikan* (fishpond) that is located nearby the village (the place is called *Setuman*).

"...but I have delegated everything about that program (the PDM-DKE) to *Pak Trisno*<sup>15</sup>, if *Mas* (brother) *Erwan* wants to know more about it please ask *Pak Trisno*. Also if *Mas Erwan* wants to know more details about the distribution of *beras murah*, please ask *Pak Kadus* (the hamlet head). I am sorry, I can not give you more information about JPS".

For the Javanese, the response of *Pak Lurah* above is "a sign" that he does not want to be bothered with more questions about that topic.

I can understand why *Pak Lurah* seemed reluctant to discuss about JPS program. It is because for *Pak Lurah* and the *Perangkat Desas* to implement the JPS program in the *era reformasi* (the reformation era) is not an enjoyable task. Different from the *Orde Baru era* (the New Order era)<sup>16</sup>, now, to carry out development programs, like JPS for instance, only

invites difficulties than benefits to the *Perangkat Desas*. Since the village community has become more critical, there is no more room for the *Perangkat Desas* to engineer the development projects for their own benefit. on one occasion, one *Perangkat Desa* complained to me about the changing situation:

"Nowadays, our community has become much more critical *Mas* (brother). Even if we only make small mistakes, they will challenge us by holding demonstrations, whereas we are only carrying out orders from above".

Later, I was informed that several people in Sudagaran village often threatened *Pak Lurah* to hold demonstrations due to their dissatisfaction with the implementation of the PDM-DKE program. The Only thing that saves *Pak Lurah* is that he is backed by a strong Muslim leader<sup>17</sup> in that village and also because of his reputation as a bad guy<sup>18</sup> during his good olden days, his challengers have to reconsider their actions against him.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibu Dullah* is well known as a kingmaker in Sudagaran village. She is a successful garment businesswoman and the leader of the *Pengajian* in Sudagaran village. It was *Ibu Dullah* who supported *Pak Lurah* to win the election for his second term. In the beginning of the campaign she actually supported her cousin to become *lurah*, but since she knows that her cousin has a different political affiliation with her, so only several weeks before election she suddenly change her mind to shift her support to the present *Lurah*.

<sup>18</sup> *Pak Lurah* comes from the rich family in Sudagaran village. His late brother, *Pak Jaya* is one of the richest garment bosses in Sudagaran. *Pak Lurah* is respected among the young generations in Sudagaran because he is good in building relationship with the youngsters. He plays gambling and enjoys to stay until late in the night chatting with people in Sudagaran in the neighborhood watch post in every corner of his village.

<sup>15</sup> *Pak Trisno* is the head of LKMD (The Resilience Institution of the Village Community) a kind of a representative institution at the village level.

<sup>16</sup> During the *Orde Baru*, the Development projects at the village level are the main economic resources (source of corruption) for the *perangkat desas*.

## 2. The PDM-DKE Program

It was interesting when I finally met with Pak Trisno as the in-charge of PDM-DKE's implementation. Pak Trisno is about 65 years old. He was a teacher, but after retiring he actively participates in various social activities including his current position as the head of LKMD. Some of my informants said that Pak Trisno was chosen as the head of LKMD because of his conduct. He is not only a public figure but also a teacher<sup>19</sup>, and also because he has a respectable family since three of his children graduated from well-known universities in Indonesia and now all of them have good jobs in Jakarta and Bandung. Although Pak Lurah told me that Pak Trisno is better informed on PDM-DKE compared to him, however, it seems that Pak Trisno is not any better. Even he looked nervous when I asked him about the PM-DKE. He started sweating while trying to find the documents of PDM-DKE<sup>20</sup> in his dairy book. Finally, he could not find the documents he was looking for, he only explained to me the general picture of the implementation of PDM-DKE in Sudagaran village. In the end, he told me that it is better to look for Mas Wardono, the village facilitator, if I want to know more about PDM-DKE in Sudagaran.

<sup>19</sup> Teachers are respected people in the village of Java. They are always chosen as a member of a committee that sets up for various objectives in the village community.

<sup>20</sup> PDM-DKE was a sensitive issue at that time. Although I told him that I am only a student, but he still thought that I am an NGO member who supervises the implementation of PDM-DKE.

Finally I got a lot of information about the implementation of PDM-DKE program from Mas Budi Wardayo<sup>21</sup>. From him I knew that Pak Trisno is only used as an official stamp in this project<sup>22</sup>. The main actors who make important decisions in this project are Pak Harto and Pak Khusnanto<sup>23</sup>. Mas Budi Wardono said that in the beginning the implementation of PDM-DKE was ignored by people in Sudagaran. This was because every body was busy with campaigns for village head elections at

<sup>21</sup> Budi Wardono is about 35 years old. He graduated from Gadjah Mada University, but because of some reasons he only stays at home to help his mother who now lives alone. He is also a son of the former village head of Sudagaran, the late Pak Munandar. Mas Wardono told me that at the beginning he rejected his appointment as a village facilitator in the LKMD meetings. He felt unhappy with the procedure of his appointment. He opines that, besides him, there are several others unemployed university graduates who are also eligible to become village facilitators. Moreover, the amount of his honoraria of Rp 750,000 for five months to serve as a village facilitator is not equal to the accusation from the community that he gets a lot of money from the project. But because of the pressure from Pak Trisno (the head of LKMD) and Pak Lurah (both of them are his distant relatives) finally gets his appointment.

<sup>22</sup> Mas Wardono complains a lot about Pak Trisno who is in charge as the head of the LKMD and the PDM-DKE program. According to Mas Wardono, Pak Trisno is too old as the head of LKMD. He should be replaced by younger people.

<sup>23</sup> Both of them are public figures in Sudagaran village. Pak Harto is a successful garment businessman. And he has a relationship with former head of Klaten district. He also used to serve as the chairman of the branch of trade chamber in Klaten district. Pak Khusnanto is a teacher at Senior High School (SMU) and social activist. He also has a wholesale shop (*toko serbu ada*) in Sudagaran which is run by his wife. Unfortunately I could not meet with those two persons during my fieldwork. Pak Harto was in trouble at that time since one of his shops in Klaten was robbed. And Pak Khusnanto was busy with his political activity during the general election campaign.

that time<sup>24</sup>. But after several meetings, the committee members of PDM-DKE finally agreed to use PDM-DKE fund to build a fishpond to raise fish. This decision was based on the consideration that Sudagaran has old spring water pool, which can be utilized more economically as fishponds than only for watering paddy fields.

From the documents given to me by Mas Wardono, it is mentioned that Sudagaran village received a total amount of Rp 18,702,000 to fund the PDM-DKE program, not including Rp 1,050,000 for *Biaya Operasional Desa/Kelurahan* (BOP, the Operational Cost for village office) and Rp 525,000 for the honoraria of the village facilitator. From the total amount of Rp 18,7 million, Rp 13,1 million was allocated to build village infrastructure and Rp 5,6 million was allocated to help small economic activities as initial capital (BPAPPD PDM-DKE Desa Sudagaran, 1998/1999). By using the PDM-DKE funds, the spring water pool in *Setuman* was renovated and became a fishpond with permanent walls. To conduct this activity, Rp 5 million was spent on labor to dig and enlarge the pond and, Rp 8.1 million was spent to renovate the pond (to buy materials and labor). Meanwhile, Rp 5.6 million, which was supposed to have been spent on economic productive activities, was diverted to buy fry (cat fish, *bawal* and, red *nila*).

<sup>24</sup> That is why Pak Lurah does not know more details about the program, because he is too busy with his campaign to win his second term position as a village head.

From the above tale, the bottom up process to choose and then implement the PDM-DKE program as idealized in the document of the program simply does not work at all. Mas Wardono also admitted these weaknesses.

"Only to tell you the truth, the implementation of this program (the PDM-DKE) did not involve the KS and Pra KS (poor family); community groups that were the main target of this program. For example we did not use labor intensive work (*padat karya*), but we preferred to hire professional labor that could work more quickly than amateur labors (Pra KS and KS I). Also the first opportunity to utilize the fishpond to raise fish was given to 10 members of the advisory board of the PDM-DKE committee (almost all of them are garment bosses), but with a duty to guide other 10 persons from Pra KS and KS one has to do the same activity. The reason is simply because they (the 10 members of the advisory board) will have the capability to pay back the PDM-DKE fund in case they failed to raise fish" (Field note).

Mas Wardono also revealed other deviations that he witnessed during the implementation of PDM-DKE. For instance, on one occasion he was asked by the *Kasi Bangdes* (the head of the Development Affairs in *kecamatan*) to give him some money when he had been working on administrative preparation to disburse

the PDM-DKE fund. But at that time he just ignored him because he believed that without his help the fund would be disbursed. But after that, the *Kasi Bangdes* successfully cheated him by asking some money to buy ten rolls of photo films, but later he only realized one roll, to make the documentation of the PDM-DKE activity in Sudagaran. Not only that, there were some other deviations that happened during the implementation of PDM-DKE in his village, including the misuse of the operational fund. But Pak Trisno always forbade him to play by the book to check every stage of the program implementation if he wanted to do so.

Due to the poor socialization of the program, therefore, only very few people in Sudagaran knew about PDM-DKE programs in their village. Some younger people, particularly from the southern part of the village, who know the program, complain about the unfairness of the implementation of PDM-DKE. On one occasion one of my respondent who has just been laid off from the *Pabrik Tembakau* (Tobacco Processing Fabric) in that village complained with a bit of anger to Pak Lurah like this:

“Why do only *orang utara*<sup>25</sup> (people from the north) benefit from the PDM-DKE program? We (*orang selatan*) get nothing although we are poorer compared to them. We have the same right to use that fund. Actually I want to hold a

demonstration against Pak Lurah with my friends, but my wife always discourages me to do so”.

In contrast to the youth, the older inhabitants though know more about the program, they just tend to ignore that problem. They think that the benefit that they will gain from PDM-DKE program is not as equal to the cost that they have to spend by conducting protests against Pak Lurah.

But after waiting for months in that village, I have never witnessed any demonstrations against Pak Lurah. Even one day I got an invitation from Mas Wardono to come and witness the first fish harvesting ceremony at the Setuman.. “Pak Bupati will also attend the ceremony because our program was chosen as “the best” PDM-DKE program in Klaten District<sup>26</sup>”, Mas Wardono gave me the information while delivering the invitation.

But the harvesting ceremony did not mark the beginning of the success story of the implementation of PDM-DKE in Sudagaran. Only witnessed by a small crowd, Pak Bupati was present for no more than five minutes in the fishpond to open the first fish harvesting ceremony. The result of the first harvesting was far from successful. From about 4,000 cat fish fry, which were raised in the pond, only half of them were harvested. Although the remaining fish in the pond can give quite good results, but still the *Pokmas* suffered a big financial loss. Therefore the *Pokmas* faced difficulties in continuing with

<sup>25</sup> *Orang utara* means people who live in the northern part of the village. They are mostly richer (garment bosses, clothes trader, civil servants etc.) compared with the people who live in the southern part of the village.

<sup>26</sup> Because of Pak Harto's lobbying therefore, Pak Bupati was willing to come to Sudagaran.

the program. Pak Lurah himself did nothing to settle that problem. Meanwhile Pak Harto tried to ask *Pak Bupati* if he could provide some funds to buy fry for the next season. But up to the present there is no certainty about it, so the fishpond is still unutilized until funds are secured to buy more fry.

### 3. The SSN for Health

The implementation of SSN for health in *Kecamatan Wedi* is under the responsibility of the Puskesmas Wedi. Since *Kecamatan Wedi* consists of 19 villages, therefore, the implementation of SSN for health in *Kecamatan Wedi* covers 19 villages, including Sudagaran. To provide free health service for 3,696 *Pra KS* (poor households), the Puskesmas Wedi is given a block grant fund by the Central Government amounting to Rp. 10,190,000 for every three months during the fiscal year 1998/1999<sup>27</sup>. This program commenced in October 1998. The funds are purposely meant to give three kinds of free health services to the poor families: (1) basic health service, (2) midwife services and, (3) nutrition improvement.

#### 3.1. Basic Health Services

The implementation of SSN program in Sudagaran was started by collecting the data of *Pra-KS* as target groups of the program. From the survey it was found out that there were around 128 *Pra-KS* families in Sudagaran (*Rekapitulasi Pendataan*

*Keluarga di Kecamatan Wedi 1998/1999*). This number is much higher compared to only 52 families before the crisis (1997/1998)<sup>28</sup>. But unfortunately, the quota of *Kartu Sehat* that was to be given to Sudagaran was only for 68 *Pra-KS*<sup>29</sup>, therefore the PLKB and Pak Kadus had to make the second round of selection to determine the most eligible families from the 128 families selected during the first round. After going through these steps, they can then determine the families that qualify to be granted the *Kartu Sehat*<sup>30</sup>. Although the judgment was based on the wisdom of Pak Kadus, but still the method is quite reliable<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> It was interesting when I clarified why the number of *Pra-KS* in Sudagaran increased so dramatic during 1998/1999. One doctor in one of the Puskesmas gave me an interesting clarification to this matter. He said that it is true the crisis is one important cause that has made the number of *Pra-Kas* to increase so sharply during 1998/1999, but besides that, the *budaya asal bapak senang* (ABS, just to make your boss happy) is also another important aspect to consider. During the *Orde Baru* (the New Order), the PLKB official tended to reduce the number of *Pra-KS* in the village under his responsibility (based on the percentage target that was determined) in order to make the data look good (the target was achieved). But now they are practicing the reverse. When the Central Government is willing to grant some funds to *Pra-KS* they tend to increase the number of *Pra-KS* in order to get more money from the Central Government.

<sup>29</sup> After the Central Government realized that there were a lot of *rekayasa data* (data engineering) at the village level in order to get more money from it, finally it made a decision that the number of *Pra-KS* in every village should be around 23% from the total families.

<sup>30</sup> There is no specific rule to select 68 out of 128 families that will be granted the *Kartu Sehat*. One Pak Kepala Dusun told me that he knows everybody in his hamlet. He knows who is rich and who is poor, so it is quite simple to determine who is more eligible to receive the *Kartu Sehat*.

<sup>31</sup> I had an opportunity to make two kinds of cross checking the data at *Pra-KS* that granted the *Kartu Sehat* above. First with my house hold survey data,

<sup>27</sup> There is no certainty from Jakarta whether this program will continue in the fiscal year 1999/2000 when I asked the head of the *Dinas Kesehatan* (the Health Service Division of Local Government) *Kabupaten Klaten*.

Families that were chosen as recipients of the program were mostly widows, widowers, and big families that have a lot of children (more than 2 children).

In my opinion, the problem of the implementation of SSN for health does not only deal with how to pick the targeted group fairly, but is much more complicated as a result of the impact of a combination of several factors such as (1) the ignorance of the *Perangkat Desas*, (2) the lack of information possessed by the beneficiaries due to poor socialization, (3) bureaucratic procedures that are applied to obtain the services.

From the household surveys and observations, I found out that a lot of people simply do not know that they are the recipients of the SSN-for health program due to the ignorance of the *Perangkat Desa*. For instance, one day I had a conversation with one of the *Kepala Dusun* in Wayang hamlet as follows:

"*King Pundi Mas Erwan* (Where are you coming from brother Erwan)", *Pak Bayan Kalis* asked me when I was walking down the Wayang alley one day. I told him that I was visiting *Pak Parno*. "*Pak Parno... yes I know him. I agree if you want to give aid to him*<sup>32</sup>, because he has a big family. He has five children if I am not

---

the second was with my local assistant and informants who knew well one by one the name of the head of the families on the list of the *Kartu Sehat* receiver given by the village midwife.

<sup>32</sup> If you conduct research in the villages, they think that you are doing *Kuliah Kerju Nyata* (KKN, Internship) that is usually conducted by students from Gadjah Mada University by giving out some practical aids to the community. Up to the present they still think that I had been doing KKN too in their village.

mistaken. He was registered to receive the *Kartu Sehat* to get free health services from the *Puskesmas*. But I'm still keeping his card. I do not have the opportunity yet to give it to him. But I think he does not need the *Kartu Sehat* as yet<sup>33</sup>. Whenever he will need It, I will not hesitate to give it to him immediately", *Pak Bayan* told me without any signs of regret in his face.

The bureaucratic procedures, that are needed before the *Kartu Sehat* holders can use it to obtain free health service from the *Puskesmas*, also become the source of the problem. For instance, a requirement to attach photos of the family members on the *Kartu Sehat* before it can be used is felt as something difficult to be fulfilled by the *Kartu Sehat* holders who are mostly old and poor people. For example one of my informants, *Pak Sarman*, just keeps his card under his pillow because of this problem. The head of the *Puskesmas*, doctor *Rianti*, admits this. She said that actually she allows them (the *Kartu Sehat* holders) to use their card without photos attached on the *Kartu Sehat* to obtain free services from the *Puskesmas*. But since the *Rumah Sakit Tegal Yoso* (the district hospital in Klaten) is very strict with this regulation, she therefore suggested that it would be better for them to complete their cards with photo identities. It is also for their own convenience if someday they will need a health

---

<sup>33</sup> Later I knew that *Pak Parno* actually needed that card when one day he told me a story that he had to sell his belongings to fund his two sons' medical treatment at the hospital when they got an accident

treatment from the district hospital. But unfortunately not every Pra-KS family knows about the discretion that is made by the head of the Puskesmas, hence still a lot of them never get the benefits out from their cards.

Another implementation problem is the reluctance of the *Kartu Sehat* holders to use the card. Some of the Pra-KS families feel ashamed to use the *Kartu Sehat* to obtain free health services from the Puskesmas. In spite of being labeled as poor people while using the card, they prefer to go to other Puskesmas' that does not use the *Kartu Sehat*. It means that they have to pay Rp 1,000 to obtain health treatment<sup>34</sup>. Doctor Rianti told me on one occasion that:

*"Selain masalah photo, masalah lain adalah adanya pemilik kartu sehat yang malu menggunakan kartu tersebut karena dianggap sebagai orang miskin. Akibatnya dia malah harus pergi ke*

<sup>34</sup> Ironically several wealthier people have asked doctor Rianti to be granted the *Kartu Sehat*. It is so interesting for me to understand this phenomenon why wealthier people did not feel ashamed in asking for free services from the Puskesmas. May be it is related with the relative security of the social status position of wealthy persons in the society compared to the poor ones. As a rich person you are always given respect by the community despite whatever you do. It reminds me of my informant's remark on one occasion: "although Pak Giono (one of the richest person in Sudagaran) always rides a bicycle wherever he goes, but everybody gives him respect and admiration (*sebagai orang sederhana* or simple person) since they know that he is a rich man (he has cars, motor bikes etc in his home). But if everybody knows that you are poor whatever you do people will never respect you. Even if you drive a car people will think that you just borrowed it from your friend". Therefore to some extent it is important not to let anybody knows that we are poor to maintain the security of our social status in our community.

*Puskesmas lain yang lebih jauh apabila harus berobat".* (Besides the photo problems, another problem is that several people who possess the *Kartu Sehat* feel ashamed to use their cards. They do not want to be called as poor people while using the card. I feel quite sorry that they have to move to other far Puskesmas).

These problems affect quite significantly the visiting frequency of the members of poor families who go to the Puskesmas to obtain free health services. For instance although the frequency of patients from poor families who use free service facilities from the Puskesmas has dramatically gone up after the implementation of SSN for health (see table-2), still, the percentage is very small compared to the number of poor family members who are eligible to use the facility.

**Table 2. The Visiting frequency of the poor family members who use free health services in the Puskesmas Wedi since the Implementation of SSN for health program 1998-1999**

Year	Month	Number of visits
1998	November	99
	December	775
1999	January	1092
	February	1270
	March	1300
	April	1402

Source: Puskesmas Wedi, *Laporan Pelaksanaan Program JPS Kesehatan November 1998-April 1999*<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>35</sup> The progress report of the implementation of SSN for health after March was not yet available during my preliminary research.

Since the numbers of the members of poor families who are eligible to use free health service facilities are 13,955 persons (Puskesmas Wedi 1999), only around 7% used this facility when they suffered from illnesses.

### 3.2. Food Supplement Program

The effectiveness of the implementation of SSN for health program also can be seen from the nutrition improvement program. The nutrition improvement program is carried out by giving food supplements for example milk, eggs, dried fish among others to the most vulnerable groups of people who have a high possibility of suffering from undernourishment i.e. infants, children under the age of five, and pregnant women.

In Sudagaran, the implementation of the food supplement program has become the responsibility of the village midwife (Ibu Yanti) and the officials of PLKB (Ibu Jujuk). Both of them, with the help of the wife of the village head, the hamlet head, and health volunteer activists, lead the monthly *Posyandu* gatherings in each hamlet of Sudagaran. The meeting commences with weighing of infants and children under the age of five in a hamlet that was scheduled. The village midwife then checks the development of the infants and the children based on their weight development, if the weight of an infant does not correspond to his age, the infant is diagnosed as suffering from undernourishment problem. Therefore the village midwife will give out 0.5 Kg

milk to the mother of the infant as food supplement in order to increase the quality of the milk of the infant's mother. If this case happens to a child under the age of five, the food supplement is given directly to the child. Separately, the village midwife will give out vaccinations to the infants and the children, as scheduled basing on the age development of the infants and the children. An interesting event happened when one day I attended the *Posyandu* meeting in Ngrandu hamlet. At that time the village midwife had just given out a packet of 0.5 Kg milk to Ibu Wartini (a breast feeding mother who was reported by health volunteer activists as suffering from inadequate protein intake). Interestingly, the milk was only wrapped in a silver paper; Ibu Yanti took off the outer side of the wrapping pack. When I asked why she did it, she explained as follows:

"This is only my strategy to prevent the milk from being sold by the recipients. Before that when I gave out a package of milk to a mother from a poor family, she sold it again in the market to get cash to buy other essential goods for her family. So if I do not devise something to stop the habit, the program to improve the nutrition condition will never meet its intended objectives".

While the official of PLKB has a responsibility of distributing free contraceptives to the *Pasangan Usia Suburs* (PUS, fertile couple) who cannot afford them on their own, She also engages in consultations with new

couples who plan to use contraceptives or if someone has a problem with her contraception. Although contraceptives are given out free of charge to everybody who needs it, but sometimes bureaucratic procedures in the Puskesmas makes some PLKB volunteers reluctant to perform their duties. In one *Posyandu* meeting in Sudagaran hamlet, Ibu Slamet complained to the village midwife about this problem.

"I prefer to go directly to the *Kecamatan* than to the Puskesmas. If I go to the *Kecamatan* I can meet Ibu Jujuk (the PLKB official) directly. Without any comments, She will hand me a box of contraceptive pills, she even gives me a box of condoms without me asking for them. But nobody uses condoms in Sudagaran hamlet".

Generally speaking, the implementation of food supplement program gives a positive impact to prevent the health conditions of children in Sudagaran from becoming worse as a result of the impact of the crisis. For instance, from the monthly report of the nutrition condition of the infants who suffered from *Kekurangan Energi Protein Berat* (KEP Berat, Chronic Inadequate Intake of Protein Energy) in *Kecamatan* Wedi, no single case was found in Sudagaran. But there are a lot of *balitas*<sup>36</sup> (children under age of five) who suffered from *Kekurangan Energi Protein Ringan* (KEP Ringan, Mild Inadequate Intake of Protein Energy)<sup>37</sup>. From the

monthly report made by the Puskesmas (table-3), in average, there were about 27 children under the age of five in Sudagaran suffering from mild KEP during the last three years. When I asked Mas Parwanto, the nutritionist in the Puskesmas, why there are still a lot of children who are under nourished while the Puskesmas has implemented SSN for health, he explained as follows:

"The economic crisis that started in the-mid of 1997 contributed to our difficulties (the Puskesmas team) to cope with the problem of malnutrition. We only have very limited funds to give out food supplements to the children under the age of five. If their parents do not pay contributions to overcome this problem, it will be a difficult task for us to solve because children under the age of five are most vulnerable considering the quality of food they take. For example a child, who recovered from KEP-R this month after giving him food supplements, automatically fell back to the same previous condition in the following month when we stopped giving out the food supplement to him. Unfortunately during the crisis, the quality of food given to the children has significantly decreased. Therefore without adequate funds from the Government, it seems impossible to solve the problem of malnutrition. Without adequate funds, my program will only fall in the vicious circle". (Field-work notes).

<sup>36</sup> Balita= Bawah Lima Tahun.

<sup>37</sup> The Puskesmas categorizes them as Balita Bawah Garis Titik-Titik (BGT, Under Dot Line) to describe

the children under certain ages who do not have adequate weight based on WHO standards.

Table 3. **The Nutrition Condition of Children under Age of Five in Sudagaran Village**

Years	1997		1998		1999	
Months	KEP-R	KEP-B	KEP-R	KEP-B	KEP-R	KEP-B
January	NA				25	
February	NA		23		24	
March	NA		23		24	
April	59		23		NA	
May	49		24		NA	
June	52		22		NA	
July	42	1	18		NA	
August	53		25		NA	
September	17		28		NA	
October	19		33		NA	
November	32		8		NA	
December	30		0		NA	

Source: Puskesmas Wedi, *Monthly Report of the Improvement Activities of Family Nutrition in Posvandu, 1997, 1998, and 1999*

NA= data not available

KEP-R= Mild inadequate Intake of Protein Energy

KEP-B= Chronic inadequate Intake of Protein Energy

The difficulty to cope with the problem of mal nutrition among the children under the age of five in Sudagaran is not only an economic factor, It also relates to the lack of awareness among the parents who have to know the importance of giving good quality food to their children.

Let alone the crisis, even during the pre-crisis period, the people in Sudagaran, whether rich or poor families, did not always serve good quality nutritious food to their children. Responding to this case, the village midwife (as also supported by Ibu *Lurah*) told me that the quality of food given to the children is not of concern to the people of Sudagaran. They are much more concerned with their physical appearance i.e. clothes, housing, gold and jewelries, cars,

among others<sup>38</sup>, rather than to think about the quality of food. This is because in their opinion people do not measure you (success or position in the community etc.) on what kind of food you have eaten, but with what kind of material things you have. "Because of this culture, therefore, there are only about 30% of the children under the age of five in Sudagaran who can be categorized as 'normal'," the village midwife told me (Fieldwork notes).

<sup>38</sup> This point of view is strongly affected with the *njogo projo* (to show the image of goodness of the family in front of the public) culture of Javanese community.

#### 4. SSN for Education

##### 4.1. The Schools and the students in Sudagaran during the crisis

In Sudagaran village there are four elementary schools (SD, *Sekolah Dasar*) where around 891 students study. These schools are (1) SD Sudagaran I (80 students), (2) SD Sudagaran II (85 students), SD Kanisius Muruh (371 students) and, SD Muhammadiyah (445 students).

Did the economic crisis affect the school activities there? It is a difficult question to answer. If the impact of the crisis is only to be measured by the number of the students who drop out from the school, then the answer to that question is No, considering the statement of the head of SD Sudagaran I below:

“Only one of my students dropped out from school during the crisis. But that one student dropped not because of the economic crisis. He did not want to continue school because he failed his exams. I have convinced him to go back to school but he prefers fishing to education. May be also because his parents do not pay attention to him, which makes him reluctant to go back to school. I also once asked his parents to do something bring their son back to school, but his parents seem so busy with their own work that they do not have time to discuss that problem”.

With the exception of SD Sudagaran I, there is no other drop out

cases found in other SDs. This data also corroborates with the data from household surveys. The data from household survey shows that during the economic crisis there were only 2 cases of dropouts in Sudagaran from all school categories. But if we used broader indicators i.e. the physical condition of the students, the delay in payment of the tuition fees, the academic achievement of the students, the capability to buy scholastic materials among others, then we can come to the conclusion that the economic crisis has greatly affected the school activities in Sudagaran. For instance the head of the SD Sudagaran I said that her students looked weaker now compared to the pre-crisis period:

“My students look *loyo* (weak) after the first break (at 9 am) during the school session. Actually, even before the economic crisis the physical appearance of my students was very poor. It is because most of my students come from poor families<sup>39</sup> who cannot provide breakfast for their children before their go to the school. In this case they (students' parents) will only give some money (*uang jajan*) to their children around Rp. 100- 250 to buy snacks at the school. But the calorie from the cheap snacks,

<sup>39</sup> Most of the students in Sudagaran I come from poor families that stay in Pundong, Batanan, Wedi, Ngrandu, Tunggul. The head of the family who lives in those hamlets usually works as a casual worker, loading and unloading, the *tukang cuci* (laundry labor), among others.

which is bought at the school, is not quite good enough to provide enough energy for my students to be active in class from 7-12 am. The students normally look sleepy after the first break" (Fieldwork notes).

Furthermore, the poor condition of the calorie intake among the students then affected their academic achievement. The school principal says that the scores of the national final exam (the Ebtanas<sup>40</sup>) that was achieved by her students were not as good as that before the crisis.

The same condition also happened in SD Sudagaran II, which also has students from the same family background as SD Sudagaran I. When I visited those two SDs, most of the students there did not put on shoes to go to school. Let alone school uniforms. The head of SD Sudagaran II told me that she allows her students not to put on school uniform if their parents cannot afford one. Due to the difficulties in getting school uniforms, the head of SD Sudagaran I has made it a policy to give free school uniform to the new students in order to attract a big number of school going children.

Another problem in SD Sudagaran I and II is the delay in the payment of the BP3<sup>41</sup>. The amount of BP3, which has to be paid, is different from one school to another. For instance in SD Sudagaran I the amount of BP3 is Rp. 1,000 per month, and in Sudagaran II the amount is Rp. 1,500. Both heads of the schools said that

during the economic crisis, several parents delayed the payment of BP3 until the end of the school year. Besides, several parents also delayed to pay the *uang ulangan umum bersama* (UUB, the examination fee) that amounts to Rp. 2,000 per four months and the final examination fee of Rp 25,000.

These conditions can also be seen at SD Kanisius and SD Muhammadiyah. Both these two SDs are private schools. SD Kanisius belongs to the catholic foundation while SD Muhammadiyah belongs to the Muhammadiyah foundation<sup>42</sup>. The heads of the two private schools said that the economic crisis did not affect their school activities. Based on my observations, the differences (between the public SDs and private SDs above) are caused by several factors. Firstly, to some extent most of the students' parents in SD Kanisius and Muhammadiyah have better financial capabilities compared to those in SD Sudagaran I and II<sup>43</sup>. Secondly, those

<sup>42</sup> Muhammadiyah is a modernist Indonesian Islamic organization founded in 1912 by KH. Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta.

<sup>43</sup> If there are no significant economic differences among the students' parents in those schools, at least there are differences of the students' parents' motivation to send their children to those schools. In both private SDs, the students' parents have a strong religious affinity (Roman Catholic and Islam) and strong motivation to send their children to schools compared to the students' parents in state owned SDs. A teacher in one of the state owned SD's told me that most of the students' parents in his school do not have strong religious orientation (*abangan*). If they are *santri* (Muslim) they will send their children to SD Muhammadiyah, and if they are Catholic they will send their children to SD Kanisius. Therefore the students in both two private schools not only come from Sudagaran village but from other villages in Kecamatan Wedi.

<sup>40</sup> Evaluasi Belajar Tahap Akhir Nasional

<sup>41</sup> the contribution to the school development that has to be paid by students' parents.

two schools get subsidies from both the government and their respective foundations. Thirdly, those two schools use self-assessment methods to determine the amount of the tuition fee and the BP3 that will be paid by the students' parents. This policy gives opportunity to the students from the poor families to continue their studies since they are allowed to pay the tuition fee and BP3 based on their economic capability.

#### 4.2. The Implementation of SSN for Education in Sudagaran

Although at the national level there are two forms of SSN for education i.e., (1) the *Program Bea Siswa* (scholarship program) and (2) the *Dana Bantuan Operasional* (DBO, the operational fund program), it is only the *Program Bea Siswa* that is implemented in Sudagaran.

The DBO is only given to the schools (can be SD, SLTP/MTs, SM/MA) that are categorized as the poorest in one Kecamatan. Since none of the four SDs in Sudagaran meets this category, therefore, these schools were not eligible to receive the DBO program. Based on the data released by the Kecamatan Committee, from 40 SDs in Kecamatan Wedi, all four SDs in Sudagaran were found as better positioned compared to the other SDs<sup>44</sup>. Finally, from 40 SDs in

Kecamatan Wedi, there are only 7 SDs that receive the DBO program. These SDs are mostly located in the poorest villages in Kecamatan Wedi.

The scholarship program for the students from poor families is implemented in three to four SDs in Sudagaran; these are SD Sudagaran I, II, and SD Muhammadiyah. The SD Kanisius is the only exception. There is no clear explanation why SD Kanisius was not included in the scholarship program. The possible explanation is because the document of the program says that the target groups of the SSN program are SD Negeri (Public School) and Madrasah (Islamic School), while SD Kanisius is neither SD Negeri nor Madrasah. That is why SD Kanisius was not given the scholarship program. But the school principal said that his SD receives operational fund aid<sup>45</sup> from the government in form of school equipments and needs i.e. paper, chalk, and teaching instruments among others.

The number of students who qualify to be given scholarships in Kecamatan Wedi is based on the quota made by the Kabupaten committee. Meanwhile, the decision to determine the number of the students who are eligible for the scholarship in each SD is made by the Kecamatan

<sup>44</sup> By using the scale from 1-7 (from the best to the worst) each of the SDs in Sudagaran has a score as follows: SD Sudagaran I ranks no 3, SD Sudagaran II ranks no 2, SD Kanisius ranks no3 and SD Muhammadiyah rankings is no 1. The scoring is based on two main indicators: (1) % of students who come from KS family, (2) BP3 per month. A school, that has a high percentage of students from KS family and cheap tuition fee, will be placed in

low ranking compared to the others. This school is then eligible to receive the DBO. Source: Kantor Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Kantor Kecamatan Wedi, *Bea Siswa dan DBO*, 1998.

<sup>45</sup> But this is different with DBO. DBO is funded by loans (development budget) while operational fund aid for private school is funded with routine budgets.

Committee<sup>46</sup>. At the lowest level, the head of the school, the chairman of the students' parents organization, the teachers representative, and the village representative have the responsibility to choose students from each school who qualify for the scholarships. After passing all these procedures, each SD in Sudagaran is granted 3 scholarships totalling Rp 10,000 per month for each student, except SD Sudagaran II, which is granted 4 scholarships.

Since there are only 3 scholarships available for each school whereas there are some other students who are eligible to receive the same scholarship, it becomes quite difficult for the head of the school to make a fair decision on who will be granted the scholarship. To solve this problem, the head of SD Sudagaran II told me that; she uses several steps to choose the most eligible student. Firstly, the preference is given to a student from a poor family, but if there are still several candidates who are eligible, then she gives preference to orphans. With that method, she feels satisfied that there are no protests from the community and the students' parents with her decision.

#### 4.3. The Deviations

If it can be categorized as deviation, the first deviation is the ignorance of the school principals and the teachers about this program<sup>47</sup>.

Although the school principal is the most responsible person in implementing the SSN program at the lowest level, not all of them do understand anything about SSN program for education. For instance the school principal of SD Sudagaran I cannot even describe clearly what SSN for education is? She only mentions that 3 of her students were given scholarships, but she was not sure whether the scholarships came from the SSN program or not. She cannot even differentiate between SSN for education and a new program launched by the *BKKBN*, namely the scholarship for *Anak Usia Sekolah Keluarga Miskin* (Auskin, the program to help the school age children from poor families). On one occasion, she tried to explain to me about SSN for education but actually what she meant was the *Auskin* program.

"The registration for application of the scholarship from the SSN was closed on July the 10<sup>th</sup> [she was referring to the Austin program instead of the SSN], unfortunately, we were late in registering our students. Most of them were registered in July the 19<sup>th</sup> 1999. Therefore, they cannot be included in the SSN program (field notes)". Note: In the brackets is mine.

This confusing situation is not surprising, because there are several scholarships that are given to the students in Sudagaran that come from

<sup>46</sup> The Kecamatan Committee consists of 14 persons from various organizations at Kecamatan level such as Pak Camat, Head of the Branch Office of the Department of Education in Wedi, the Head of the Puskesmas Wedi, the NGOs, the Religious organizations among others.

<sup>47</sup> The lack of information about the SSN for education program also happens among the village

official (the *Pamong Desas*). On one occasion I asked Pak Sup whether he knows who has ever received the scholarship in his hamlet. But Pak Sup simply did not know whether there is a scholarship program in his village let alone children who receive them.

several different sources for instances the *Gerakan Nasional Orang Tua Asuh* (GNOTA, the surrogate parents national movement for education) and the village head association in Kecamatan Wedi.

The second deviation is the reduction in the amount of the scholarship that is received by the students. For example one of the head of the schools in Sudagaran told me that every four months each student who qualifies for the scholarship is given an amount of Rp. 30,000. From that amount, Rp. 5000 is deducted by the school for administrative costs i.e. paper, photo copy etc. The reduction of the amount of the scholarship that is given to the student is a serious deviation, since the program document says that it is prohibited to reduce the amount of the scholarship that is given to the student for any reasons.

#### **5. The Cheap Rice Program (OPK, Operasi Khusus or Special Operation)**

The OPK in Sudagaran village is implemented by the village officers. To make the operation easier, Pak Lurah appointed the hamlet heads (Sudagaran consist of 4 hamlets) to coordinate the distribution of the cheap rice packages to each hamlet. As the coordinator, the hamlet head has the responsibility to select a number of poor families (KS families) that are eligible to buy the cheap rice in his hamlet. After the target group is selected, then each month the hamlet head distributes a coupon to each KS family targeted. That coupon is used as an identity to buy the cheap rice in the *Balai Desa* (Village office building).

Ideally, the OPK program that was started in July 1998 allows the KS family to buy 20 Kgs of cheap rice priced at Rp 1,000/Kg. But because of several reasons the package of cheap rice in Sudagaran was reduced to only 5 Kg per family. As is the case with other villages, the reasons for the reduction of the package are (1) incapability of the poor families to obtain cash of Rp. 20,000 per month to buy 20 Kg rice; (2) there are other families that claim themselves as also eligible to buy the cheap rice.

It is very clear from the statements of the hamlet heads that the implementation of the OPK program is a very difficult task for them. The implementation problems arise from both the top and below. From the top the village officers have to be obedient to their superiors on whatever decision they make. And from below, they are pressurized by the community in the name of reformation movement.

On one occasion when I visited the village office, Pak Riyanto, one of the hamlet heads in Sudagaran, complained to me about the weighing problem of the rice that has to be distributed

"The BKKBN always claims that every sack that is delivered to the village office contains 50Kg of rice. But actually not every sack always contains 50 Kg. most of them only contain 49.5 Kg. Because of this weighing problem, every month we have to pay extra money to the tune of Rp 21,000 to the BKKBN. We have complained about it, but the BKKBN officers do not give positive

responses. We are only asked to sign the delivery form if we reject the rice that is delivered because of weighing problems. If we do so, it can be interpreted that we are against the reformation program. You can imagine what will happen to us by bothering the reformation program”.

The weighing problem does not end after the delivery of the rice to the village office. Another problem faced, is how to distribute the rice equally to the target groups. The hamlet heads have to divide every '50'Kg sack of rice into smaller packages (5 Kg per package). This is not such an easy job for them since they are not professionals in handling rice i.e. rice traders. Not to mention about the problem of unreliable balance that is used. Therefore to divide 50Kg rice into ten equal parts of 5Kg packages of rice is not always an easy job to be done by the hamlet heads. It often happens that the weight difference becomes the source of gossip amongst the community. For instance when the package, that is supposed to be 5Kg, only has a real weight 4.5Kg, KS families are not ready to pay the Rp 5,000 but only Rp 4,500. The hamlet head usually asks the KS still to pay Rp 5,000 instead of Rp 4,500, because if he allows them to pay Rp 4,500, he has to pay extra money to the BKKBN. But this policy then becomes a source of gossip among the community as one *Pak Kepala Dusun* told me:

“They accuse us that we deduct secretly the amount of the rice that should be distributed to the community. They do not know our problem. Therefore not to

make the problem worse, we ask them to divide the 50Kg rice themselves. Our duty is only to distribute one sack of 50 Kg rice to every one group of KS families (each group consists of ten families). With that system our job becomes much more easier”.

Another problem is the envy of the other families that are not given the opportunity to buy the cheap rice who also claim that they have the same right since the rice is from the government. The opinion about the need to be treated equally does not only come from the poor families but also from some quite rich families. Ibu Riyanto, the wife of one of the hamlet head told me how she felt 'crazy' when she thought about this problem.

“I really do not know why some of the rich people here have the idea that they are also entitled to have the same right to buy the cheap rice. One of my neighbors here, actually my distant relative, also thinks like that. One day he had asked me to buy the cheap rice, but I had turned down his demand because his family is not so poor. The following day the whole of his family members did not want to speak to my husband and me. I felt very unhappy about it. Rather than making me sick, my husband told me to give him a coupon to buy the cheap rice. After that he wanted to speak to my family again”.

Because of the above problems, Pak Lurah made a policy to equalize (*meratakan*) the distribution of the cheap rice. With this policy, not only

the KS families have the opportunity to buy the cheap rice, but also the nearly poorer families (of course based on the hamlet head's judgment) or everybody who wanted to buy the cheap rice was given the opportunity. Therefore, when I asked Ibu Nani one of KS family in Slegrengan hamlet, how many packages of cheap rice she had bought so far? She replied that she only bought two times. If the OPK program is carried out properly, the KS family, like that of Nani was given the opportunity more than seven times from the beginning of the program until the mid of July when I conducted my fieldwork.

When I confirmed about it to Ibu Nani, she only said that she does not know why so suddenly she is no longer given the coupon any more. "May be because the coupon has to be distributed to some body else", she added. But Ibu Nani does not want to ask Pak Kepala Dusun. "I am ashamed to ask Pak Kepala Dusun about it. Only if I have some money, I buy (*nempil*) the cheap rice from my neighbors who have the chance to buy the cheap rice in the village office. Some times, if the quality of rice is not good, I am then allowed to buying the rice. After that I will mix it with better quality rice before cooking".

The quality of rice is another problem that has to be faced by the village officers.. When the quality of rice that is delivered to the village office is good, then there is no such big problem for the village officers to sell it, although when several of the KS families do not want to use their coupons. But when the rice has very bad quality, then the village officer (Pak Lurah) has to pay in advance to the BKKBN.

"Last month they delivered very bad quality of rice. After the community knew about it, nobody wanted to buy that rice, although we gave them the cheap rice coupons. It therefore becomes a source of problem for us, because we have to hand in the money to the BKKBN on time every month. So Pak Lurah has to pay in advance to the BKKBN. But sometimes Pak Lurah is also reluctant to do that before the PLKB officers from Kecamatan 'intimidate' him".

To solve that problem, the hamlet head has to offer to everybody in his hamlet one by one to ask whether there is anybody who wants to buy cheap rice. During the general elections campaign, the PDI *Perjuangan* (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) cadres who helped the hamlet head to offer cheap rice to the community.

With such complex problems mentioned above, the result of the implementation of OPK program in Sudagaran village is far from successful. The low frequency and the amount of rice, that is received by the poor families every month simply does not contribute to cope up with the problem of fulfilling basic necessities among poor families. Although administratively (on paper) the implementation of the OPK is good, because the village offices can hand over the rice money on time, but in terms of effectiveness the OPK program was not able to achieve the intended objectives.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

From the above description, several points can be drawn from the

implementation of SSN program in Sudagaran village:

- (1). The implementation of SSN program only produces very little effect to the community as policy instruments to reduce the impact of the economic crisis to the village community. The SSN for health may be the only exception in this case. Although not as good as it is hoped, the SSN for health has given quite significant impact to the community in curative health services and midwifery services, or at least to protect infant and children under the age of five from malnutrition.
- (2). The failure of the implementation of SSN program in Sudagaran is caused by several factors: (1) lack of the socialization of the program to the community or target groups, (2) the ignorance or incapability of the *Perangkat Desas* as the implementors of the program, (3) lack of supervision, (4) the existence of a culture of formality approach. By using the formality approach, it is assumed that if formally (as told by the procedure) all the programs have been implemented (can be proven with expenditures receipts and good report), the objectives of the program were achieved without any question whether those programs have reached the target groups or not.
- (3). In spite of the weaknesses of the *perangkat desa*, the demand from the part of the community members, who are not eligible as target groups of the the SSN program to obtain the same treatment, has made a lot of tension in the community that

force the *perangkat desas* to make several "policy adjustments" that deviate from the main objective of the policy.

## REFERENCES

- Bappenas, *Panduan PDM-DKE 1998/1999*
- Central Agency of Statistic (BPS), *Survey on the Implementation of Jaring Pengaman Sosial*, February 1999.
- Clarke, Simon. (1994). *Marx's Theory of Crisis*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Kecamatan Wedi (1999), *Komite Kecamatan: Beasiswa dan DBO*.
- Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Kecamatan Wedi (1999), *Program Aku Anak Sekolah: Panduan Pelaksanaan untuk Komite Sekolah*.
- Document of the World Bank Report No. P7307-IND 1999
- Hill, Hal. (1999) *The Indonesian Economy in Crisis*, Pasir Panjang: ISEAS.
- INFID (1999). *Briefing Paper for Annual Lobby 1999*
- Kantor Desa Sudagaran, *Buku Data Monografi 1998*.
- Monitoring dan Evaluasi oleh Tim Pengendali Jaring Pengaman Social 1999 (Several documents)
- Puskesmas Wedi, *Laporan Pelaksanaan Program JPS Kesehatan November 1998-April 1999*
- Puskesmas Wedi, *Monthly Report of the Improvement Activities of Family Nutrition in Posyandu*, 1997, 1998, 1999
- SMERU Newsletter march-April 1999.
- Suara Merdeka daily April 12, 2000
- World Bank (1998) in Hal Hill (1999). *The Indonesian Economy in Crisis*, Pasir Panjang: ISEAS.