

A New Design of Raskin Program (An Analysis of the RASDA Implementation in Kulonprogo Regency)

Raden Rahman Asjhatri Fandaru
Public Administration Master Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Universitas Gadjah Mada
avant_combat@yahoo.com

Received: March 2016

Accepted: April 2016

Published: May 2016

Abstract

This thesis is an analysis of public policies based on the research carried out about the implementation of RASDA Program (local rice husbandry) in Kulonprogo in 2015. It is claimed as a new alternative offered to replace the Government RASKIN Program that is already running. This research aimed in determining how effective the implementation of the RASDA Program in Kulonprogo was and identifying the factors that cause RASDA program did not run as the expectation. The method used in this study was a qualitative method using two types of data, primary and secondary data. The data collection techniques used were observation, interview, and documentation with informants selection technique using the principle of purposive and snowball techniques. The data analysis technique was done through data reduction, data display, and data verification.

The results showed that efforts to renew the RASKIN Program (cheap-priced rice) through RASDA program were not successfully done. The achievement of program outputs and outcome indicators were still far away from the expectation. The progress was not significantly improved, it still encountered the same problems as those in the implementation of the previous RASKIN Program. Meanwhile, farmers did not have any benefits from the uptake of the local rice because it was not optimally prepared.

There are several factors that cause RASDA Program in Kulonprogo did not run well. The first reason was that it is difficult to link the concept of the program with the actual situation, seen from: (1) the farmers as the program target still thought conservatively causing the loss of the benefits that will be gained from the RASDA Program; (2) the intervention of political elites in the process of policy formulation; (3) the limited authority of the local government in the National RASKIN Program; and (4) the incoherency among the needs for resources in the factual conditions. The second cause, the conflict of interest among the holders cause the program implementation did not synchronize to each other, as seen from: (1) their efforts to make RASDA program as a springboard for "other" purposes; (2) the bias support of BULOG; (3) the lack of enthusiasm and initiatives among the holders/bureaucracy; and (4) the entrepreneurs' mindset of business that dominated farmers community. The third reason is that there was not awareness on the characteristics of the group target to anticipate problems that arise.

Based on these findings, the researcher suggested the government to focus in optimizing the current mechanisms of the food subsidies. The government should also concern in looking for other alternatives to optimize the potential of the local foods. The government should also do some efforts to gain the welfare for farmers, by: (1) reconstructing values and norms in terms of social rules to support the program with the intensive socialization; (2) allocating the budget the APBD for the procurement of subsidized rice for poor households who are not registered; (3) monitoring the program up to the lowest level intensively; (4) encouraging small entrepreneurs to become BULOG's partners to seek an access to the Capital; (5) maintaining fair competition among rice traders; (6) conducting studies on the possibility of establishing a integrated rice husbandry regional company; (7) encouraging the local rice branding.

Keywords: evaluation of implementation, implementation policy, program performance, RASKIN

INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes the implementation of the RASDA program in the district of Kulonprogo, Yogyakarta. This program is a new design offered by the government in its food aid system for the low-income communities through RASKIN Program. The research focused on finding the factors that cause RASDA program in the district of Kulonprogo did not run as the expectation. It was conducted by evaluating the implementation of the program. The key issue background of this research is that there were not so many problems solved in the implementation RASKIN Program. During couples of year of RASKIN program implementation, the success of the program is difficult to be reached. There were so many complicated regulations that resulted inefficiency of the program.

Research results of SMERU Research Institute (2012) concluded that there were still many shortcomings of the RASKIN program. It reflected that 6T's benchmark indicators performance of the program's success had not been achieved yet. Meanwhile, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK, 2013) also submitted the suspected institutions related to this RASKIN Program. KPK considered this subsidy program cannot meet 6T as an indicator of the effectiveness of the program. There were problems related to the lack of monitoring and control system, which then concluded the inefficiency in the ongoing RASKIN program. Therefore it is necessary to reconstruct the program (www.kpk.go.id). BPS-Statistic Indonesia's data shows that the number of RASKIN program tar-

gets had not reduced significantly from the beginning of the program implementation (15.16 million in 2002) until today (15.53 million in 2014). SUSENAS' first quarter of 2013 showed that the rice subsidy in RASKIN program was benefited by 31.23 million households (RT) from 15.5 million registered RTS-PM (Head of BPS, Suryamin, in Jakarta, Thursday, January 2nd 2014. Source: www.merdeka.com).

The problem in RASKIN program is the raise of issues related to the continuity of the program. At the end, the government decided to continue the cheap rice program which was intended to help the poor (Raskin) while looking for other alternative policies, including the alternative to make RASDA as a new design of the RASKIN program. Redesign RASKIN program is a part of government efforts in formulating effective and efficient policies for the society.

The problems arising in the RASKIN implementation implicated an irrelevancy of the government's agenda in addressing existing public problems. Therefore, it is important then to find other alternative policies to address the existing problems. RASDA program, which was initiated in the district of Kulonprogo, became one of the new alternatives of RASKIN program. It was also the answer to the solution for various problems found in RASKIN program that had been running. Replacing the RASKIN program with the RASDA Program means modifying the system that the procurement of rice is supplied by local farmers through *Gapoktan* (rice farmers community).

The RASDA Program ultimately is consid-

ered as a flagship program to improve the long-standing RASKIN program. The policy of decentralization allows the government at the lowest level can take the right decision in accordance with actual conditions in each area. In RASDA Program implementation, the data validity at the village level is the key to overcome the lack of valid data problems. RASDA program also allows people who are not registered in the RTS-PM, but in the actual condition are worthy to receive can be covered. Supplying rice from the local farmers guarantees RTS-PMs receive rice in much better quality than the old stock of rice distributed from the unreliable sources or even imported from abroad. The distance between the upstream and downstream is a closer making distribution cost can be reduced. The distance proximity also leads the rice distribution time more efficient.

However, as the time goes on, its implementation earns another problem. *Gapoktan* cannot supply the amount of the rice required to support RASDA program. It is only about 46.5% of the requirement can be fulfilled. Besides, there are concerns related to the quality and the origin of rice supplied by the *Gapoktan*, such as the compliance of the rice program for civil servants in Kulonprogo regency. In 2015, RASKIN Coordination Team and the District Social Welfare Workers find at least 20% of rice that were distributed to the public in several districts in Kulonprogo is still unclean and crumble (tribun.news.com, 04.09.2015). Several challenges are also faced with the problem of the decreasing of agricultural lands, crop pests that of-

ten attack, and the unstable climate. The downward trend in the number of agricultural production especially rice occurs from year to year and it has no solution yet.

Departing from the background of the above problems, the main question that becomes the formulation of the problem in this research is "Why is RASDA Program in Kulonprogo still not optimal?". The question, in advance, is then broken down into more specific questions; "How is the implementation of RASDA program in Kulonprogo regency?", and "What are the factors causing RASDA Program in Kulonprogo not optimal?"

James E. Anderson (2003: 3), says that a relative stable and a purposive course of an action followed by actors in dealing with a matter of concern, where the policy cannot be separated from the roles of the actors who define and implement policies to overcome the problems faced. Thomas R. Dye (1972: 1), defines public policy as whatever government choose to do or not to do. It means that whatever the government's decision can be regarded as a public policy. Meanwhile, David Easton (1953, in Dye, 1972: 1) defines public policy as the authoritative implementation of values for the whole society. Furthermore, the government's decisions will finally result in the implementation of the values. From the description above, it can be said that the public policy is a decision or an action taken by the government in achieving particular objectives through the implementation of values to the society by utilizing existing resources. The elements of public policy established a relation-




Figure 1. Logical framework performance measurement of the policy implementation

ship of mutual influence to each other.

According to Grindle (1980: 6), the implementation of the policy is to establish a relationship that leads the realization of the policy goals as a result of government activity (establish a link that allows goals of public policies to be role models as outcomes of governmental activity). Purwanto and Sulistyastuti (2012:21) say that the point is how the implementation of the policy outputs conducted by the executor to the group targets to be good in an effort to actualize the policies.

The implementation process departs from the existence of a program that has a specific purpose. To achieve these objectives, it is required policy inputs that will be processed into policy outputs through the activities to the group targets. When the policy outputs have been delivered to the group targets, it can be said that the policy has led to an initial policy effect or out-

come, namely an immediate effect. The next stage is exploring the policy outputs to produce final policy outcomes. If the policy outcomes are able to reach the objectives of the policy, it can be claimed that the policy outcomes are high-performance implementations of policies.

Policy performance indicators are measured using measurement instruments. Purwanto and Sulistyastuti (2012:105) divide the main indicators of the performance implementation measurement of the policy into two, namely: 1) output indicators, to determine the direct consequences that are felt; and 2) outcome indicators, which are used to assess outcomes (impacts) on the implementation of the policy. A logical framework performance measurement of the policy implementation according to Cole and Parston (2006) as cited Purwanto and Sulistastuti (2012: 100) can be seen in Figure 1.

Experts	Factors
Edward III	Communication Resources Disposition Bureaucratic structure
Merilee S Grindle	Policy content Implementation environment
Daniel A Mazmanian and Sabatier	Characteristics of the problem Characteristics of the policy Environment Variables
Donald S Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn	Policy standards and targets Resources Communication among the related organizations Characteristics of the holder agencies The political, social, and economic situations The executor disposition
G Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A Rondinelli	Environmental conditions The relationship between organizations Resources in the organization for policy implementation The characteristics and capabilities of the holder agencies
David L Weimer and Aidan R Vining	The scheme of the policy The environment where the policy implemented The capability of the apolicy executors

Table 1. Factors That Influence the Policy Implementation

Some experts emphasize some of the factors that affect the implementation of the policy in a various variables (table 1).

Conceptualization of the RASDA Program in Kulonprogo was carried out by combining the concepts of experts who believe that characteristics of the policies were the object of research. There are three main focuses of this study related to the implementation of the policy. They are integrated in three different dimensions and cannot be separated from the characteristics of the environment where this policy was implemented.

On the dimension of the new policy concept, the important thing is how the concept of the policies can be so implemented in accordance with the context of the implementation that the scheme prepared run as it is expected previously. Meanwhile, the dimension of the executors concerns the relationship among the execu-

tive actors RASDA Program in Kulonprogo which have characteristics and interests of each. In advance, in the dimensions of the group targets, the authors focus on trends in the behavior performed by the group targets as a part of environmental policy influences on the process and as the results of the RASDA program implementation.

RESEARCH METHODS

The method in this research was the qualitative descriptive method complemented by an analysis of secondary data. The research was conducted in the district of Kulonprogo, Yogyakarta, from November 2015 through to January 2016. Meanwhile, RASDA program in the district of Kulonprogo has been running since January 2014.




Figure 2: Framework Research

Source: Researcher identification

The data used were the combination of both primary data directly obtained from the field through direct observations, depth interviews, and secondary data obtained from the documents. The collection of data from the data source was conducted by involving the techniques of the direct observation, the interview and the documentation. To ensure the validity of the data, the researcher tested the validity using triangulation techniques. In processing and analyzing the data, the authors applied an interactive analysis consisting of data reduction, data display, and data verification.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The integration between RASDA and RASKIN in Kulonprogo

The implementation of RASDA program is

not much different from RASKIN program that is already running. The concept that had been designed for RASDA program has not been fully implemented. The fact shows that RASDA program is only a matter of alteration term from RASKIN program because the rice procurement that should be through *Gapoktan* has not been fully implemented.

The RASDA program leads the new executor as a supplier of rice called the local *Gapoktan*. InProSuLa (Institute for Promoting Sustainable Livelihood Approach) takes a major role in the design, the initiation, and the assistance in the implementation of the program. Those stages will be then measured by the government. The opportunity for public participation in the development process is a manifestation of a good governance. RASDA program gave a wide chance

for the public society in the procurement of rice as well as in its distribution. The civil society, private institutions, and the government are all responsible for the RASDA program with the duties and the functions of each.

Rice Procurement of RASDA program

There were only about seventeen *gapoktans* which were qualified to be involved from eighty-eight *gapoktans*. The government of Kulonprogo regency used the supply capacity of each *gapoktan* as the standard supply quota. The capacity of a *gapoktan* depends on the capability and the experience of the trader inside of it. This statement comes from a fact that actually the warehouse, the steamroller, and the means of transportation belong to the trader inside of the *gapoktan*. As the effect, the benefits of the rice procurement in RASDA program are mostly taken by the trader itself. Meanwhile, the *gapoktan* get only a few of it.

From eight *gapoktans* that are recommended to *BULOG*, there are only six *gapoktans* that are active as suppliers. Meanwhile, the two other *gapoktans* do not supply the rice to *BULOG*. From the six *gapoktans*, there are apparently only three *gapoktans* which meet the target quota. However, the overall target quota can be achieved.

The low HPP rice makes it difficult to get the rice or grain from local farmers. This situation may override the priority to absorb the rice from the local farmers. *gapoktans* would not buy at a lower price than HPP to keep the margin re-

mains profitable.

Farmers have the authority to determine when and where they will sell their agricultural products. It can be both to *gapoktans* directly (trader in), to resellers or other smaller businesses, and to other *BULOG*'s partners. The traders inside the *gapoktans* do not only buy the rice from the local farmers but also from outside the farmers' area through second suppliers (resellers). Finally, the rice coming into *BULOG* for RASDA Program in Kulonprogo are not only the local rice. It can be either from *gapoktans* procurement or other partners, and even also from outside the area.

Rice Distribution of RASDA program

The RASKIN technical rules that made by RASKIN Regency Coordination Team was not specific in anticipating the problems that may occur. They only regulated normative rules related to the distribution of rice subsidies and the indicators used to measure the success of the program. The initialization of the RASKIN program implementation was conducted in the beginning of every year by inviting relevant stakeholders.

The amount of the quota was based on the List of Beneficiaries (DPM). The data source was from the integrated database for social protection programs taken from the Social Protection Registration Program (PPLS) 2011 under the institution of BPS managed by TNP2K. The data of RTS-PM are collected from the integrated database to the central government through

Output		Outcome		
Achievements are still not up				
1	6T achievement	1	Initial	
	- <i>tepat sasaran</i> (right target) : unfulfilled		the bargaining position of farmers	
	- <i>tepat waktu</i> (right time) : fulfilled		- increased	
	- <i>tepat mutu</i> (right quality) : fulfilled	- not all rice from local farmers	2	Intermediate
	- <i>tepat jumlah</i> (right quantity) : unfulfilled	- community involvement increased		not enough to improve the welfare of farmers as well as to optimize the potential of local food
	- <i>tepat harga</i> (right price) : fulfilled			
	- <i>tepat administrasi</i> (right administration) : fulfilled			
2	Absorption of local rice by Gapoktan can not be achieved optimally.	3	Long-term	
			impact on the development of the national economy and the local village yet to be felt	

Figure 3. RASDA Program Performance

Source: Researcher identification

the Secretariat TNP2K. The reconstruction of the mechanism is done in several stages, starting from the village through the discussion in a local meeting until the final decision in the central government. The mechanism of the data updating that have to pass many stages was considered ineffective and inefficient.

TD rice distribution should be carried out monthly according to the prepared schedule before totaling eighty eight points. Each village in a district should receive rice on the same day as the distribution day. Unfortunately, until 2015 the real condition had not met the expectation yet. This is a result of the existing policy in which the RTS membership was driven by the sense of community and camaraderie in one environment. It also caused the emergence of jealousy of the society who was not registered be-

cause of the abstract policy.

The implementation of the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Program is conducted periodically afterward. M&E aims in improving the effectiveness of the distribution of RASKIN conducted by networks through coordinating TKPK, covering the actual distribution, identifying problems, and making efforts to solve problems. The evaluations were conducted through a coordination held at the end of the program year. The reports were established periodically arranged according to the structural levels of the teamwork.

Each RTS-PM pays 24,000 rupiahs for one sack weighing 15 kilograms in TD each month. RTS-PM collectively also pays for the transportation cost. The mechanism used was a direct payment through *BULOG* officials who come directly to any distribution spot of the rice.




Figure 4. Objectives of RASDA Program Achievement Indicators

Source: Researcher identification

Evaluation of the Program Achievement Indicators

RASDA Program shows the achievement indicators can be seen in Figure 4. The achievement of the outputs and the initial outcomes of RASDA program has not been optimal yet. The donation program in achieving the intermediate outcome is not very well conducted. It impacts on the RASDA implementation that has not been sufficient to improve the welfare of farmers and to optimize the most appropriate potential of the local foods in Kulonprogo. It still cannot be seen the positive impact of the policies implementation to the national economy development in general, and to local village economy in particular.

Based on the facts on the field, the outcomes of the RASDA Program implementation in 2015 are as described in Figure 3.

Factors That Cause RASDA not Optimal Conflict between Concept Design and Reality

In RASDA program, emerging constraints resulted by the scheme of the concept design this new program are not solved optimally. It causes a collision between the concept design of the program and the reality on the ground.

The scheme of RASDA program concept was missed so it could not run optimally. Problems arise when the rice used for this RASKIN was actually purchased at a price that is likely to

be low, using the benchmark Government Purchase Price (HPP) that is always under the prevailing market price. Furthermore, sadly the scheme to improve both the welfare of the farmers and the use of local rice for RASKIN through *BULOG* was really difficult to achieve. It was actually caused by the rationality of the farmers itself. The use of local rice to RASKIN program provides greater opportunities to farmers in getting a lower price than they could get. As for the benefits, the design of RASDA concept is not much beneficial to the rice farmers.

One of the major changes that are expected to work during the initial RASDA program design is an attempt to shift the role of *BULOG* as both the provider and the distributor of rice for RASKIN program. Meanwhile, there are many interests that underlie the implementation RASKIN program. Therefore, it will be so difficult to do a major change. Blaming groups that take advantage from the imports is not that easy. They will not be willing to lose "field" anyway. It also needs to consider the the *BULOG* resistance which can be attack by the multi-billion fund company, which has the potential to contribute a great advantage for the company itself.

Kulonprogo government partnering with Yogyakarta *BULOG* Regional Division, which was also located at the same provincial level, oversees the entire territory of Yogyakarta Province Government. In this case, the level of decision-making are not aligned to each other. Meanwhile, Yogyakarta Regional Division has a limited authority. It have to follow also with the policies of the central government. This subsidy

budget management became the *BULOG*'s authority completely. The local government could not interfere in the *BULOG*'s internal policies. Thus, in this case the government Kulonprogo regency also could not do much in making decisions such as: the purchase price of rice, the amount of the subsidy, the origin of the rice, and the policies related to the management of both pre and post purchase rice distribution.

The problems arise concerning the readiness of the society and *gapoktan* were involved to implement the delegation of tasks that have been performed by Perum *BULOG*. It requires expertise and adequate infrastructure support as already been owned by Perum *BULOG* previously. Here are still a lot of things to be prepared to get start to the all *BULOG* tasks as mentioned above. It may be ranging from improving the quality of human resources and *Gapoktan* members, providing standards-compliant warehouse, providing means of transportation, and the like. However, it still needs further study on the effectiveness and efficiency to successfully achieve the objectives.

Conflict of Interest in the Implementer Disposition

The main objective of the initial concept of RASDA Program (version of InProSuLa) is to reduce the *BULOG*'s roles and to encourage the regency government's. The re-design of RASKIN program into RASDA program is a part of their struggle to take the next step, where there are many other plans that will be carried out afterwards.

BULOG tends to have a refusal mainly due to the issue that its role as a provider of RASKIN rice is likely to be omitted. This trend is visible from a *BULOG*'s effort to counter attack by blaming groups who want to shift the third *BULOG*'s functions, either openly or not. Currently, *BULOG* faces pressures from the public related to the execution of their duties.

BULOG then makes some efforts to maintain its functions that are rational for a company. They give the potential benefits greatly from the needs of the national RASKIN rice reaching more than 232.963 tones (regular quota in 2015). *BULOG* absolutely do not want to lose a source of huge profits for his company. It is also due to the political reasons. However, the pressures faced by *BULOG* leads a positive effect on the improvement of the *BULOG* performance in his role as the executor of the RASKIN rice distribution.

In the implementation of the RASDA program, the regency government cannot work alone. It really needs a commitment and a serious work of SKPD (units of work) under its controll to implement the program. SKPD has a diverse disposition in this Program. Not all of the agencies are working well, as well as the institution under the regency government. They are actually trying to support the Regent policies, none of them can really meet to the objectives that want to be achieved. The position of the government in the implementation of RASDA tends to be both vary and unclear. This means that they are in a position which is not completely supporting to success the RASDA program. Howev-

er, they also do not completely resist the implementation of the program.

Disposition of *Gapoktan* here will not be far from the business scheme as part of the economic motives in order to seek profits. Employers will try to maximize profit-making that is obtained, because a reason of either the convenience gained through the facilities by the government or the different profit margin between the purchase and sale prices. In order to get the maximum benefit, employers also will not emphasize the origin of the rice bought. As long as they can save the maximum benefits, the rice coming from outside area is not a problem for them. The conflicts of interest in optimizing local rice is searching the maximum benefit.

Furthermore, norms have become one part of social rules, where mostly people in Kulonprogo live in rural area dominated by the Javanese and some still hold a principle of modesty. There are some people who tend to be fearer of social sanction they may be received in a community where they lives rather than of the provisions in force (in the RASKIN program) that have unclear sanctions for them. The closeness between the client and the street-level bureaucrats in term of informal relationships and norms in a traditional society is still strong. The situation impacts on the raises of the findings of the irregularities that occurred in the RASDA implementation. There is a tendency to negotiate the sanctions between the target groups as clients with vanguard bureaucrats that have a close relationship informally.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the findings on the field as it has been described in previous chapters, it can be concluded as follows:

1. The achievement indicator of the program in case of the re-design efforts from RASKIN program to RASDA program is still not completely successful.
2. There are several factors that cause RASDA Program in Kulon Progo failed to be implemented successfully, namely:
 - a. The conflict of the concept design of the program with the existing realities results some difficulties to actualize the concept design itself. It is seen from (1). Their rationality as program targets farmers was beaten by the possibility of the benefits that will be gained; (2). The intervention of complicated interests from political elites in the process of the policy formulation; (3). The limitations of the decision-making authority of local government in the National RASKIN Program; and (4). The gap between the resources capability in the draft and in the factual conditions.
 - b. The existence of a conflict of interest in the disposition of the lead implementer of each program managers tends to walk on their own and less synergistic. It is seen from (1) there are suspected efforts to make the RASDA program as a springboard to achieve other objectives; (2) the apparent support of *BULOG*; (3) the lack of enthusiasm and initiatives among the holders/bureaucracy; and (4) the business

mindset that dominates entrepreneurs in *Gapoktan*.

- c. The target groups that as a part of the environment program has not received a sufficient attention as a support in overcoming problems that arise.

RECOMMENDATION

From the research, it can be seen that there are many weaknesses in the concept design in the beginning of RASDA program that eventually lead to major challenges in its implementation. There will a lot of energy to spend if the government of Kulonprogo Regency is still targeting to implement the program fully. Related to that situation, the advices that can be offered by the writer are first, focusing only on improving the implementation of RASKIN that has been underway. The second, it is looking for other alternatives as efforts to optimize the potential of the local food to increase the welfare of society in general and of the farmers or rice producers in particular. Meanwhile, a positive steps has been achieved through an MoU with *BULOG* to continuously maximize the *Gapoktan* role as a supplier of rice to *BULOG*.

The findings on the field in the previous description show that the problems arising from the implementation of the RASKIN program (case in Kulonprogo) actually come from dynamic changes that occur in the implementation of the program. This situation comes from both the implemented program by the government or *BULOG*, and the behavior the people at the grassroots level. Moreover, the efforts to im-

prove the performance of RASKIN program can be started from maximizing the system that has been formed previously to get the 6T indicators. It can be indicated by seriously overcoming deviations that occur. This is where the significance of monitoring, evaluation, and reporting are carried out with seriousness in accordance with the real problems that occur in the field. As an evaluation of improvement, it also includes how to prepare both the operational and technical guidelines to both prevent and solve the problems. It is related to how to completely minimize the potential irregularities as a referral executor underneath.

If it is proven that the indicators that often lead to the achievement of 6T indicator are not achieved. One of those is the practice of the distribution of rice to be targeted. There are some things you can do to minimize the deviations effect. One of them is holding a socialization to the lowest level society to enlarge the mindset. One of the provision that should be believed is that RASKIN program implementation is not only about qualification along with the criteria but also about involving local public figures. They are expected to professionally control the RASKIN program and no need to be reluctant if the share of the rice that is not right. It is quite difficult to change the mindset of people like this. However, it is not impossible to do because basically the traditional rural society tend to be more easily touched by using the sociological approach in the form of reconstruction of values and norms in society. This is an attempt to apply more effectively the social sanctions to support

the achievement of program objectives.

Moreover, one of the efforts to minimize the presence of nepotism practice is updating the data of RTS-PM to be more valid. Although the quota of rice recipients from the central government is limited, at least the lower level government should have a priority list of RTM conditions that more accurate. In addition to get a better program target accuracy, it is also important to avoid jealousy of RTMs which are not registered, which are sometimes more appropriate for the subsidy. The writer also suggests the local governments to provide a budget allocation in the APBD to back up the subsidy of the rice procurement to poor families who are not registered in the RASKIN rice recipients list from the central government as a part of the social protection. Although the amount of the budget is a limited, this still may be done in the implementation of the budget allocation priority for the poor (pro-poor). Absolutely it needs to prepare local regulations as a legal basis, including a regulation to avoid the society's dependency on the government assistance.

Meanwhile, the control of RASKIN rice quality has now become the *BULOG's* authority. In addition to that authority, there has been no other parties that are more appropriate to replace the role. It is not only about the quality of the rice demanded, but also the guaranty of the stock availability on each quantum distribution of RASKIN. It also deal with infrastructures supporting the implementation of the program on a national scale. The main issue is only how to maximize the role of the society to monitor the

quality of the rice received by RTS-PM as a part of the control mechanisms of the RASKIN program. It also needs to open widely a public complaints channel and to hold a good coordination with *BULOG*. Those have been already done so far in Kulon Progo, but it still needs to be supported more frequently to control up to the lowest level.

The involvement of the rice entrepreneurs in *Gapoktan* as *BULOG*'s partner is an evidence to improve the RASKIN program both from the supply and the quality of the rice that can shift up the performance of *BULOG* itself. At least it becomes a positive step forward and it needs to be continued. Another positive step that should be taken is maximizing the market share of the potential demand of RASKIN rice program, either for the entrepreneurs themselves or for Kulonprogo regency. The rice entrepreneurs/traders in *Gapoktan* who become the *BULOG* partners will be able to cut the distribution chain affecting on the decrease of the rice price. This is because the employers in *Gapoktan* are generally small-to-medium business actors which have more often become middlemen liaison between farmers and other partners. It is now just only about how the entrepreneurs in this *Gapoktan* can also be instrumental in the development of *Gapoktan* overall. Moreover, the government can also seek how small-medium businesses that already exist can gain an access to the central government to develop their businesses and management skills in term of entrepreneurship to be better.

The limitation in this study is on the analysis of the RASDA program conducted. The re-

searchers here can only advise to do a study related to the possibility of establishing a regional company in the case of the rice management integrated to Kulonprogo government. It is based on the fact that the local rice in Kulonprogo is very potential considering the condition of the surplus is always achieved. Meanwhile, the surplus has not been managed well to increase the welfare of the farmers. Furthermore, the farmers who have their own agricultural lands and products tend to have an inferior position. That is why, with a little government involvement in the downstream sector, it is expected to establish the standard quality and the price of rice openly to the public. It aims in avoiding the incoherent information to the farmers. It can also be a counterweight to maintain a fair competition among existing entrepreneurs and also to encourage the establishment of a better price as well so that the farmers and the entrepreneurs are both likely to get benefits accordingly. A better management by the related parties can certainly increase the products value and expand the market access.

Walking along with the widespread spirit of the movement *Bela Beli Kulonprogo* (shift up the local products), it is necessary to label up the local products including rice, to encourage the rice employers in Kulonprogo to do branding on the rice products. It is expected that in advance, the local products will be recognized by the society well. The society will be able to identify which is the local product and which is not easily. As a result, people are involved much better in lifting local products. Of course, it is important to keep the quality and the price to main-

tain the competitiveness of the products. The promotions can also be done by the local government. Finally the most important is how the policies and programs drawn up are actually beneficial for many people, especially for the target groups. It is not expected that the program is fruitful only for a few people on behalf of the public interests and efforts who try to take benefits privately through the government policy.

REFERENCES

- _____, 2015, *Pedoman Umum RASKIN 2015*, Kementerian Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat, Jakarta
- _____, 2015, *Road Map RASDA*, InProSu-La, unpublished
- _____, 2015, *Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Program RASKIN 2015*, Pemprov DIY, Yogyakarta
- Abidin S. Zainal, 2002, *Kebijakan Publik*, Pancur Siwah, Jakarta
- Anderson E. James, 2003, *Public Policy Making*, Houghton Mifflin Company; Boston USA
- Badan Pusat Statistik, 2015, *Kulonprogo Dalam angka 2014*, download from <http://www.kulonprogokab.go.id/v21/getfile.php?file=kulonprogo-dalam-angka-2014.zip> tanggal 15 Oktober 2015
- Badan Pusat Statistik, 2015, *DIY Dalam angka 2014*, download from http://bappeda.jogjaprov.go.id/assets/uploads/docs/DDA_2014.pdf tanggal 15 Oktober 2015
- Bird & Vaillancourt, 2000, *Desentralisasi Fiskal Negara-negara Berkembang*, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta
- Brinkerhoff W. Derric dan Crosby L. Benjamin, 2002, *Managing Policy Reform – Concepts and Tools for Decision Makers in Developing and Transitioning Countries*, Kumarian Press Inc., Blue Hills Avenue USA
- Dunn N. William, 1998, *Pengantar Analisis Kebijakan Publik – Edisi Kedua*, Gadjah Mada University Press, Yogyakarta
- Dwiyanto Agus. dkk, 2005, *Mewujudkan Good Governance Melalui Pelayanan Publik*, Gadjah Mada University Press, Yogyakarta
- Dye T. Thomas, 1972, *Understanding Public Policy*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey USA
- Grindle S. Merilee, 1980, *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*. Prenceton Univercity Press, New Jersey USA
- Islami Irfan, 1997, *Prinsip-Prinsip Perumusan Kebijaksanaan Negara*, Bumi Aksara, Jakarta
- Kickert. JM. Walter, Klinjn. H. Erik dan Koppenjan FM. Joop, 1997, *Managing Complex Networks – Strategies for the Public Sector*, SAGE Publications, London-Thousand Oaks –New Delhi
- Lembaga Penelitian SMERU, 2012, “*draf - Ker- tas Kerja, Tinjauan Efektivitas Pelaksanaan RASKIN dalam Mencapai Enam Tepat*”, diunduh dari <http://www.smeru.or.id/sites/default/files/publication/raskinmencapaienamtepat.pdf> June 6th 2015
- Lipsky. Michael, 1980, *Street-level Bureaucrac: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, USA
- Mazmanian A. Daniel and Sabatier A. Paul, 1983, *Implementation and Public Policy*, Scott Foresman and Co., USA
- Moleong J. Lexy, 2004, *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif – Edisi Revisi*, Rosdakarya Offset, Bandung

- Mustopadidjaja A.R., 2003, *Manajemen Proses Kebijakan Publik – Formulasi, Implementasi, dan Evaluasi Kinerja*, LAN – Duta Pertiwi Foundation, Jakarta
- Nawawi Hadari, 2003, *Metode Penelitian Bidang Sosial*, Gadjah Mada University Press, Yogyakarta
- Nugroho Ryan, 2014, *Public Policy – Teori, Manajemen, Dinamika, Analisis, Konvergensi dan Kimia Kebijakan*, PT. Elek Media Kompetindo – Gramedia, Jakarta
- Parsons, Wyne: 2005, *Public Policy: Pengantar Teori dan Praktik Analisis Kebijakan*, Kencana, Jakarta
- Purwanto A. Erwan dan Sulistyastuti R. Dyah; 2012; *Implementasi Kebijakan Publik – Konsep dan Aplikasinya di Indonesia*; GAVA Media, Yogyakarta
- Riawanti, Wahyu., 2015, *Kajian Ekonomi Politik Kebijakan Pangan: Studi Kasus Rent-seeking dalam Impor Beras Tahun 1999-2009*, Desertasi – Universitas Gadjah Mada, unpublished
- Subarsono A.G., 2005, *Analisis Kebijakan Publik – Konsep, Teori dan Aplikasi*, Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta
- Sutopo HB., 2000, *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif*, Sebelas Maret University Press, Surakarta
- Thoha Miftah, 2007, *Birokrasi dan Politik di Indonesia*, Radja Grafindo Persada, Jakarta
- Wahab. S. Abdul, 1997, *Analisis Kebijakan : Dari Formulasi Ke Implementasi Kebijaksanaan Negara*, Bumi Aksara, Jakarta
- Wibawa Samodra, Prabuningrat Y. dan Pramusinto A., 1994, *Evaluasi Kebijakan Publik*, PT RajaGrafindo Persada, Jakarta
- Wibawa. Samodra, 1994, *Kebijakan Publik: Proses dan Analisis*, Intermedia, Jakarta
- Winarno Budi, 2002, *Teori dan Proses Kebijakan Publik*, Media Pressindo, Yogyakarta
- <http://berita.suaramerdeka.com/....> accessed June 1st 2015
- <http://bkpp.jogjaprovo.go.id/....> accessed May 29th 2015
- <http://BULOG.go.id/....> accessed May 29th 2015
- <http://data.tnp2k.go.id/....> accessed May 29th 2015
- <http://dipertahut.kulonprogokab.go.id/....> accessed May 27th 2015
- <http://inprosula.org/2015/02/....> accessed May 27th 2015
- <http://kpk.go.id/id/berita/siaran-pers/....> accessed August 29th 2015
- <http://kulonprogo.go.id/....> accessed May 29th 2015
- <http://regional.kompasiana.com/2013/12/....> accessed May 27th 2015
- <http://www.harianjogja.com.baca20151230stok-beras-.....> accessed January 15th 2016
- <http://www.kulonprogokab.go.id/v21/Jatah-..> accessed May 27th 2015
- <http://www.merdeka.com/uang/....> accessed August 29th 2015
- <http://www.rmol.co/read/2015/01/14/...> accessed August 29th 2015
- <http://www.rri.co.id/yogyakarta/post/berita/...> accessed June 1st 2015
- <http://www.tribun.news.com/2015/04/....> accessed May 27th 2015