ISSN Online 2685-7790

GLOBAL SOUTH REVIEW

Volume 5 No. 1 January 2023

Global South Review (GSR)

Published by:
Institute of International Studies
Department of International Relations
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences

Global South Review is an academic journal published by Institute of International Studies on behalf of the Department of International Relations Universitas Gadjah Mada dedicated to provide academic and policy platform to exchange views, research findings, and dialogues within the Global South and between the Global North and the Global South. The Journal is designed to be a media to examine all the issues encountered by Global South in the context of current international justice, security, and order. Issued twice a year every June and December, contributors of the Journal are open for those who share concern on south – south cooperation.

Editorial Office
Institute of International Studies
Departemen Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, FISIPOL UGM
Gedung Bulaksumur Lt. 5, Jl. Socio-Justica 01 Bulaksumur,
Yogyakarta 55281, Indonesia
Tel. +62 274 563362 ext. 115
Email: gsr.fisipol@ugm.ac.id
Website: http://iis.fisipol.ugm.ac.id

The editorial board of Global South Review would like to express our utmost gratitude to all the peer reviewers that participated in this edition's articles review process.

Editor's Note

Mohtar Mas'oed
Suci Lestari Yuana

Welcome to the latest edition of the Global South Review, a platform dedicated to the exploration of pressing issues facing nations in the Global South. We are thrilled to present a collection of insightful articles that shed light on the multifaceted challenges and opportunities in this dynamic region. Our mission has always been to provide a space for research and thoughtful analysis, fostering a deeper understanding of the issues that shape the Global South. The common thread running through these articles is the interconnectedness of Global South concerns, transcending geographical boundaries and underscoring the region's global significance.

Our journey begins with the first article, "Democracy Assistance to Global South: A Case Study of Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) Freedom Agenda in Indonesia." This study examines the influence of democracy promotion in Indonesia by the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), a German political foundation, takes center stage as an actor in Indonesia's political landscape. Indonesia, as a nation in the Global South, is a poignant illustration of the Global North's involvement in shaping democratic processes. The study scrutinizes how KAS's "Freedom Agenda" initiatives aim to instill Western democratic ideals within the Indonesian context, providing valuable insights into the intricate relationship between the Global North and the Global South in matters of governance and political transformation.

In the second article, "Whither Just Transition? A Case Study of Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM) Country Platform in Indonesia," we delve into the critical realm of energy transition. This article unveils the multifaceted web of global dynamics that intertwines with Indonesia's energy landscape. It lays bare how foreign investments and support can serve as both catalysts and challenges in the pursuit of a just transition. The implications of such external influence ripple through the Global South, raising questions about sovereignty, equity, and sustainability. The notion of a "just transition" resonates far beyond Indonesia's borders, echoing throughout the Global South, where nations grapple with the need to balance economic development with environmental responsibility. By dissecting Indonesia's experience, this article provides a lens through which we can scrutinize the broader global energy transition discourse, acknowledging that the choices made by countries in the Global South carry global consequences.

Our third article, "Not So Ambitious? Indonesia's Coal Dependence Amidst The Era of Energy Transition," explores Indonesia's coal dependence and its climate commitments. This article unravels Indonesia's intricate dance between climate commitments and the stark

reality of continued coal reliance. This dilemma encapsulates the broader struggle faced by many nations in the Global South, as they endeavor to balance environmental stewardship with developmental aspirations. The concept of "securitization" forms a crucial chapter in this narrative. This article illuminates how environmental concerns have become inseparable from broader security considerations. As the world grapples with the consequences of climate change, issues such as resource scarcity, displacement, and geopolitical tensions have emerged on the security agenda, particularly in the Global South.

In the fourth article, "Bride Trafficking from Vietnam to China: The Critique of Socialist Feminism," we turn our attention to gender issues and politics. The focal point of this article is the harrowing phenomenon of bride trafficking, a deeply troubling issue that plagues many countries in the Global South. As we immerse ourselves in the narrative, we come to understand the profound implications of this practice, particularly for Vietnamese women forcibly transported to China for marriage. This exploration is made even more illuminating by the application of a socialist feminist perspective, a critical lens that unveils the intricate intersection of two formidable forces: patriarchy and capitalism. Through this analytical framework, the article reveals how these oppressive structures conspire to perpetuate the exploitation of women, not just in Vietnam and China but across the Global South.

Our journey concludes with the fifth article, "The Opportunity to Achieve Net Zero Emissions in Indonesia Through Green Economy Implementation to Address Climate Change." This research engages with the pressing global issue of climate change and endeavors to elucidate Indonesia's capacity to transition towards a green economy, a pivotal aspect of the collective global response to climate change. By examining the empirical context of Indonesia, this study provides valuable insights into the intricate interplay between environmental responsibility and sustainable economic development—a dynamic that resonates deeply with the concerns and aspirations of numerous Global South nations. The central premise of achieving net-zero emissions takes center stage in this academic discourse, serving as both an aspirational and pragmatic goal in a world confronting unprecedented ecological challenges. The study underscores Indonesia's endeavor as emblematic of broader aspirations within the Global South, where the imperative of carbon emissions reduction harmonizes with the imperatives of economic growth and poverty alleviation.

We firmly believe that understanding and addressing the challenges faced by the Global South is paramount for progress and well-being. These articles exemplify the diversity and complexity of these challenges while highlighting the role of scholarly research in finding innovative solutions. As we continue our commitment to promoting research and facilitating dialogues on Global South matters, we extend our heartfelt thanks to the dedicated authors and peer reviewers who have enriched this issue. We hope that the insights presented here

spark further discussions, inform policies, and inspire actions aimed at creating a more equitable and sustainable Global South. Thank you for your ongoing support, and we invite you to explore this enriching collection of articles in the current edition of the Global South Review.

Sincerely,

Mohtar Mas'oed - Editor in Chief
Suci Lestari Yuana - Managing Editor

GLOBAL SOUTH REVIEW

Table of Contents Volume 5 No. 1 January 2023

Democracy Assistance to Global South: A Case Study of Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) Freedom Agenda in Indonesia

Tsabita Afifah Khoirunnisa, Yusli Effendi
10.22146/globalsouth.81109

Department of International Relations
Brawijaya University, Indonesia
tsabitafifah@student.ub.ac.id

This paper aims to investigate and analyze the democracy promotion carried out by Konrad-Adanauer Stiftung (KAS) in Indonesia. Our provisional findings on the case show that the hegemony of the North over the South is also perpetuated through political and economic assistance. Through the German political foundation of KAS, Germany seeks to foster a Western "better democracy" in Indonesia through several programs in collaboration with local actors. These "Freedom Agenda '' include training for civil apparatus and legal drafting training for national legislation. The Freedom Agenda carried out by KAS in Indonesia is associated with Germany's pursuit of democracy promotion policy. This study utilizes Neo-Gramscian Approach by Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) to investigate the role of KAS in maintaining the hegemonic order of Western Democracy in Indonesia through Cox's historical structure. By using library research, this study seeks to explain the reciprocal relationship between Cox's social forces in hegemony structure of Western democracy.

Keywords: *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung; democracy promotion; hegemony; social forces*

Introduction

To implement their foreign policy, EU members utilize political foundations as actors to carry out the program. The Federation of German Government is one of the EU members that has attributed political foundations *(Stiftungen)* to pursue their national interest abroad. The political strategy of using *Stiftungen* to pursue political interests is familiar to German authorities. The popularity of *Stiftungen* has encouraged other European countries to do the same under the development assistance policy (Lloyd, 2010). The study below discusses how Germany's *Stiftung* maintains hegemonic order by distributing hegemonic ideas and Western democratic values.

The formation of political foundations in Germany has existed since 1925. The Social Democratic Party founded Stiftungen in Germany under Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). This was followed by establishment of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation by the Christian Democratic Party in 1956. Other initiatives emerged after that, such as the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, which is affiliated with the Free Democrats Party, and the HannsSeidel Foundation by Chris-

tian Social Union in 1967. The growth of these political foundations reveals that German governments have been attributing political foundations as part of their political strategy.

Previous research on the attribution of German political foundations in the Global South region is sufficient to give us an idea of how foundations—affiliated with political parties and funded by the government—conduct their activities abroad. There were various topics in *Stiftungen's* research; a recent one was conducted by Weissenbach (2016) analyzes the party funding to the political foundations. Using the MSSD method, This study shows that party promotion instruments always corresponded to a party's individual characteristics and promoted the institutionalization process when they were in a certain sequence (Weissenbach, 2016). Before Weissenbach, previous research was carried out by academics such as Schurmann (1989), who discussed KAS activities in India, and Kress (1985), who discussed the comparison of FES and KAS activities in Latin America. Proceeding Weissenbach, another research on German political foundations was introduced by Sieker (2019) through her PhD thesis, which discusses the role of six German political foundations as a form of public diplomacy for German foreign policy. In addition, Samse and others (2019) discuss the role of KAS in the East Asia region, while in the Middle East, there is research on the role of *Stiftungen* in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Tel Aviv (Abelmann & Konarek, 2018).

Irrespective of the previous research mentioned above, the research topics regarding political foundations–especially Konrad Adenauer Stiftung–encompass what activities are carried out by *Stiftung* to support Germany's political interests. Without regard to these previous studies, the authors discuss the role of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in maintaining hegemonic order by distributing hegemonic ideas through democracy promotion policy.

Democracy promotion carried out by Germany is not limited to certain forms of democracy but involves the application of the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Germany perceives this way because development, in any case, cannot be achieved without democratic principles (Sieverdingbeck, 2004). The values in democracy promotion by Germany include 'promotion of democratic elections and parliaments, equal rights for women and protection of minorities, and participation of civil society in government decision-making processes, and promoting a free and independent media (Lloyd, 2010)'. German socio-democratic values shared common elements to the concept of Western democracy e.g social justice, rule of law, and freedom of speech. However, Germany's democratic values have a stronger emphasis on the role of the state in the economy to regulate markets; redistributive policies to address socioeconomic disparities; labor rights and union influence on decision making process; as well as progressive taxation; and publicly funded and accessible public services such as education, healthcare, and social services. This relates

to the concept of hegemony adopted by Cox from Gramsci, where 'to become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a world order which was universal in conception that most states could find compatible with their interests (Cox, 1983)'. According to Cox, hegemony is the driving force of history, manifested as a material and ideological component of world power relations that change over time (Cox & Jacobson, 1977). The authors argue that to maintain hegemonic order, Germany uses its political foundation to extend their agenda in the Global South through the promotion of democratic values as their foreign policy.

This study explores how Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the German government distribute Western democratic values abroad as a strategy to carry out hegemony in the Global South. The authors focus on KAS activities in Indonesia between 2015 and 2021, specifically during Angela Merkel's administration. KAS Partnership programs focus on activities covering the fields of 1) Parliament and Parties; 2) Democracy, the rule of law and civil society; and 3) Social Market Economy (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2022). Their programs range from seminars, international conferences, and training to promote, what the authors refer to as, the Freedom Agenda under the hegemonic ideology of Western democracy.

The Freedom Agenda is recognized as the promotion of Germany's democratic values under the hegemonic order of Western Democracy in Indonesia that distributes social democratic values through partnership programs in which hegemonic ideas are created and preserved in Indonesian society. For instance, on the program Pesantren for Peace, KAS collaborated with the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) to promote peace and stability (UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2015). In addition, the KAS program with the Jimly School of Law and Government promotes the concept of independence of the judiciary and the rule of law (BINUS University, 2019).

Research on democracy promotion mostly sees it as an independent policy or places democracy promotion within the framework of different policy areas, such as foreign policy or development cooperation (Weissenbach, 2016). This research stands on the position of democracy promotion as part of foreign policy, or what the authors refer to as the 'Freedom Agenda'. This study is driven by Cox's idea that 'world hegemony is expressed in universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms that establish general rules of behaviour for states' (Cox, 1983). The Freedom Agenda carried out by Germany through KAS includes promoting social market economic values, freedom and peace, and the integration of the European Union. These values are considered the 'legacy' of Konrad Adenauer.

Cox's view on a hegemonic structure is derived from the global level of analysis. In the broader sense of KAS principles and values, the foundation promotes German democratic values which share common elements with Western Democracy that encompass basic principles and norms most Western countries hold, such as freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law, promoting peace

and stability. United Nations expanded these principles into ten categories; 1) Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; 2) Freedom of association; 3) Freedom of expression and opinion; 4) Access to power and its exercise under the rule of law; 5) The holding of periodic free and fair elections by universal suffrage and by secret ballot as the expression of the will of the people; 6) A pluralistic system of political parties and organizations; 7) The separation of powers; 8) The independence of the judiciary; 9) Transparency and accountability in public administration; and also 10) Free, independent and pluralistic media (United Nations, 2023). This categorization, classified by the United Nations, is one of the evidences that highlights the concept of institutions according to Coxian Critical Theory, which emphasizes the role of international institutions in sustaining hegemonic ideology through Western democratic values.

In order to investigate how hegemonic ideas are created and sustained in Indonesia, we explored KAS partnership programs in Indonesia. This can be seen through KAS's activities with SATUNAMA, which runs a democratization program through the Sekolah Politisi Muda (SATUNAMA, 2015) by training young people about democracy and politics. In addition, other activities can also be seen through KAS's routine activities with CSRC, which organizes the Pesantren for Peace (PfP) program with the theme revolves around Western democratic values (CSRC, 2021; UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2015). The program run by KAS with its partners in Indonesia can form collective intellectuals, where according to Gramsci, this intellectual group has a major role in building a historic bloc (Cox, 1983) because intellectuals can play a role in developing and maintaining mental images from a class or historic bloc to become a common identity.

The data gathered in this research is analyzed through the Neo-Gramscian approach offered by Cox, called Coxian Critical Theory (CCT). The Coxian Approach can explain the relationship between material capabilities, ideas, and institutions in maintaining hegemonic order. In this research, the concept is utilized to explain how KAS distributes Western democratic values as hegemonic ideas in Indonesia and how material capabilities and international institutions help to sustain those ideas.

Contrary to German political foundations, foundations in Indonesia tend to use the labels 'non-profit' and 'independent' in representing their institutions; therefore, the authors cannot fully claim foundations in Indonesia as political foundations *(Stiftungen)*. Nevertheless, various studies have shown the role of foundations–in general–regarding various social phenomena. Research conducted by Achsin et al. (2020) discusses the role of the Wahid Foundation in preventing violent extremism in Indonesia. Several studies have raised the role of foundations in improving the community's welfare in certain areas (Murtani, 2019; Muthahari, 2019). At the international level, recent research discusses the Wahid Foundation program with UN Women (Ayunur, 2020) and the role of international philanthropic organizations in the developmental area (Radikawati et al.,

2020). The research gap on foreign political foundations analysis in Indonesia composes this study as one of the initiated research on the area.

Based on the research development of political foundations in Indonesia, this situation requires an exploratory study to investigate this phenomenon. This research design is a descriptive qualitative study that uses data collection methods through library studies. This study aims to explain the role of Cox's social forces in hegemonic structure that contribute to maintaining hegemonic order on the international level. The authors departed from several preliminary assumptions. First, the authors assume KAS activities in Indonesia are associated from Germany's national interest, promoting democracy abroad. Second, democracy promotion delivered by KAS in Indonesia is to support the hegemonic order of Western democracy that is dominant to the global order. This research is based upon a research question; how does the Konrad Adenauer Foundation support and preserve the hegemonic order of Western democracy through its Freedom Agenda in Indonesia? The authors utilize the Coxian Critical Theory approach with library research to answer the former question.

Coxian/Neo-Gramscian Approach

This study uses Robert Cox's approach regarding the three forces in the structure to explain the role of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in preserving hegemonic ideas in Indonesia in the context of democracy promotion. The approach by Cox is commonly known as the Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) or Neo-Gramscian Approach. The authors will discuss Cox's concepts and attribution to the study case in this section.

The main idea of Cox's political thoughts is rooted in Gramsci's ideas. Cox is considered one of the figures who linked Gramsci's thinking to studying international relations. Cox adopted Gramsci's concepts: hegemony, institutions, and historic blocs. His major works (Cox, 1981, 1983) explain how he adopts Gramsci's ideology into international relations. The turn of Gramscian in IR provides a way to conceptualize a world order free from the constraints of state-centric approaches and relations between states while explicitly recognizing their importance (Moolakkattu, 2009)

Cox and Gramsci both adopted a school of Marxism called historical materialism. This school can reason historically and seeks to explain and promote changes in social relations (Cox, 1981). Historical materialism not only examines the relationship of forces in production but also in conditions as well as in international relations. In short, historical materialism can see conflict as a possible cause of structural change. In historical contexts, political structures—such as churches, education systems, media, and other institutions—contribute to building behaviour and expectations of society that are consistent or in line with the hegemonic social order (Cox, 1983).

Gramsci shared the view that the state and society form a solid structure called the historic bloc. Gramsci uses this term to describe the unity between structure and superstructure in which several social forces

share ideas and values. Cox also adopted this concept regarding social forces. Cox explains that the world can be represented as a pattern of interaction between social forces, where the state acts as an intermediary between global and local social forces (Cox, 1981). The historic bloc concept is dialectical, where interacting elements create greater unity.

According to Gramsci, the historic bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic class—the dominant class in a country or social order (Cox, 1983). In this context, intellectual groups are important in building historic blocs. Gramsci saw this group as organically connected with social class. Gramsci identified the party as a form of collective intellectuals, which plays a role in building the mental images of society. According to Gramsci, intellectual groups have a role in developing and maintaining mental images, technologies, and organizations that bind members of a class and a historic bloc into a common identity (Cox, 1983).

Cox also adopted Gramsci's concept that ideas and material conditions are always bound together, influence each other, and cannot be reduced to one another (Cox, 1983). This concept relates to the three categories of forces in the structure, which will be discussed later. According to Gramsci, ideas or ideologies must be understood concerning material conditions and conditions that include social relations (Cox, 1983). Cox offers a historical structure method representing a certain scope of human activity in its historically located totality or limited totalities (Cox, 1983).

Cox's approach through historical structures tries to explain three forces in structure: material capabilities, ideas, and institutions. Cox defines historical structures as 'continuous social practices, created by collective human activity and transformed through collective human activity', shaped by interactions between 'certain combinations of thought patterns, material conditions, and human institutions' (Pass, 2018). This method can understand how ideas, material capabilities, and institutions have interacted at different times to shape the motivations and interests of actors at the organizational/material/discursive level in parallel with the explanation of global politics (Altiparmak, 2022).

The relationship of these three forces can be considered reciprocal (Cox, 1981). This concept is inspired by Gramsci, where the reciprocal relationship between material and ideas brings reciprocity between structure (social relations and physical production) and superstructure (ideology and political organization) (Altiparmak, 2022). This study highlights the role of 'organic intellectuals' which Moolakkattu (2009) stated that they are not only producing ideas, but also form complex and competing strategies.



Figure 1: Coxian Historical Structure

Cox explains that material capabilities are potential in productive and destructive forms. In a dynamic form, this power is manifested as technological and organizational capabilities. In contrast, in an accumulative form, it is seen as a natural resource which can change technology, equipment supply, and wealth. Furthermore, the next element discusses ideas within this framework. There are two types of *ideas*: ideas with an intersubjective meaning and ideas that hold a collective picture of the social order. The first one, Cox explains, is that ideologies have shared ideas about the nature of social relations—which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behaviour that have been historically conditioned. In the second type, ideas are collective images of the social order held by different groups so that each group has a different view of the nature and legitimacy of the prevailing power relations.

The last element of Cox's structure is institutions. This concept also adopts the concept of institutions initiated by Gramsci. According to Gramsci, institutions can provide a way to deal with internal conflict with minimal violence. Furthermore, Gramsci explained that institutions can be an anchor for a hegemonic strategy. Cox himself sees institutions as a tool to stabilize and perpetuate a certain order, which can reflect the prevailing power relations and encourage a collective image consistent with these power relations. Institutions are considered a mixture of ideas and material forces, which influence the development of these ideas and material forces (Cox, 1981).

Cox's view of international institutions places institutions as a process in power relations in which hegemony is institutionalized (Cox & Jacobson, 1977)'. The hegemonic concept of world order is found in regulating inter-state conflicts and civil society. For Cox, the expansion of hegemony was carried out in peripheral countries as a passive revolution (Cox, 1983). Value hegemony occurs through the adoption of cultural, economic, and political aspects by peripheral countries (Cox, 1983) of universal values brought by hegemonic actors through international institutions as a place for these values to be distributed.

The authors use this concept to explain how the Konrad Adenauer Foundation maintains the existing hegemonic order in which Western democracy is dominant in international politics. Hegemony in the international system is a complex relationship between the international community that links social classes from various countries (Cox, 1981). Hegemony can be represented as a union between material forces, ideologies, and institutions where the three things are interrelated—this relates to the idea that the world is seen as a pattern of interacting social forces. World hegemony is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms, which set the ground rules for states and their societies to act according to universal standards.

Democracy Promotion Policy

The promotion of democracy by the Western, especially the members of the European Union, has become one of their foreign policies. It is essential to understand how

German authority involves democracy promotion as one of their foreign policies. The role of the EU in promoting democracy started long ago since the Post-Soviet condition, in which EU and US interference followed in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. Although the existence of the Western in the Global South through democracy promotion does not always succeed, they still manage to adopt this method as foreign policy.

The previous study by Wolff in 2013 discusses four rhetoric of government officials on German democracy promotion. First, the Germans prefer to use universal values and international norms rather than supporting specific forms of democracy. For example, The Development Ministry (BMZ) explicitly emphasizes that Germany does not promote a particular form of democracy but 'the implementation of democratic and rule-of-law principles' (Wolff, 2013). Second, the Germans perceive democratization as a long-term structural change for better conditions. The next one, democracy promotion, focuses more on cooperation and inclusion with non-democratic actors. Lastly, the actors of German foreign policy prefer to use pronouns like freedom, peace, and liberty rather than democracy. Federal ministries and other agents of democracy promotion policy commonly use these rhetorics. Wolff also mentioned that the German government takes international norms as the point of departure for conceiving its democracy promotion agenda (Wolff, 2013).

Germany's foreign policy on democracy promotion involves various actors. There are more than three actors involved in this foreign policy. The interrelation between these actors can be traced to relative parliamentary power during Merkel's fourth administration, which was dominated by Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD). For example, the Foreign Affairs Office and the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMUV) were led by SPD figures. In contrast, CDU members led the Ministry of Defence and Economic and Energy Cooperation, and CSU led the BMZ.

The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) focuses on several issues. For example, they build strong partnerships to achieve shared development goals, track issues that define a common global future, protect global goods, tackle structural causes of conflict, displacement, and violence, and support peacebuilding programs (BMZ, n.d.). The following agent is Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), which supports not only BMZ but also Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection (BMUV), Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs and European Union (GIZ, n.d.-a). One of the main agendas involving democracy promotion is the Alliance for Integrity (AFiN), a global project focusing on Participatory Development and Good Governance; Protection of the Environment and Resources; Ecological Sustainability; Gender Equality; and Poverty Orientation (GIZ, n.d.-b).

Germany's foreign policy is designed as a value-oriented foreign policy. Human

rights and democracy have been core values of German foreign policy. The Federal Foreign Office is responsible for formulating and implementing foreign policy. Although The Office is not directly emphasizing core tenets of preferable democratic values, they manage to refer to other terms such as civil society participation and freedom of speech. They also try to frame democratization as a long-term process that must be nurtured by the respective society (Faust & Leininger, 2014).

EU representatives in host countries also contribute to the democracy promotion policy. The EU influences and–in some cases–determines Germany's foreign policy and vice versa (Faust & Leininger, 2014). Democracy promotion has been advanced as an essential new symbolic policy agenda for twenty-first-century EU foreign policy (Kurki, 2011). Therefore, the democracy promotion conducted by Germany not only fulfils the political interest of domestic politics but also contributes to the regional agenda.

Political party foundations also become leading agents of German democracy promotion. Before 1990, German democracy promotion was mainly the business of the political party foundations (Wolff, 2013). The politics of Stiftungen in Germany is usually affiliated with a major political party—such as the Christian Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party. However, its funding is through the German government, which is 'divided based on the relative power of the party in the national parliament' (Lloyd, 2010). KAS is a part of the Christian Democratic Union; however, it was mentioned that there was no political intention between KAS and CDU in the sense of democracy promotion. Nevertheless, its power, popularity, and access to other countries benefited from its relative power in a parliamentary system–especially when Chancellor Angela Merkel was in the administration.

These agents play crucial roles in democracy promotion policies. Some of them use a political approach, and the rest of them use a developmental approach. There are different approaches to democracy promotion. Cited from Babayev (2014), Carothers mentioned two approaches to this foreign policy: the political approach that perceives the value of democracy as a political end; and the developmental approach that perceives democracy as a contributing factor in national development.

The democracy promotion conducted by KAS in Indonesia focuses on the second approach, whereas they use more indirect methods. FES, another political foundation from Germany that also works in Indonesia, has a controversial reputation during the SBY administration. Therefore, it is one of the main causes for KAS to use a 'friendly' approach rather than the aggressive one.

The developmental approach is implemented through several activities, such as supporting social and economic development, supporting institutions in terms of building state capacity and good governance, and also emphasizing the importance of partnership with the host government (Babayev, 2014; Perdana, 2019; SATUNAMA, n.d., 2015). These are reflected through their flagship programs with each partner in Indo-

nesia. For example, KAS's partnership with SATUNAMA Foundation focuses on giving informal education to teenagers and young adults about participatory and representative democracy. Furthermore, KAS partnership with the Jimly School of Law and Government conducts a seminar in several provinces of Indonesia by providing training for jurisdiction members about the rule of law (BINUS University, 2019, 2020, 2021a, 2021b). A strong emphasis on supporting the rule of law links its human rights approach with its aim of supporting democracy (Faust & Leininger, 2014). Rather than being aggressive like FES, KAS activity in Indonesia is more moderate in terms of associating their Christian Democratic values with Indonesia's society. This means that the change in KAS building is more gradual, small-scale, and less politicized with a slow and iterative process.

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Indonesia

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is a political foundation associated with Christian Democratic Union, which aims to promote liberal democracy and its social market economy called *Soziale Markwitshaft.* In addition, KAS also promotes peace and freedom, transatlantic relations, and European integration (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, n.d.). Foundation's funding, Lloyd stated that 97 per cent of KAS funding comes from the German Government (Lloyd, 2010). In accordance with the former statement, the foundation received 214 million euro from federal grants and 3 million euro from state and local governments in 2022 (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2023a)

The study we conducted here took place between 2015 to 2021. During this period, Germany was led by Angela Merkel as the ChancellorChancellor. This background aligns with how we perceive KAS activity in Indonesia because neither Merkel nor KAS shared a common interest associated with Christian Democratic Union. CDU itself domestic politics have succeeded three political figures as the ChancellorChancellor: Konrad Adenauer, Helmut Kohl, and Angela Merkel.

Indonesia is one of the KAS partner countries with a long relationship since 1968. KAS activities in Indonesia are carried out through three principles that are applied, namely by using a decentralized project approach, by collaborating with local partners, and by offering the development of democracy that is not 'Western democracy' (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2022)

KAS's partners in Indonesia are divided into research institutes, governments, and NGOs. First, KAS partners with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which has an annual Strategic Dialogue program. This program has been implemented five times, and every year, both parties bring significant themes that are mutual for both institutions.

KAS also has a partnership program with the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) from UIN Jakarta. This partnership with CSRC is implemented under the Pesantren for Peace (PfP) program, where the main target in this partnership is students in Java (Republika, 2015). In con-

trast to the annual KAS program with CSIS, the partnership program with CSRC is carried out regularly. This program carried out training for students related to Counter Extremism Narrative, which relates to the KAS agenda at the global level to fight against extremism, antisemitism, and racism. According to KAS, extremism is considered unconstitutional outside democratically determined political boundaries (Bickel & Semaan, 2022). Furthermore, this foundation considers that extremism can threaten democratic practices such as elections, separation of powers, human rights, pluralism and secularism, and the rule of law (Bickel & Semaan, 2022).

The foundation also has partnerships with several other NGOs, such as the Yayasan Perspektif Baru (YPB), owned by Wilmar Witoeler, which is engaged in the environmental sector. The partnership established by KAS and YPB works under the Campus Road Show program, where YPB will visit several campuses and hold energy and environmental issues seminars. Aside from YPB, the foundation also built a partnership with SATUNAMA Foundation. The partnership program carried out by SATUNAMA and KAS is engaged in democracy, which can be seen through its regular programs, Sekolah Politisi Muda (SPM) and Civic Education for Future Leaders (CEFIL). This program aims to; 1) increase the capacity of young politicians as important political subjects in the development of democracy, 2) increase the sensitivity of young politicians to social problems and challenges to democracy in Indonesia, and 3) increase awareness and knowledge of young politicians about the urgency of politics as a medium of struggle in articulating and aggregating the people's interests, needs, and rights (SATUNAMA, n.d.). In its financial report (SATUNAMA, 2020), SATUNAMA obtains funds from several foundations, one of which is KAS itself. In the 2020 financial report, SATUNAMA received revenue of Rp.963,870,769 for the CPID program.

KAS also builds a partnership with Paramadina University through the Paramadina Institute for Education Reform (PIER). This partnership inserts a narrative on the Soziale Markwitshaft, or social market economy (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2017). The purpose of this market economy is to obtain maximum prosperity with the best possible social protection so that people have advantages in the market, such as free choice of workplace and freedom of price, and can stem losses such as market monopoly, market pricing, and unemployment (Deutschland, 2018). The program with Paramadina University moves in training whose targets are teachers or educators (Halvaima, 2022; Rahadi, 2018). In addition to the idea of a social market economy, the program also brings narratives about democracy into the training (Majalah Teras, 2020; PIER, 2021).

In the judicial sector, KAS builds a partnership with the Jimly School of Law & Government (JSLG), which provides training and seminars to court and law enforcement institutions. This training has been attended by various judges from the high courts, such as in East Nusa Tenggara, the Chairperson of the Religious Courts attend-

ed this training for Kupang, Ruteng, Waikabubak, and Maumere (BINUS University, 2021a). In addition, the Yogyakarta High Court and Religious Courts also participated in the KAS-JSLG training on 'Management of Case Handling in Courts in the Perspective of the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judge Conduct' (BINUS University, 2021b). KAS-JSLG also organizes this training for judges in DKI Jakarta and its surroundings (BINUS University, 2019, 2020).

Furthermore, KAS establishes a partnership relationship with the Indonesian executive agency, the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (Kemendagri). The partnership with the Ministry of Home Affairs operates under the Human Resources Development Agency (BPSDM) of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which provides training for ASN to develop their capabilities. The training held by the Ministry of Home Affairs BPSDM with KAS is about digitalization, such as technological innovation (BPSDM Kemendagri, 2021d; Dianita, 2022a, 2022b) and digital literacy (BPSDM Kemendagri, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c, 2021d; Ramdhani, 2021). This partnership is intertwined with the KAS program, Think Tank Report, which discusses digitalization and connectivity.

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung's partnership in Indonesia has different values to promote, but these values are inseparable from Western democratic values. KAS distributes these values by implementing them through the seminars or training that the partners carry out. Hence, western democratic values could be absorbed into Indonesian society.

Discussion

Based on the previous explanation above, we focused on how Western Democracy as a hegemonic idea is created and preserved in Indonesia. We divided our discussions into three sections by applying Cox's concept of hegemony structure. First, we discuss the promotion of Western Democracy in Indonesia which not only perpetuated by a single actor, rather a network of different actors and followed by explanation of the KAS programs to promote Germany's democratic values. Second, we focus our analysis on material capabilities given by KAS that help to support the advancement of hegemonic ideas at the global level. Finally, we will discuss the international institutions that legitimize Western Democracy as hegemonic ideas and democracy promotion as EU foreign policy.

This concept of Western democracy emerged as the dominant form of government and the standard of good governance. Instead of focusing on democracy as the body of government, democracy promotion focuses on implementing democratic values abroad. The EU recognized democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights as the cornerstone of peace and human development (Elmar Brok MEP, 2007), regardless of the diversity of foreign cultures in interpreting these concepts. As a result, implementing democratic values worldwide became one of the main agenda in EU foreign policy.

Democracy promotion in Indonesia is delivered through various channels. Some programs are carried out by collaborating

with local governments; some are distributed through civil society organizations (CSOs). Irrespective of the channels where the program is implemented, democracy promotion in Indonesia is usually intertwined with development and P/CVE programs. Corresponding to the scope of research, we managed to map out democracy promotion channels in Indonesia using network tools from Atlas.



The network presented above has shown various channels contributing to democracy promotion policy. Although we already point out some actors in this policy, it does not rule out any possibility of other actors contributing in this area. In this study, we found that actors in democracy promotion in Indonesia came from different branches; some are under regional mandate, some from bilateral agreements, and others from international regimes. The network also illustrates the relationship between actors and its programs, where programs focus on development, research, and good governance. One of the things that we can conclude through this network is that regardless of the diversity of channels that deliver these programs, they come from the same framework, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna Declaration, and the United Nations Charter. This also concludes that despite how many initiatives are conducted in Indonesia, these actors strive to create what is suggested before, Western democracy as hegemonic ideas where they try to shape understanding that Western democratic values are the most suitable for society.

Approaches to democracy promotion by KAS in Indonesia are carried out by collaborating with different local channels. Those channels range from government institutions such as the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) and House of Representatives (DPR) to research institutions such as CSIS and CSRC, and also through CSOs like Yayasan Perspektif Baru and SATUNAMA Foundation (Perspektif Wilmar TV, 2020; SATUNAMA, 2015). KAS engagements with local channels are to build strong relationships for the good cause of Germany's relationship with Indonesia and to implement Germany's foreign policy, promoting Western democratic values.

A previous study carried out by (Mißfelder, 2014), a former member of the German *Bundestag,* presented that Germany's foreign policy enforces human dignity, freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values because they see those values correspond to the universal essence of human beings. Therefore it should be acceptable for other countries to implement it. Furthermore, he suggested that 'all Asian partners should respect the universal values and norms of international law because as

the members of the UN, they are particularly committed to the mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Mißfelder, 2014)

In pursuit of implementing Western democratic values in Indonesia, KAS divides each value into institutions that have expertise in the area. For example, KAS chose to pursue their P/CVE program with CSRC because CSRC has a focal point on Islamic scholarships. Furthermore, KAS collaborated with the Jimly School of Law and Government to conduct training for court judges considering this institution offers informal education regarding the implementation of law and government. The foundation also conducts a program with the SATUNAMA Foundation that focuses on participatory politics and gender equality to promote the role of the rising generation. Hence, this foundation is not necessarily promoting all Germany's democratic values through the same platforms; rather, they deliberately divide following the focal point of their partners.

Programs / Partner	**Promotion of Western Democratic Values**
Pesantren for Peace / CSRC	1. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedom 2. Freedom of expression and opinion 3. The separation of powers 4. Promoting peace and stability
Annual Strategic Dialogue / CSIS	1. Freedom of association, expression and opinion 2. Access to power and its exercise under the rule of law 3. The separation of powers 4. Transparency and accountability in public administration
Civilising Politics for Indonesia Democracy (CPID) / SATUNAMA	1. Pluralistic system of political parties and organizations 2. Freedom of association, expression and opinion 3. Access to power and its exercise under the rule of law 4. The separation of powers 5. Transparency and accountability in public administration 6. Free and fair elections
Kontra Narasi Ekstremisme / CSRC	1. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedom 2. Freedom of association, expression and opinion 3. Free, independent and pluralistic media
Campus Roadshow on Sustainable Environment / Yayasan Perspektif Baru	1. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedom 2. Access to power and its exercise under the rule of law 3. Free, independent and pluralistic media
Teachers Training / PIER	1. Social market economy 2. Freedom of association, expression, and opinion 4. Pluralistic system of political parties and organizations
Court Officer Training / Jimly School of Law and Government	1. The independence of the judiciary 2. The separation of power 3. Transparency and accountability in public administration 4. Access to power and its exercise under the rule of law
State Civil Apparatus Training / Kemendagri	1. Transparency and accountability in public administration 2. The separation of power 3. Access to power and its exercise under the rule of law

Table 1: Western Democratic Values in KAS Freedom Agenda in Indonesia

Table 1 presents KAS's distribution of Western democratic values in Indonesia through partnership programs. Corresponding to the table, it shows that this foundation prefers to build partnerships with intellectuals that came from legitimized institutions rather than through collective movements. In addition to this funding, this foundation sees the role of practitioners, decision-makers, and academicians in shaping society. Hence, through Cox's concept, the authors conclude that KAS uses intellectuals to distribute democratic values to create historic blocs since these intellectuals develop mental images. Ultimately, these mental images of Western democracy become a common identity in society. However, the role of collective intellectuals in this Agenda does not necessarily result in long-term structural change because the outcome of these partnership programs did not change the existing identity in Indonesia, which is dominated by nationalism (Pancasila).

Reflecting on the aforementioned Mißfelder's study, Germany's foreign policy encompasses human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the protection of the rights of minorities (2014). Consequently, its aim in democracy promotion is to create peaceful and just order. KAS's contribution to promoting Western democratic values has shown in their democracy-focus program called "Shaping. Democracy. Together". However, its contribution to democracy promotion can also be traced back to the Cold War, when the foundation committed to assisting CDU in reunifying Germany as a free and democratic state (Tserkovnikov & Petrovich-Belkin, 2015).

KAS's contribution at the global level to promoting Western democratic values is limited to the scope of research study and scholarships. The foundation's position to the party, Christian Democratic Union, is a kind of expert division that provides the necessary analytical materials on topical issues around international relations and domestic politics (Tserkovnikov & Petrovich-Belkin, 2015) KAS along with other political foundations such as Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Hanns Seidel Foundation, and Heinrich Boll Foundation committed in their joint statement that 'their socio-political and democratic educational work, information, and political advice at home and abroad, are based on the principles of the free democratic basic order and committed to the principles of solidarity, subsidiarity and mutual tolerance (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2023)'.

KAS has increased their expenditure for international cooperation from 2021 to 2022, where previously, they spent around 103 million euro in 2021 and then increased to 127 million euro in 2022 (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2023a). KAS expects to spend more on promoting students and graduates, conferences and seminars, promoting art and culture, international cooperation and other projects, up to 158 million euro in 2023. (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2023a).

One of the ongoing projects KAS carried out to promote democracy is Konrad Adenauer School for Young Politicians (KASYP). This program is specifically designed for young politicians from Asia since it is

under the Regional Programme Political Dialogue Asia of KAS. Aside from providing the framework and module for the program, the foundation will also provide 1) Economy class air ticket from home country to the training venue; 2) Accommodation on a twin sharing basis; 3) Cost of visa fee and local transfers related to the training programme; and 4) Meals during the training programme (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2023c). The authors argue that this program is part of the Freedom Agenda since some of the purposes of this program are to strengthen participants' democratic knowledge; and to nurture participants' democratic values (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2023a).

Aside from KASYP, KAS also grants public scholarships through programs such as Doctoral Colleges, Women's Colleges, and Political Education like AdenauerCampus. These programs are educational-based programs that offer scholarships to the participants. For instance, in the Doctoral College program, the foundation grants 1350 euros per month and an additional budget for research of around 100 euros (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2023b).

The foundation's commitment to maintaining Western democratic values is attributed to other programs at the global level. At the international level, KAS carried out three main programs known as 1) the Rule of Law Program, 2) Party and Political Dialogue, and 3) International Media Program. Each program focuses on promoting democracy, the rule of law, freedom, and the social market economy. KAS provides not only legal entities to carry out the programs but also the funding for the programs. The Rule of Law program is dispersed outside European countries; it encompasses Colombia, Singapore, Kenya, Senegal, Sub-Saharan Africa, Romania, and Lebanon (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2023b), which has outputs in the form of international and national conferences, seminars, workshops, discussion rounds and courses.

The programs that KAS has delivered at the global level are bound to the implementation of democracy promotion worldwide. These programs are affiliated with Western democratic values implemented and distributed throughout the programs. Its regard for democracy is generous. Thus, in maintaining Western democracy as a hegemonic idea, the foundation contributes to providing programs that not only accommodate the platform but also grant funding in order to preserve Western democracy around the world.

International regimes and institutions secure Ideas and material capabilities that make it possible for these elements to remain hegemonic in international politics. Despite the grand funding KAS has provided worldwide to promote Western democracy, democracy promotion will not be as welcome to foreign publics if there are not things that bind foreigners to democracy. This section discusses international regimes and institutions that legitimize democracy promotion as foreign policy and Western democracy as an ideational standard for the international community.

Democracy promotion channels in Indonesia, aforementioned in Network 1, have shown that this policy is carried out by

Germany and its political foundations and other actors such as the United States, European Union, and United Nations. Democracy promotion has become a Western foreign policy mostly carried out by EU members. In addition, the study also explained that democracy promotion has become the extension of developmental aid (Lloyd, 2010), in which Mißfelder points out that 'education is the key to a better, freer, and more self-determined future. Therefore the lack of development can be combated through education (Mißfelder, 2014)'.

The authors argue that Western democratic values have become hegemonic in international politics because it is intertwined with international commitments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration. These commitments were institutionalized into international organizations such as the United Nations and European Union, which they adopted as core values or principles. These ideas subsequently participate in the organization's agenda through the organisation's principles, where those values are distributed.

The institutionalization of Western democratic values into international organizations is prominent to analyze in this study. At the United Nations, several units specifically work to promote democracy, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), Department of Peace Operations (DPO), Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and UN Women. Western democratic values promoted by the UN encompass good governance, monitoring elections, supporting civil society to strengthen democratic institutions and accountability, ensuring self-determination in decolonized countries, and assisting in drafting new constitutions in post-conflict nations (United Nations, 2023). The institutionalization of democratic values into UN organizations is based on the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. This organization suggests that 'Democracy provides an environment that respects human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in which the freely expressed will of people is exercised (United Nations, 2023)'.

The UN distributes Western democratic values through several international programs that entail worldwide participation. For example, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The agenda suggested that "democracy, good governance and the rule of law as well as an enabling environment at national and international levels, are essential for sustainable development" (UNDP, 2015). The acknowledgement of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law in Sustainable Development Goals promotes access for Western countries to persuade democracy promotion abroad. In addition, resolutions published by Human Rights Council in 2012 (Resolution 19/36) and 2015 (Resolution 28/14) also supported democracy promotion policy in which the resolution stated that "democracy, develop-

ment and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms were interdependent and mutually reinforcing" in consequence forum on human rights, democracy and the rule of law emerged into the international community. The UN has also distributed funding for democracy promotion through UNDEF, which has spent up to 210 million dollars for 800 projects in more than 130 countries (United Nations, 2023). This participation by the UN in democracy promotion supports the legitimization of Western democracies worldwide; it shapes Western democracy as the more preferable, sustainable, and just form of government.

Aside from the UN, the authors also paid attention to the European Union as an international institution that promotes democracy promotion as foreign policy. In advance of the explanation above, the EU has curated an Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy that states the organization, and its members are committed to strengthening global leadership with priorities to "protecting and empowering individuals; building resilient, inclusive and democratic societies; promoting a global system for human rights and democracy; harnessing the opportunities and addressing challenges of new technologies' and delivering by working together (European Union, 2020). Accordingly, the organization will promote democracy and human rights abroad through trade, environment, development, and counter-terrorism. The Action Plan consists of a 5 years program on democracy promotion with specific sub-topics that foreign policy agents can deliver. In promoting Western democracy, the EU is also supported by think tanks and research institutions like the Research Network External Democracy Promotion (EDP), the European Courts of Human Rights, and the Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). This plural participation by other organizations supports democracy promotion as foreign policy. Thus, these organizations also maintain Western democracy as a hegemonic idea.



Figure 2: Application of Cox's Concept

The domination of EU members in promoting democracy shapes Western democratic values as international principles that should be acceptable abroad; it makes Western democratic values become hegemonic ideas in the international arena. This hegemonic idea is supported and preserved through international norms and institutions in which they create worldwide programs based on the principles of Western democracy. As a result, democracy promotion agents such as Konrad Adenauer Stiftung receive access to distribute these Western democratic values with conviction abroad. This mechanism of hegemony structure has shown how ideas, material capabilities, and international institutions sustain the hegemonic order.

Conclusion

The Freedom Agenda carried out by KAS in Indonesia is a form of extension to implement Germany's foreign policy to Global South because of its strong relations to the federal government. Germany's democracy promotion policy is related to the EU agenda to promote democracy outside the region. However, KAS activities in Indonesia are strategically inclined to Germany's social democratic values rather than Western democracy in general. Difference between Western democracy and Germany's social democracy is the emphasis on certain areas of the general public e.g role of the state in the economy to regulate markets, labor and union influence on decision making process, progressive taxation, and publicly funded healthcare and education.

KAS activities in Indonesia are carried out through partners such as the Ministry of Home Affairs; Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC); SATUNAMA, and others. These partnerships established by KAS with local institutions help to channel Germany's social democratic values to Indonesian society. The Freedom Agenda carried out by KAS manifested as seminars, training, also national and international conferences in which the hegemonic ideas are distributed. KAS partners in Indonesia serve as collective intellectuals that play an important role to shape mental images of Indonesian society. However, these collective intellectuals do not result in a long term structural change because it does not necessarily change the historic bloc within society.

KAS's reputation as agents of democracy promotion is supported by the material capabilities they have delivered globally. Its contribution to the international system manifested through programs such as scholarships and research grants. Regardless of what democratic values are shared by KAS in Indonesia, this Freedom Agenda promotes Western democracy as hegemonic ideas in the international system. The Agenda is also supported by international institutions such as the United Nations and European Union in which they legitimize democracy promotion as a foreign policy. As a result, the role of the UN and EU in this policy gives wider access to KAS and other agents to promote Western democracy as hegemonic ideas.

References

Books

Abelmann, A., & Konarek, K. (2018). *The German Political Foundations' Work between Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv*. (Eds.). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-20019-0

Cox, R. W., & Jacobson, H. K. (1977). Decision making. In *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge University Press.

Kress, R. (1985). *The political foundations in development policy: An analysis of the cooperation between the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and the Konrad-Adenauer- Foundation with political partners in developing countries*. Studienverlag Brockmeyer.

Mißfelder, P. (2014). CDU/CSU: Deutsche Außenpolitik steht weltweit für Werte! In *Außenpolitik mit Autokratien* (pp. 385–390). DE GRUYTER. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110346572 385

Schürmann, M. (1989). Zwischen Partnerschaft und politischem Auftrag. In

Fallstudie zur entwicklungspolitischen Tätigkeit der Konrad-Adenauer-Stifung (pp. 61–62).

Sieker, M. (2019). The Role of the German Political Foundations in International Relations. In *The Role of the German Political Foundations in International Relations* (pp. 291–330). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845287904-291

Weissenbach, K. (2016). *Parteienförderung im Transitionsprozess*. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-94206-3

Conference Proceeding

Achsin, M., Seniwati, S., Effendi, R., Triyanto, T., Bello, M., Ninggara, N., Rafifah, S., & Gularso, S. (2020). The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Preventing Violent Extremism in Indonesia: The Case of Wahid Foundation. *Proceedings of the Proceedings of the First Brawijaya International Conference on Social and Political Sciences, BSPACE, 26-28 November 2019, Malang, East Java, Indonesia*. https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.26-11-2019.2295216

Report

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2023a). Annual Report 2022. https://www.kas.de/de/jahresberichte/detail/-/content/jahresbericht-2022

SATUNAMA. (2020). *Laporan Auditor Independen dan Laporan Keuangan Yayasan Satunama Yogyakarta*. http://satunama.org/laporan-tahunan/

Thesis/Dissertation

Ayunur, B. (2020). *Implementasi Kerjasama Wahid Foundation dan UN Women dalam Pemberdayaan Perempuan di Indonesia melalui Program Peace Village*. Universitas Pembangunan Nasional "Veteran" Jakarta.

Muthahari, A. H. (2019). *Peran Yayasan Odesa dalam meningkatkan kesejahteraan keluarga: Studi deskriptif di Desa Cikadut, Kecamatan Cimenyan, Kabupaten Bandung* [Doctoral Dissertation]. UIN Sunan Gunung Djati.

Journal Article (retrieved online, with DOI)

Altiparmak, S. O. (2022). Explaining Contentious Energy Policy: Coxian Structural Forces, Environmental Issues, and the Keystone XL Pipeline. *World Review of Political Economy*, *13*(1). https://doi.org/10.13169/worlrevipoliecon.13.1.0118

Babayev, A. (2014). Democracy promotion between the "political" and the "developmental" approach: US and German policies towards Belarus. *Democratization*, *21*(5), 937–957. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.777430

Cox, R. W. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, *10*(2), 126–155. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501

Cox, R. W. (1983). Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations : An Essay in Method. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, *12*(2), 162–175. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298830120020701

Kurki, M. (2011). Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies1. *International Political Sociology*, *5*(4), 349–366. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00139.x

Lloyd, L. (2010). European Approaches to Democracy Promotion. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy*

Analysis, *65*(3), 547–559. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201006500302

Martini, A. (2019). Peran UPZ (Unit Pengumpul Zakat) Yayasan Ibadurrahman Dalam Meningkatkan Kesejahteraan Ekonomi Masyarakat Kecamatan Mandau. *Jurnal Al-Qasd Islamic Economic Alternative*, *1*(1), 52–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.22303/al-qasd.1.1.2016.52-64

Moolakkattu, J. S. (2009). Robert W. Cox and Critical Theory of International Relations. *International Studies*, *46*(4), 439–456. https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171004600404

Pass, J. (2018). Gramsci meets emergentist materialism: Towards a neo neo-gramscian perspective on world order. *Review of International Studies*, *44*(4), 595–618. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210518000116

Radikawati, B., Anam, S., & Wahyuddin, Y. A. (2020). Peran Organisasi Filantropi Internasional dalam Mendukung Pembangunan Daerah Lombok–Nusa Tenggara Barat (Studi Kasus: Yayasan LombokCare). *Indonesian Journal of Global Discourse*, *2*(1). https://doi.org/10.29303/ijgd.v2i1.15

Samse, S., Brauer, R., Badenheim, A., Hefele, P., & Merkle, D. (2019). The work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) in Northeast Asia. *Asian Journal of German and European Studies*, *4*(1), 10. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40856-020-0026-4

Wolff, J. (2013). Democracy Promotion and Civilian Power: The Example of Germany's 'Value-Oriented' Foreign Policy. *German Politics*, *22*(4), 477–493. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2013.853043

Journal Article (retrieved online, without DOI or page numbers)

Tserkovnikov, V., & Petrovich-Belkin, O. (2015). Konrad Adenauer Foundation and its Role in the Foreign Policy Making of the Federal Republic of Germany. *Vestnik Rudin International Relations*, *2*. Retrieved from https://journals.rudn.ru/international-relations/article/view/10742

Audiovisual media (videos, music recordings, podcasts, etc.)

Perspektif Wilmar TV. (2020, November 30). *Webinar Nasional Perspektif Baru "Hidup Baru dengan Energi Terbarukan." Yayasan Perspektif Baru* [Video file]. Retrieved from https://youtu.be/h_KHoseNOqM

Electronic source

Bickel, S., & Semaan, N. (2022). Radikalisierung und Extremismus: Vom schwierigen Umgang mit roten Linien. Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/de/einzeltitel/-/content/radikalisierung-und-extremismus-vom-schwierigen-umgang-mit-roten-linien

BINUS University. (2019, September 29). Diskusi Penalaran dengan Para Hakim Tinggi di DKI Jakarta. BINUS University. Retrieved from https://business-law.binus.ac.id/2019/09/29/diskusi_penalaran_dengan_para_hakim_tinggi_di_dki_jakarta/

BINUS University. (2020, January 30). Penataran Penalaran untuk Hakim - Hakim Jabodetabek. BINUS University. Retrieved from https://business-law.binus.ac.id/2020/01/30/penataran-penalaran-untuk-hakim-hakim-jabodetabek/

BINUS University. (2021a, September 3). Penemuan dan Penalaran Hukum untuk Hakim - Hakim di NTT. BINUS University. Retrieved from https://business-law.binus.ac.id/2021/09/03/

penemuan-dan-penalaran-hukum-untuk-hakim-hakim-di-ntt/

BINUS University. (2021b, November 18). Penalaran Hukum untuk Hakim - Hakim dari Pengadilan Tinggi Agama dan Umum Yogyakarta. BINUS University. Retrieved from https://business-law.binus.ac.id/2021/11/18/penalaran-hukum-untuk-hakim-hakim-dari-pengadilan-tinggi-agama-dan-umum-yogyakarta/

BMZ. (2022). New quality of cooperation. Retrieved from https://www.bmz.de/en/countries/reform-strategy-bmz-2030

BPSDM Kemendagri. (2021a, June 23). Workshop Pengembangan Kemampuan Jurnalistik Humas Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri Menghadapi Era Post Truth. BPSDM Kemendagri. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/BPSDMkemendagri/status/1407961798146281472?s=20&t=1e60dUHY-2oDuxIP8neZxgA

BPSDM Kemendagri. (2021b, September 20). Kembangkan Inovasi Daerah Unggulan, BPSDM Kemendagri Gandeng Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) Jerman Perwakilan Indonesia dan Timor Leste. BPSDM Kemendagri. Retrieved from https://bpsdm.kemendagri.go.id/berita/page/454

BPSDM Kemendagri. (2021c, September 20). Workshop "ASN Melek Literasi Digital Menuju Keterbukaan Informasi Publik." BPSDM Kemendagri. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/BPSDMkemendagri/status/1439861451426963459

BPSDM Kemendagri. (2021d, September 27). Kepala BPSDM Kemendagri Dorong Para ASN Tingkatkan Kapasitas Literasi Digital. BPSDM Kemendagri. Retrieved from https://bpsdm.kemendagri.go.id/berita/page/455#

CSRC. (2021, October). Pelatihan Kontra Narasi Ekstremis Suara Pesantren untuk Perdamaian dan Toleransi. CSRC. Retrieved from https://www.instagram.com/p/CPmvFvfL23F/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link

Deutschland. (2018, June 18). 70 years of social market economy. Deutschland. Retrieved from https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/business/social-market-economy-in-germany-growth-and-prosperity

Dianita, S. (2022a, August 3). BPSDM Kemendagri Tekankan Pentingnya Society 5.0 dalam Transformasi Digital. BPSDM Kemendagri. Retrieved from https://bpsdm.kemendagri.go.id/berita/page/598

Dianita, S. (2022b, August 30). Kemendagri: Dorong Pelayanan Publik melalui Penerapan Inovasi Daerah. BPSDM Kemendagri. Retrieved from https://bpsdm.kemendagri.go.id/berita/page/623

European Union. (2020). EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024. Retrieved from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_action_plan_on_human_rights_and_democracy_2020-2024.pdf

Faust, J., & Leininger, J. (2014). Supporting Democracy Abroad: An Assessment of Leading Powers - Germany. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_Demo_Reports_Germany_final.pdf

GIZ. (2022). Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/23079.html

GIZ. (2022). Projektdaten. Retrieved from https://www.giz.de/projektdaten/region/2/countries/ID(show:error)

Halvaima, N. A. (2022, August 11). Universitas Paramadina Gelar Program Pelatihan Ekonomi Pasar Sosial di Mandalika Lombok NTB. Pos Jakut. Retrieved from https://jakartautara.pikiran-rakyat.com/

pendidikan/pr-1765249801/universitas-paramadina-gelar-program-pelatihan-ekonomi-pasar-sosial-di-mandalika-lombok-ntb

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (n.d.). About us. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/en/web/guest/about-us

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2017, July 23). Post Graduate Course mengenai Ekonomi Pasar Sosial. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Retrieved from https://paramadina.ac.id/content/homepage-news/postgraduate-course-on-social-and-ecological-market-economy

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2022). Kantor Perwakilan di Indonesia dan Timor-Leste: Tentang Kami. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/in/web/indonesien/ueber-uns

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2023b). Democracy and Law. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/de/demokratie-und-recht

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2023c). Konrad Adenauer School for Young Politicians (KASYP). Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/en/web/politikdialog-asien/konrad-adenauer-school-for-young-politicians-kasyp-

Majalah Teras. (2020, December 1). PIER Universitas Paramadina dan KAS Pelatihan Guru. Majalah Teras. Retrieved from https://majalahteras.com/pier-universitas-paramadina-dan-kas-pelatihan-guru

Perdana, A. K. (2019, November 19). Rambung Ide Pengembangan Program CPID. SATUNAMA. Retrieved from http://satunama.org/6130/rembug-ide-pengembangan-program-cpid/

PIER. (2021, November 9). KAS Jerman dan PIER Paramadina Selenggarakan Pelatihan Demokrasi di Pekanbaru. Paramadina Institute for Education Reform. Retrieved from https://www.pier.web.id/artikel-128-kas-jerman-dan-pier-paramadina-selenggarakan-pelatihan-demokrasi-di-pekanbaru.html

Rahadi, F. (2018, September 6). Paramadina-KAS Gelar Pelatihan Ekonomi Pasar Sosial. Republika. Retrieved from https://www.republika.co.id/berita/pemsgs291/paramadinak-as-gelar-pelatihan-ekonomi-pasar-sosial

Ramdhani, G. (2021, September 28). Era Revolusi Industri 4.0, Kepala BPSDM Kemendagri Dorong ASN Tingkatkan Kapasitas Literasi Digital. Liputan6. Retrieved from https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4669693/era-revolusi-industri-40-kepala-bpsdm-kemendagri-dorong-asn-tingkatkan-kapasitas-literasi-digital

Republika. (2015, July 1). Ini Latarbelakang Terbentuknya Program Pesantren For Peace. Republika. Retrieved from https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nqrz3a/ini-latarbelakang-terbentuknya-program-pesantren-for-peace

SATUNAMA. (n.d.). Sekolah Politisi Muda. SATUNAMA. Retrieved from http://satunama.org/sekolah-politisi-muda/

SATUNAMA. (2015, June 24). 21 Politisi Muda Ikuti Sekolah Politik Di SATUNAMA. SATUNAMA. Retrieved from http://satunama.org/2143/reportase-video-21-politisi-muda-ikuti-sekolah-politik-di-satunama/

Sieverdingbeck, K. (2004). Promoting democracy in German foreign policy: Supporting political reform processes and popular participation - a BMZ position paper. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Retrieved from www.bmz.de.

UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. (2015, July 2). CSRC Launching Program Pesantren for Peace. UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. Retrieved from https://www.uinjkt.ac.id/csrc-launching-program-pesantren-for-peace/

UNDP. (2015). Sustainable Development Goals Booklet. UNDP. Retrieved from https://www.undp.org/publications/sustainable-development-goals-booklet

United Nations. (2023). Democracy. United Nations. Retrieved from www.un-.org/en/global-issues/democracy

Whither Just Transition? A Case Study of Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM) Country Platform in Indonesia

Aldi Haydar Mulia, Sekarini Wukirasih, Widhi Hanantyo Suryadinata

10.22146/globalsouth.81111

Department of International Relations
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia
aldihaydar02@mail.ugm.ac.id

Without a coordinated and effective global energy transition action plan, numerous projects and aid given by the Global North states dominated today's energy transition scheme–particularly for many Global South states. One is Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM), which claims to actualise just transition through its platform recently launched in Indonesia. It promises to improve societal participation, address socio-economic issues, and gives its recipients an affordable and sustainable path to a just transition. The latter focuses on early coal retirement, which is rampant in Indonesia. Despite its relatively novel focus on just transition, ETM fails to live up to its "just" concept, once again resembling debt-heavy funding and a lack of holistic assessment of the funding's effects on the affected society. This paper aims to elaborate on such problematisation while questioning how foreign funding could help realise just transition in the Global South. A qualitative case study provides context for the just transition in Indonesia.

Keywords: *energy transition mechanism; just transition; Global North; Global South; Indonesia*

Introduction

On November 14, 2022, Indonesia and Asian Development Bank (ADB) officially launched the Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM) Country Platform Indonesia at a G20 meeting in Bali. Previously, a series of Forum Group Discussions (FGD) was conducted by both parties, and ETM was soft-launched in August 2022 (Badan Kebijakan Fiskal, 2022). The platform is marketed as Indonesia's serious attempt to champion an affordable and just energy transition (Kemenkeu, 2022). The optimism aligns with Indonesia's updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) in September 2022, which commits itself to 43.2% emissions reduction by 2030 with international support, a 2.20 percentage point increase over its initial pledge in 2016 ("Enhanced Nationally Determined," 2022).

The platform centres around the early coal plant retirement premise, which aims to reduce Indonesia's reliance on coal to supply its electricity and, in turn, ready the nation to start anew in developing and consolidating low-carbon energy. The platform claims to give an opportunity of realising a "just transition" in Indonesia, meaning that ETM

claims to not only facilitate coal plant retirement but also adhere to the need to ensure equitable and fair energy transition, which constitutes the just transition spirit.

Just transition is a relatively new concept for energy transition funding, let alone foreign aid schemes. Apart from ETM, the only project that labels itself as "just transition" aid is European Union's Just Transition Platform (limited to EU Members) and International Partners Group (IPG)'s Just Energy Transition Platform (JETP), co-led by the United States and Japan, which also announced its partnership with Indonesia in the G20 Summit 2022. However, the need for just energy transition resembles the particular challenges for–but not limited to–Global South countries since, for them, energy transition adds another complicating layer to their development agenda, ranging from macroeconomic growth and infrastructure building projects to dealing with providing necessities and rights for its citizens (Collins, 1991). The dilemma causes them to rely on foreign funding to transition their energy, which could be problematic because their energy transition and policy agenda face the prospect of being dictated by the donors (Babayomi et al., 2022; McGillivray & Clarke, 2018). The donors, mainly from the Global North, could have a crude economic agenda in funding energy transition plans to pave the way for their fossil fuels assets and large investments' future (Babayomi et al., 2020; Goldthau et al., 2020).

In clarifying the term "Global South" and–consequently–"Global North," the paper follows the categorisation proposed by Fuhr (2019), assuming that a "Global South" state conforms to at least three out of the five indicators, such as non-OECD member, low-income and middle-income countries (less than US$12,055 in 2017), and countries belonging to the G77 bloc in the United Nations. Conversely, "Global North" refers to states failing to meet the criterion, mainly consisting of industrialised and wealthy nations.

With that being said, the "just transition" label on ETM, among other "just transition" foreign funding, provides a reason to address whether one should be optimistic about the truthfulness of the agenda. Thus, the significance of ETM must be explored. The article aims to assess the implications of ETM's "just transition" scheme to Indonesia. In doing so, the proposal contrasts the idea of the funding and the Global South conditions–portrayed in the just transition principles postulated by McCauley & Heffron (2018)–which tend to have enormous discrepancies. The article argues that ETM, despite promoting "just transition" in its design and jargon, eludes just transition principles and further perpetuates the unequal relations between the Global North and Global South. Therefore, the article advocates for questioning to what extent foreign funding could help jumpstart the just transition in the Global South.

The paper demonstrates such implications in two later subchapters: one concerning the potential of looming debt and its economic effects from applying the transition mechanism, and one concerning its limitations to inclusively empower Indonesian cit-

izens, which could be seen from gender, economic, and social aspects. Meanwhile, the first subchapter discussion will set the scene for the matter by showing the North-South divide in energy transition, the urgency of just transition, and a brief of Indonesia's situation regarding energy transition.

Methodology

The study employs a case study method to analyse the proposition of ETM, a just transition, concerning what constitutes a "just transition" in Indonesia. The study aims to question the extent to which a just energy transition could be achieved through an initiative imposed by the Global North on a Global South country, specifically Indonesia. It is suitable because a case study could succinctly explore the specific context of Indonesian society while generating some generalisable knowledge actually or potentially relevant to other cases (Vernesson, 2008).

An in-depth analysis of the "just" narration built around the ETM, which will be assessed concerning McCauley & Heffron's (2018) definition of just transition and its impact on the Global South, is the main foundation for formulating the argument. For instance, the existing debt in "just transition" can be seen as a power relation and business as usual because it entrenches the donors' wants rather than ensuring low-carbon energy accessibility to people. This study used the qualitative method because it provides a contextual understanding well-suited to explore complex social phenomena through power relations in "Just" transition narratives (Saldana, 2016).

Data was collected through a literature review using journal articles, books, and news to provide the context of the funding and its implementation. Data was collected from ETM and Government focusing on financial channels and schemes for Indonesia to assess its effects on the government and locals, such as the ADB project schemes that ADB promised, statements from actors initiating and supporting the project, and the latest development of the project implementation. This data was then analysed through top-down qualitative, which aims to identify critical and significant ideas from each used reference. Therefore, every finding, concept, and argument from previous research is necessary for this study's elaboration.

The North-South Divide and the Need for Just Transition

As climate change worsens with each passing moment, the energy transition becomes increasingly urgent. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that the energy sector accounted for approximately 34% (20 GtCO2-e) of total global emissions in 2019 (IPCC, 2023). This figure will be higher if the transportation, manufacturing, and household sector, which uses energy in their activities, are categorised under the energy umbrella. Succeeding in energy transition is vital in halting the climate crisis.

However, the sense of urgency often must grapple with the intricate complexities of realising energy transition. The existing policies are solely focused on rapidly reducing carbon emissions, predominantly with an understanding that high-carbon and high-us-

age energy sources must be replaced with low-carbon and low-usage energy sources (Kumar et al., 2022). Meanwhile, consumers are encouraged to adopt a more environmentally sustainable lifestyle, focusing on "small-but-meaningful steps" such as buying electric cars, eating organic foods, and preferring eco-friendly products (Vergara-Camus, 2022). While said transformations are not entirely useless, it tends to depoliticise or reduce climate change, including energy transition, into a merely technological and behavioural change (Gasparatos et al., 2008; Swyngendouw, 2013; Vergara-Camus, 2022).

Crucially, the seemingly apolitical understanding of energy transition ignores the present socio-economic inequality, especially in the Global South. Transitional schemes spearheaded by the Global North become the primary path for Global South countries to participate in the energy transition. This is because energy transition is frequently viewed as expensive, mainly in acquiring capital and technological capabilities. It is political, on which this paper will elaborate later, and those schemes are conceptually highly fixated on reducing emissions, albeit marred with vague planning and realisation. Donors need to thoroughly assess and engage with the social, economic, and environmental problems needed to alleviate carbon emissions justly. It resembles the prominent Multi-Level Perspective theory, which advocates for rapid and radical changes in the energy transition (Fernandes de Freitas & Jehling, 2023). The theory's view on energy transition phases, "start-up," "acceleration," and "stabilisation" (Kanger, 2021), which implicitly represent the North's outlook on energy transition, also tend to view the South's energy system as deficient and should be synchronised with the North. Its application could be detrimental to the Global South since the transition might prefer using "established" energy sources to pivot for, namely natural gas, which may not always be suitable for all states.

The prominence of a homogenous view above highlights the dividing reality between the Global North and Global South. It connotates a path dependency for the South as they are unable to exert their vision of energy transition, which is to have "differentiated" contributions in energy transition as opposed to the prominent North's "everyone should jointly contribute" (Beer, 2014). The aspiration does have an empirical basis of historical emission consideration, which puts the Global North as the primary emitter; thus, they should contribute equally to their cumulative emissions. Hickel (2020) estimates that the North emitted 92% of global emissions from 1850 until 2015. Instead, the Global South countries are expected to massively reduce their emissions like everyone else.

Even with foreign assistance, only replacing high-carbon energy with low-carbon energy in a quick fashion could be problematic and insensitive to the Global South's current situation. It should be noted that the Global South, including Indonesia, faces a variably similar dilemma (Beer, 2014; Collins, 1991), which is caught between pursuing economic growth, primarily aiming for rapid industrialisation utilising cheap and

high-carbon energy, and lack of capacity to perform said task in a sustainable way (Goldthau et al., 2020). Furthermore, excluding China, Brazil, and India, which gained significant investment in renewable energy, the Global South only received 12% of the total investment in renewable energy in 2017 (Goldthau et al., 2020). Economic growth is favoured instead of sufficient investment because growth is imperative. Such practice is exacerbated through neoliberal markets' inducement to conduct massive resource exploitation and sell it at a competitive price, often compromising labour wages and sustainability practices (Acosta, 2013; Gellert, 2019). It might be why many Global South countries failed to meet their Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) as signatories to the Paris Agreement.

The Urgency for Just Transition

Perhaps even more strikingly, there are questions about how energy transition would improve or hinder equitable access to basic needs such as education, jobs, and transportation. If low-carbon energy is expensive, rapidly changing the existing energy mix makes little sense since it would hinder people's access to basic needs. Conversely, disregarding energy transition would not be advisable either. The two scenarios could entrench already marginalised groups, such as riverside slums, into more climate-related injustices. They would bear the worst effect because of their precarious location, lack of equitable access to disaster mitigation, and minimal resources. Furthermore, this peril has been more conspicuous–but not limited to–the Global South, despite their relatively low carbon emissions (Mendelsohn, 2012). Thus, energy transition needs to be done with a careful and inclusive approach to ensure that the transition could be a driver for improving welfare and equality (Dalabajan et al., 2022).

The "Just Transition" concept origins can be traced back to the 1980s movement of global trade unions who demanded job opportunities–green jobs–after a proposed shift away from fossil fuels (Abraham in McCauley & Heffron, 2018). The workers, who mostly worked for high-carbon industries like coal, felt job security was mandatory for their livelihood. Tony Mazzochi, The Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers official, proposed the term as a dignified way to repay workers affected by the transition for their service to the community (Abraham, 2017).

Later, the term evolves for formulating and incorporating justice in the energy transition. This paper concurs with McCauley & Heffron's (2018) definition of "Just Transition," which is "a fair and equitable process of moving towards a post-carbon society." In viewing "justice," the phrase concerns three justice aspects: (i) distributional justice, (ii) procedural justice, and (iii) restorative justice. Distributional justice refers to (un)fairness of sharing costs and benefits due to energy development across civilisations (Lee & Bryne, 2019; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). This also accounts for the affordability of energy transition (McCauley & Heffron, 2018).

Procedural justice concerns the pathways to accomplishing a just transition and noting fundamental issues that limit the

just process. Moreover, this justice aspect emphasises a vibrant community and other stakeholders' participation in creating an acceptable and rooted energy transition (Lee & Bryne, 2019; McCauley & Heffron, 2018). Lastly, restorative justice pays attention to how past damages could be handled. It focuses on individuals, the environment, and the climate (McCauley & Heffron, 2018). Restoring could also exude historical assessment, which underpins climate change discourse and, more importantly, advocating for a closer look at the North-South divide regarding energy transition. It would be useful for addressing the transition financing schemes and their consequences for the Global South.

The Case of Indonesia

Indonesia's experience is indifferent to the dilemmatic position of many Global South states. In January 2022, Indonesia's President Joko Widodo openly asked developed countries for a helping hand to fund Indonesia's energy transition projects during the World Economic Forum. Specifically, Jokowi highlighted aspects such as better "funding sources" and "technology transfer" that would be a "game-changer" for Indonesia (Shofa, 2022). Jokowi stated that Indonesia would need 50 billion US dollars to switch toward renewable energy and a further 37 billion to reduce carbon emissions from forestry, land use, and marine sectors (Shofa, 2022). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Sources stated at a G20 webinar that Indonesia would need 1 trillion dollars by 2060 to materialise its energy transition roadmap (Antara News, 2022). It involves ramping up low-carbon energy to the national energy mix and connecting the main islands with electricity supplied by low-carbon power. Furthermore, Jokowi stressed the need for a "strong collaborative effort" to achieve the transition, which–or the lack thereof–has become the focal question from the developing countries (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 2022).

Due to needing proper investments, transitioning from fossil fuels to low-carbon is costly for Indonesia. It is because coal and oil/diesel are major contributors to Indonesia's primary energy mix by significant margins compared to other energy sources such as geothermal, gas, and biofuel. It also provides jobs for the local community, thus decreasing unemployment (Wibisono, 2015). In 2019, coal amounted to 37.3% of Indonesia's energy mix, with oil coming close at second place, amounting to 35% (ADB, 2020). Furthermore, coal holds a significant share in Indonesia's exports, which was 494 million tonnes in 2022 ("Indonesia sees record," 2023). The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources expected coal export to increase in 2023, indicating the country's continued coal craze ("Indonesia sees record," 2023).

Lastly, it is worth noting that socio-economic inequality in Indonesia is still rampant. Although absolute poverty has steadily decreased over the years, moderate poverty–a condition in which one can survive by meeting their basic needs but cannot meet other life aspects adequately–actually increased and is experienced by 36% of the population (Gibson, 2017). It is accompanied

by the growing inequality between rich and poor, indicated by a 0.003 increase in Indonesia's 2022 Gini ratio to 0.384 (Sulaeman, 2022). It challenges the energy transition in Indonesia, which mandates a just transition.

Challenges and Opportunities for Achieving a "Just Transition" from Green Climate Fund to Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM)

Then, how would the "just transition" be achieved? On the surface, Climate Fund (GCF). GCF is becoming one of the initiatives to achieve this "just transition" even though it is still based on the Global North's narrow view of the definition of the energy transition, which does not address the complexity of social and economic factors that construct the high-carbon to a low-carbon economy (Pattberg et al., 2013). The limitation of local communities, workers, and other stakeholders in the planning and implementation of projects can lead to a lack of understanding and support for the transition to low-carbon. It is caused by the GCF's incapability to handle its challenges.

Green Climate Fund (GCF), as a collective funding initiative from the Global North, faces a significant challenge: an ambitious goal of mobilising $100 billion per year while lacking the capacity to meet such a target, which currently sits on 80% of its annual target. GCF previously had a total target to mobilise $5.3 trillion due to concern from Global North about the fairness of GCF. Global North sees Global South contributes to this issue from industrialisation that generates carbon emissions. For instance, China contributes more than 29% to global carbon emissions, with 10 billion tons annually or 7.48 tons per capita. China produces its carbon emission exponentially with industrialisation within the country. It questions the Global North on GCF under the fairness factor and implies that GCF faces ineffective funding categorisation (Chen, 2018). Due to this factor, the global North prefers to use bilateral or multilateral channels to fund global climate initiatives, providing more transparency and leading to a more efficient distribution of resources. Prioritisation of projects is needed to match the needs of developing countries. Then, ETM was born as a financial instrument that supports climate justice, focusing on supporting the transition to low-emission and climate-resilient energy systems in developing countries (Afifa, 2022). ETM is a supporting system for countries facing a challenging energy transition due to limited resources, capital, infrastructure, and technology, through capacity-Building, planning, and financing. ETM proposes three financing schemes with their target and mechanism, Acquisition Model, Synthetic Model, and Portfolio Model.

Funding Models as ETM Strategies for Energy Transition

Acquisition model used by ETM to acquire capital in coal-fired power plants (CFPPs) to control the plants' operation. It can be done by purchasing shares or assets of the utility company. ETM proposes early termination; it generates output for ETM to close and then plant or repurpose it for another function, a renewable energy facility.

The risk from this model is the potential for financial losses if the plant does not perform as expected. Synthetic models allow ETM to invest in power plants with or without having a share in the power plant. The synthetic model is also an effective way to address the financial and contractual complexities of retiring CFPP. Synthetic is also known as a contractual agreement with the owner and utility to provide appropriate security.

The Portfolio Model is becoming one of three financing mechanisms under the ETM to assess the current energy system. It aims to identify priority, planning development, and monitoring. Portfolio models ensure multiple ETM projects that can drive the energy transition in certain countries. The model is adaptable to specific contexts for each country and intends to support achieving the country's sustainable development goal. In Indonesia, ETM uses a portfolio model through the Senior Loan scheme, a debt instrument that provides a small interest rate and long-period payment to mitigate debt risk. Senior loans are also considered as Low-Risk investments. As corporations often use senior loans to fund large-scale projects. ETM is a vital bridge for corporate sponsors interested in investing in clean energy projects in Indonesia. Developing this comprehensive portfolio of projects in developing countries to address different priority areas and energy sources, also working with multiple funding, attracts investors (Smith, 2022).

Challenges and Limitations in Implementing the Energy Transition Mechanism

While the Energy Transition Mechanism promises to become "the way" to fund the energy transition with bilateral and multilateral investment through sponsors, it still faces many challenges in issuing debt (Zeraibi et al., 2022). ETM can be considered the explanatory reason for the cause that leads to an increase in debt levels for developing countries. The first concern is the debt trap for developing countries. Following the exponential growth of debt for developing countries, if the project is unsuccessful, it will burden the countries to repay the investor. There are also concerns about the cost and reliability factors. It will cause slower economic growth and development (Reuters, 2022). Developing countries are also vulnerable to economic crises if it occurs during the repayment period and can lead the country to bankruptcy. It is important to view that ETM is implemented in a way that balances debt and relevancy for the investment in renewable energy can avoid excessive debt levels. Mitigating this risk is crucial for the sustainability of the projects and the countries.

Second, ETM only focuses on economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness, which led to a narrow view of the definition and constitutes the "Just Transition" and its challenges to addressing complex social and economic issues within the transition process. Limitations can be seen in the scope of renewable energy. The development of renewable energy technology needs to be acknowledged or included in the financing process to speed up the adaptation process. ETM focuses on the CFPPs that undermine investment that can lead to unnecessary cost of opportunity that use coal to operate. ETM

sees it can be done through utilising incentives to power plants. CFPPs, the location of these plants, and emissions can jeopardise the low-income and minority communities' environmental conditions, violating environmental justice values (Galgoczi, 2014).

Socio-economic Limitation: The Reproduction of International Power Hierarchy

When the term "Just Transition" was first coined in the 1980s by the trade union movement, it aimed to secure the rights and livelihoods of workers during the transition to sustainable production (McCauley & Hoffner, 2018). Over time, the concept of a just transition has expanded beyond its workers-related concerns. Specifically, after the Paris Agreement 2015, the spirit of a just transition has shifted towards inclusive, sustainable, and socially, politically, and economically transformative energy structures (ILO, n.d.; Climate Justice Alliance, n.d.; Smith, 2017). This expanded understanding indicates that every energy transition project should adopt the same spirit. However, this article finds that energy transition projects launched so far often limit Southern countries' ability to achieve a just transition. An example is the Energy Transitions Mechanism (ETM) project launched by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) at COP 26 in Glasgow in 2021, which will be piloted in Indonesia. This section will explore three social limitations in the ETM scheme based on recent planning developments.

First Limitation

The first limitation pertains to the establishment of early retirement processes. As the pilot project, which involves the early retirement of the Cirebon-1, a 660 MW coal power plant (CPP) in West Java, was nearing its launch, planning related to the early retirement process and its provisions became a critical issue to be discussed. Referencing the Just Transition framework, which is used as the basis, ETM should consider the welfare of power plant workers and the communities living around the power plant by initiating an open discussion that allows them to voice their aspirations and intervene in policy-making processes (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022). An early retirement process without a transparent scheme can create greater vulnerability for residents and workers, who may lose their jobs and bear the process's social, economic, and environmental impacts.

However, in the case of planning the pilot project of ETM in Indonesia, specifically, the early retirement of the Cirebon-1 CPP, the scheme and process of early retirement was discussed by ADB, PLN, Indonesian Investment Authority, and Cirebon Electronics Power (CEP) - the operator of the early retirement consisting of a consortium of Japanese company Marubeni Corporation; Korean companies KOMIPO and Samtan Corp.; and Indonesian company PT. Indika (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022). Meanwhile, residents and PLTU workers should have been notified of the discussion (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022). This means that the process that took place was

entirely a result of discussions among shareholders in the first circle while excluding the aspirations of the community and preventing their intervention from aligning the process and terms of early retirement with their interests.

The exclusion of aspirations and interventions of affected communities results in a scarcity of power where policymakers have full access to the policy-making process. In contrast, the community that receives its consequences has no power to intervene in the policy-making process. Furthermore, in the case of Indonesia, Bhima Yudhistira, Director of Celios—an Indonesian research NGO that focuses on economics and public policy to encourage economic equity, a sustainable economy, and the quality of digital innovation—stated that ADB was strongly influenced by Marubeni Corporation, the largest shareholder of CEP, in the policy-making process (CNN Indonesia, 2022). This statement raises concerns about the future of the early retirement of coal-fired power plants in Indonesia, which may follow the preferences of the donor country or, specifically, Japan instead of focusing on the needs of the community and emissions reduction targets (CNN Indonesia, 2022).

The Second Limitation

The second limitation in achieving a just energy transition is the repurposing clause in the new ETM scheme, which Marubeni Corporation supports as one of the operators of the early retirement of the Cirebon-1 power plant. This is in addition to the inadequacy of the process and criteria for early retirement, as discussed earlier. In a press release, Marubeni stated that operators have the right to mitigate potential impacts of the early retirement of power plants, such as alternative power source arrangements (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022). Repurposing as an alternative power source arrangement opens the potential for other methods that may prolong the life of coal power plants, such as coal-biomass co-firing, replacing coal with ammonia or hydrogen, and so on (Bhawono, 2022). It introduces the possibility of implementing methods that do not align with the goals of a just energy transition and can negatively impact the environment and communities surrounding the power plants.

The extension of the CPP's lifespan could create new vulnerabilities for communities because the burning of coal at Cirebon 1 has caused a major rise in severe chronic respiratory illnesses, the loss of coastal fisheries and contamination of surrounding land and coastal areas (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022). In addition, the misdefined repurposing could also support the formulation of solutions and the procurement of green infrastructure that does not adhere to the principles of a Just Transition that prioritises sustainability and structural transformation. It could encourage the development of infrastructure that is not entirely low-emission, such as pumped hydropower, carbon capture, storage infrastructure, and battery plants (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022).

Third Limitation

The final limitation is closely related to the monitoring system of the ETM project called Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA). The SESA analysis is intended to examine the positive and negative socio-economic impacts of each ETM project implementation, including the Cirebon 1 pilot project (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022). In other words, the results of the SESA analysis should be able to accommodate issues in the field. However, the indicators from this analysis are deemed problematic by FFA. This is partly due to several factors.

The first factor includes indicators of women's participation that are not sensitive to gender lenses. Women's domestic work is seen as unpaid (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022). However, women's role in navigating household work is crucial to the project's success. For instance, if women also work formally, the project may not run smoothly because setting up a shift with the father to care for the child may be necessary. Instead, the project considers that the framework used is already gender-sensitive because it provides a non-coal-based economy with opportunities for women to have more training and income-generating opportunities in the renewable energy sector (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022).

The second factor involves the SESA analysis that does not consider the social and environmental risks that may occur during the early retirement process (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022). However, the implementation of ETM could stretch as long as 10-15 years. Certainly, the implementation process takes a long time. During the implementation, there are CCP workers who "wait in line" for their retirement for 10-15 years, and the sustainability of the environment needs to be evaluated. Moreover, the risks generated during the process may differ from when early retirement is complete.

The third issue is closely related to the above point, where the SESA assessment is overly focused on assessing opportunities provided by the renewable energy infrastructure that is said to be built (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022). However, the ADB still needs to clarify the new infrastructure to create green jobs (FFA and NGO Forum on ADB, 2022). These problems with the indicators indicate that even in its monitoring and evaluation system, ETM fails to establish equal, inclusive, and sustainable indicators.

As previously shown by those social and economic limitations, it is necessary to straighten some issues as a coda. The first and second limitations exemplified that in the first pilot planning, the Cirebon-1 plant retirement and repurposing involves international power relations, in which Japan, through its company, Marubeni Corp, holds a massive stake in the CEP. Therefore, it holds immense control over the planning, while the affected people nearby–workers and villagers–are not involved. On the other hand, the third limitation shows that the evaluation hinges on universal standards rather than on-field gender, economic, and social conditions–to name a few. The latter preference would have enabled the transition by viewing people as subjects rather than evaluation objects. That

being said, this subchapter intends to assert that ETM is no more than just a Global North project intending to reap benefits from their "generosity" and reproduce an unequal hierarchy favouring the Global North. Even the "just transition" label does not guarantee the realisation of accommodative justice principles needed in a just transition.

Conclusion

The Energy Transitions Mechanism (ETM) is a financial instrument that aims to assist climate justice by financing developing countries' transition to low-emission and climate-resilient energy systems. The Paris Agreement in 2015 has become the momentum for the Just Transition concept to expand beyond its original works-related concerns to encompass a shift towards inclusive, sustainable, and balance it with social, political, and economically transformative energy structures. ETM has three financing schemes, Acquisition Model, Synthetic Model, and Portfolio Model. Indonesia's ETM uses the Portfolio Model to support Indonesia in facing a challenging energy transition due to limited resources, capital, infrastructure, and technology.

However, the financing initiative faces challenges, including the debt trap for developing countries and inadequacies in staying true to its just transition jargon, apparent by its sole focus on the economy's efficiency and cost-effectiveness. This article also highlights the limitation for Global South to achieve a just transition in three social limitations under the ETM scheme: lack of community involvement in the early retirement process, exclusion of impacted communities, and clause of repurposing, which allows operators to mitigate potential impacts without adequate compensation. Instead of performing just transition, the ETM platform perpetuates the Global South's socio-economic inequality. The community is in danger of losing their jobs and access to affordable energy while being excluded again in the decision-making process. Meanwhile, the state must repay its debt to the investor with clauses that may compromise their manoeuvres in developing their country.

This study understands that the materials and references are largely preliminary because the project has just begun. Further examination of the funding is needed throughout the project's expansion and implementation. However, the early signs do not look too well to justify the implementation of just transition through the ETM platform.

References

Books

Pattberg, P. H., Biermann, F., Chan, S., & Mert, A. (Eds.). (2012). *Public-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Emergence, Influence and Legitimacy*. Edward Elgar.

Saldana, J. (2016). *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (3rd ed.).* Sage Publications.

Chapter in an Edited Book

Acosta, A. (2013). Extractivism and neoextractivism: two sides of the same curse. In M. Lang & D. Mokrani (Eds.), *Beyond Development: Alternative Visions from Latin America* (pp. 61–86). Transnational Institute.

Goldthau, A., Eicke, L., & Weko, S. (2020). The Global Energy Transition and the Global South. In M. Hefner & S. Tagliapetra (Eds.), *The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition* (pp. 319–339). Lecture Notes in Energy vol. 73. Springer.

Kumar, A., Pols, A., & Höffken, J. (2021). Urgency v justice: A politics of energy transition in the age of the Anthropocene. In A. Kumar, J. Höffken, & A. Pols (Eds.), *Dilemmas of Energy Transitions in the Global South* (pp. 1–17). Routledge.

Vennesson, P. (2008). Case studies and process tracing: theories and practices. In D. Della Porta & M. Keating (Eds.), *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (pp. 223–239). Cambridge.

Vergara-Camus, L. (2022). The energy transition and the Global South. In H. Veltmeyer & P. Bowles (Eds.), *The Essential Guide to Critical Development Studies* (2nd ed., pp. 319–326). Routledge.

Report

Dalabajan, D., Mayne, R., Bobson, B., Qazzaz, H., Ushie, H., Ocharan, J., Farr, J., Romero, J., Priego, K., Gomez Correa, L. V., Gomez Ortiz, L., Socci, L., Buenaventura Goldman, M., Rosario Felizco, M., Dabi, N., Chauke, N., Haq, O., Martinez Arellano, P., & Mojica Enciso, S. P. (2022). *Towards a Just Energy Transition: Implications for communities in lower- and middle-income countries*. Oxfam. https://doi.org/10.21201/2022.9936

Fair Finance Asia (FFA) & NGO Forum on ADB. (2022, December). *The Asian Development Bank's Energy Transition Mechanism: Emerging Social, Environmental and Rights-Based Considerations.* https://fairfinanceasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Report_FFA-NGO-Forum-on-ADB_The-Asian-Development-Banks-Energy-Transition-Mechanism-Emerging-Social-Environmental-and-Rights-Based-Considerations_final.pdf

Gibson, L. (2017). *Towards a More Equal Indonesia: How the government can take action to close the gap between the richest and the rest*. Oxfam. https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/bp-towards-more-equal-indonesia-230217-en_0.pdf

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2023). *SYNTHESIS REPORT OF THE IPCC SIXTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (AR6).* https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf

Smith, S. (2017, May). *Just Transition: A Report for the OECD.* https://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/g20-climate/collapsecontents/Just-Transition-Centre-report-just-transition.pdf

Thesis

Wibisono, B. Y. (2015). *Impact of Coal Production on Economic Growth in Indonesia* [Master Thesis]. Institute of Social Studies.

Journal Article (Retrieved online, with DOI)

Abraham, J. (2017). Just Transitions for the Miners: Labor Environmentalism in the Ruhr and Appalachian Coalfields. *New Political Science*, *39*(2), 218–240. https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2017.1301313

Babayomi, O. O., Dahoro, D. A., & Zhang, Z. (2022). Affordable clean energy transition in developing countries: Pathways and technologies. *IScience*, *25*(5), 104178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2022.104178

Chen, L. (2018). The challenges and opportunities for the Green Climate

Fund. *Chinese Journal of Urban and Environmental Studies, 06*(01), 1875001. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2345748118750015

Fernandes de Freitas, A., & Jehling, M. (2023). Change and path dependency in expanding energy systems: Explaining Peru's energy transition beyond a North–South divide. *Energy Research & Social Science*, *99*, 103039. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103039

Fuhr, H. (2021). The rise of the Global South and the rise in carbon emissions. *Third World Quarterly*, *42*(11), 2724–2746. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1954901

Gasparatos, A., El-Haram, M., & Horner, M. (2008). A critical review of reductionist approaches for assessing the progress towards sustainability. *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, *28*(4), 286–311. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2007.09.002

Gellert, P. K. (2019). Neoliberalism and altered state developmentalism in the twenty-first-century extractive regime of Indonesia. *Globalisations*, *16*(6), 894–918. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2018.1560189

Hickel, J. (2020). Quantifying national responsibility for climate breakdown: An equality-based attribution approach for carbon dioxide emissions in excess of the planetary boundary. *The Lancet Planetary Health*, *4*(9), e399–e404. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(20)30196-0

Kanger, L. (2021). Rethinking the Multi-level Perspective for energy transitions: From regime life-cycle to explanatory typology of transition pathways. *Energy Research & Social Science*, p. *71*, 101829. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101829

Lee, J., & Byrne, J. (2019). Expanding the Conceptual and Analytical Basis of Energy Justice: Beyond the Three-Tenet Framework. *Frontiers in Energy Research*, *7*(9), 1–10. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2019.00099

McCauley, D., & Heffron, R. (2018). Just transition: Integrating climate, energy and environmental justice. *Energy Policy*, *119*, 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.014

McGillivray, M., & Clarke, M. (2018). Fairness in the international allocation of development aid. *The World Economy*, *41*(4), 1068–1087. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12636

Mendelsohn, R. (2012). THE ECONOMICS OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. *Climate Change Economics*, *3*(2), 1250006. https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010007812500066

Zeraibi, A., Jahangir, A., Sunday Adebayo, T., Ramzan, M., & Yu, Y. (2023). Greenfield investments, economic complexity, and financial inclusion-environmental quality nexus in BRICS Countries: Does renewable energy transition matter? *Gondwana Research*, *117*, 139-154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gr.2022.12.020

Journal Article (Retrieved online, without DOI or page numbers)

Beer, C. T. (2014). Climate Justice, the Global South, and Policy Preferences of Kenyan Environmental NGOs. *The Global South*, *8*(2), 84–100. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/globalsouth.8.2.84

Collins, C. P. (1991). Climate Change Negotiations Polarize. *Ambio*, *20*(7), 340–345. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4313856

Galgóczi, B. (2014). The long and winding road from black to green: Decades of structural change in the Ruhr region. *International Journal of Labour Research, 6*(2), 217–240. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/actrav/in-

ternational-journal-labour-research/WCMS_375223/lang--en/index.htm

Swyngedouw, E. (2013). The Non-political Politics of Climate Change. *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 12*(1), 1–8. Retrieved from https://acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/948

Newspaper Article (Online)

Afifa, L. (2022, November 18). PLN, ADB to plan early retirement for independent coal power plants. *Tempo*. Retrieved from https://en.tempo.co/read/1658318/pln-adb-to-plan-early-retirement-for-independent-coal-power-plants

Bhawono, A. (2022, November 19). Pendanaan Pensiun Dini PLTU Ditengarai Tak Bersih Batu Bara. *BetaHita.* Retrieved from https://betahita.id/news/detail/8161/pendanaan-pensiun-dini-pltu-ditengarai-tak-bersih-batu-bara.html?v=1668789457

CNN Indonesia. (2022, November 18). Pengamat Khawatirkan Potensi Konflik Kepentingan di Transisi Energi RI. *CNN Indonesia.* Retrieved from https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20221117172750-85-875219/pengamat-khawatirkan-potensi-konflik-kepentingan-di-transisi-energi-ri

Reuters. (2022, January 20). Global energy transition to cause short-term economic pain -report. *Reuters.* Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/global-energy-transition-cause-short-term-economic-pain-report-2022-01-20/

Reuters. (2023, January 30). Indonesia sees record coal exports of more than 500 mln tonnes in 2023. *Reuters.* Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indonesia-sees-record-coal-exports-more-than-500-mln-tonnes-2023-2023-01-30/

Shofa, J. N. (2022, January 20). Indonesia Asks Developed Countries to Fund Energy Transition. *The Jakarta Globe.* Retrieved from https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-asks-developed-countries-to-fund-energy-transition

Smith, T. (2022, December 5). Extending off-grid solar access across sub-saharan Africa. *ESI.* Retrieved from https://www.esi-africa.com/business-and-markets/extending-affordable-off-grid-solar-access-across-sub-saharan-africa/

Sulaiman, F. H. (2022, July 19). The poverty rate drops in Indonesia, but inequality does not. *The Jakarta Post.* Retrieved from https://www.thejakartapost.com/business/2022/07/19/poverty-rate-drops-in-indonesia-but-inequality-does-not.html

Electronic source

Badan Kebijakan Fiskal. (2022, August 4). Pemerintah Terus Sempurnakan ETM di Indonesia. Retrieved from https://fiskal.kemenkeu.go.id/baca/2022/08/05/4365-pemerintah-terus-sempurnakan-etm-di-indonesia

Climate Justice Alliance. (n.d.). Just Transition Principles. Retrieved from https://climatejusticealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/CJA_JustTransition_highres.pdf

Enhanced Nationally Determined Contribution Republic of Indonesia. (2022, September). Retrieved from https://ditjenppi.menlhk.go.id/berita-ppi/4357-enhanced-ndc-komitmen-indonesia-untuk-makin-berkontribusi-dalam-menjaga-suhu-global.html

International Labour Organization (ILO). (n.d.). Frequently Asked Questions on just transition. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/

green-jobs/WCMS_824102/lang--en/index.htm#q_0

Kementerian Keuangan Republik Indonesia (Kemenkeu). (2022, November 14). Siaran Pers: Indonesia Luncurkan ETM Country Platform untuk Percepat Transisi Energi yang Adil dan Terjangkau. Retrieved from https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/informasi-publik/publikasi/siaran-pers/Siaran-Pers-Indonesia-Luncurkan-ETM-Country

Presiden Republik Indonesia. (2022, January 20). Pidato Presiden Republik Indonesia Pada World Economic Forum: State Of The World Address._Retrieved from https://www.presidenri.go.id/transkrip/pidato-presiden-republik-indonesia-pada-world-economic-forum-state-of-the-world-address/

Not So Ambitious? Indonesia's Coal Dependence Amidst The Era of Energy Transition

Amira Hasna Febriyanti, Sayyid Al Murtadho, Yassriani Almattushyva

10.22146/globalsouth.81488

Department of International Relations
Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia
sayyid.a.m@mail.ugm.ac.id

Indonesia ratified the Paris Agreement to combat climate change and pledged to reduce its carbon emissions. This commitment, however, contrasts Indonesia's development plan under Joko Widodo's administration. His policy has enabled the development of additional power plants, hence perpetuating Indonesia's reliance on coal. Thus, it is essential to examine why Indonesia is still struggling to break free from its dependence on coal, despite its ambitious goal to tackle climate change. This paper will apply the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory to explore how security is defined and shapes Indonesia's energy transition process. Furthermore, this research will use distributive and procedural justice theory to examine the decision-making process and climate change policy implementation. In order to accomplish so, we will employ qualitative methods such as desk studies, which will comprise academic literature as well as government statements and regulations. This paper argues that Indonesia's energy transition is impeded by how other security issues are prioritised above climate change. In addition, the lack of justice principles in the climate policy formulation and implementation has contributed to Indonesia's reliance on coal. Since Indonesia is the world's largest coal exporter and one of the top ten global polluters, this study intends to contribute to identifying challenges in the transition to renewable energy.

Keywords: *Indonesia; coal dependence; energy transition; securitisation; distributive and procedural justice*

Introduction

To combat climate change, Indonesia, under the administration of President Yudhoyono, ratified the Paris Agreement and pledged to reduce its carbon emissions by 26% from the business-as-usual level and 41% under the condition of international assistance by 2030 (Soesilo, 2014). This commitment is further enhanced under President Joko Widodo "Jokowi", who has targeted emission reduction by 29% of the business-as-usual scenario and has shown his willingness to lead in climate protection on multilateral forums. Forestry and the energy sector are the two highest Indonesian emission contributors (Elliot & Setyowati, 2020). Thus, Indonesia has targeted a reduction of 17% in forestry and 11% in the energy sector (UU No. 16/2016). However, domestic energy demands have risen as the Indonesian economy is constantly growing, followed by population growth and rising living standards (Fünfgeld, 2020). This means the energy sector will soon be the most significant car-

bon emissions source.

Historically, Indonesia has relied on coal to fulfil its domestic energy demand and coal-fired power plants are seen as the cheapest means to supply electricity (Ordonez et al., 2021). This reliance on coal is perpetuated under Jokowi's development plan that aims to build 35.000 MegaWatt (MW) of power plants, of which 25.000 MW are from coal (Detik Finance, 2015). The increase of coal-fired power plant (PLTU) construction contrasts with Indonesia's commitment, further destructing the environment, leading to land conflicts, and even increasing the impoverishment of the already marginalised community. This raises the question of how Indonesia will balance its development plan with its commitment to transform its energy sector into renewable energy to achieve its environmental targets.

The fact that transforming the energy system is very complex, comprising the elements of science and technology, social, political, economic, and environmental, also poses challenges for governments or stakeholders to implement the program. This complexity is mainly experienced by developing countries like Indonesia, which still need significant assistance in funds, technology, and knowledge to support the progress of the energy transition. Indonesia also faces a geographical challenge with uneven potential for renewable energy resources and population distribution.

Moreover, the complexity also comes from the uncertainty of international politics, making developing countries vulnerable. For instance, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 brought the whole world into shock, slowing down economic activities and disrupting the energy transition agenda since the government needs to prioritise the health and socioeconomic sectors first (Wahyuni, 2022). The world is recovering from the pandemic, and many countries, including Indonesia, are trying to bounce back the economy; thus, energy demand is projected to rise significantly to support global development (Wahyuni, 2022). Furthermore, the dynamics at the domestic level also exacerbate the government's effort to break free from the coal industry. These dynamics include many interests in the coal industry from lobby groups and oligarchs shaping energy security in Indonesia.

Hence, in this research paper, we would like to explore and examine Indonesia's commitment to energy transition and its dependence on coal from the perspective of securitisation. We argue that Indonesia's energy and development policy is different from its commitment to cut down emissions from the energy sectors because the pro-coal discourses dominate the securitisation of energy and have shaped Indonesia's energy dynamics. While the government justifies that coal is more beneficial than other energy sources, civil society discourse offers different perspectives which reveal injustices due to coal dependence.

Theoretical Framework

This study applies the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory to comprehend how Indonesia constructs its energy security, which is strongly related to Indone-

sia's progress in its energy transition and efforts to tackle climate change. Securitisation theory argues that security is socially constructed through discursive practices. Instead of focusing on security, it focuses on how a problem becomes or is transformed into a security threat (Hough et al., 2015). In order to construct a shared social understanding of threats, securitisation theory, therefore, places a strong emphasis on process. Hence, when an issue is understood as "*posing an existential threat, [it opens] the way for the state to mobilise…… or to use whatsoever means are necessary to block the threatening development*" (Buzan et al., 1998, as cited in Hough et al., 2015). According to securitisation theory, constructing a threat is done through speech acts, in which elites declare a problem a security issue. This speech act should be followed by the audience's acceptance that the issue is essential.

Energy security rhetoric is frequently used to frame the building of coal-fired power plants as part of the development agenda. Unfortunately, as previously indicated, this narrative only marginalises climate change as a security issue. Therefore, the application of securitisation theory in this research is intended to understand how the concept of energy security shapes Indonesia's energy and development policy and becomes prioritised over climate change policy.

Research Methodology

This paper utilises a qualitative approach to provide a comprehensive elaboration of ideas behind the making of policy regarding expanding the coal-fired power plants or development plan established under Joko Widodo's administration that perpetuates Indonesia's reliance on coal despite the demand for renewable energy. The method used to collect data in this research is desk studies. We obtain information from secondary resources such as academic literature reviews, articles, and journals, as well as government reports, statements, and regulations. Moreover, we get deeper into discussions and conversations on the current state of Indonesia's energy transition by analysing news reports, statements, and research findings from grassroots and NGOs. Then, we analyse the data that mainly discuss energy transition, coal dependence and the effort to shift energy use in Indonesia to examine the commitment and challenges of energy transition from the perspective of securitisation.

The Securitisation of Indonesia's Energy Sector

The energy sector is the second largest contributor to carbon emissions in Indonesia. As more coal-fired power plants have been built under the Jokowi administration, the government's commitment to the carbon reduction target is viewed as purely symbolic. Unfortunately, coal-fired power plants are responsible for up to 97,22% of Indonesia's energy sector's overall emissions (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Republic Indonesia, 2019). The government frequently uses the rhetoric of energy security behind its infrastructure or development policy. Thus, it is crucial to comprehend how the energy sector is "securitised" and how this affects the government's decisions to build more power plants.

For Indonesia, being energy secured means being energy independent. According to the former Minister of Defence of the Yudhoyono administration, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, energy independence consists of the ability to respond to the dynamics of global energy changes and the ability to ensure the availability of energy at home at reasonable prices (Ministry of Defence of Republic Indonesia, 2012). This view is also adopted by the current government, which is reflected through the National Energy General Plan (*Rencana Umum Energi Nasional*/NEGP), which stresses the paradigm of energy resources as domestic development capital to achieve energy independence (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Republic Indonesia, 2017). This unusual position is corroborated by the belief that the country has abundant natural resources, especially coal.

Indonesia now plays a central role as the world's biggest coal exporter (Esterman, 2021). In 2015, Indonesia produced a total of 461,6 million tons which 79,3% was exported while only 20,7% was supplied to the domestic market and mostly directed toward power plants (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Republic Indonesia, 2017). In 2021, according to the Special Staff of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Irwandy Arif, Indonesia's coal reserves are still abundant, reaching 38.8 billion tons (Liputan6.com, 2021). As a result, coal is put at the centre of energy security, and it creates a sense of urgency for the government to maximise the use of coal for domestic needs considering the uncertainty about global markets and the fact that too many exports will threaten Indonesia's energy supply and self-sufficiency. Within the previously mentioned paradigm, coal is thus seen as an essential national energy resource for domestic economic development. In other words, the abundant domestic supply of coal is the cheapest and the most affordable option to foster national economic development compared to the alternatives. This is one of the significant factors in Indonesia's dependency on coal.

This paper analyses the Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration's development policy to see how this plays out. We found that to maximise the domestic use of coal; the Jokowi administration has released The Mid-term National Development Plan 2015-2019 (RPJMN 2015-2019) that elaborates the government plan to build 35,000 MW power plants, of which 25,000 MW are from coal (Ministry of National Development Planning of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015). This development program is necessary since economic growth and electricity demand are predicted to increase over time. Furthermore, this ambitious development project also intends to make electricity more accessible for rural communities. The rural electrification program has set targets of 97.35% electrification by 2019 and 100% by 2024 (Ordonez et al., 2021). This phenomenon correlates with the findings presented by Kim & Yoo (2016) about coal consumption and economic growth in Indonesia, in which they found that economic growth stimulates coal consumption—the increase in GDP will increase coal consumption.

Furthermore, they also found that among many factors, coal consumption in Indonesia also leads to a high GDP (Kim & Yoo, 2016). This explains the government's rationale for its RPJMN 2015-2019. Due to the belief that the coal supply is abundant and is the cheapest means to supply electricity compared to renewable energy, Indonesia heavily relies on coal as its energy-development capital.

The reliance can also be seen in the speech act of government officials. Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, Indonesian Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs, during a pers conference regarding Just Energy Transition Partnership:

"We believe that we must not sacrifice our economic development, but we must also build a more sustainable economy for future generations." (Wahyudi, 2022)

The speech act presented economic development as the main priority above energy transition. In this sense, Indonesian coal dependence is inevitable to maintain and accelerate economic development. Hence, it is understandable when the Indonesian government emphasises maintaining economic growth more than energy transition.

This dynamic of securitising the energy sector for development needs hinders Indonesia's effort to reduce carbon emissions. Suppose we observe the speech act from the government to reduce carbon emissions in the coal sector, compared to the urgency to maximise it. In that case, the government does not mention coal and the development of coal-fired power plants in its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) (Atteridge et al., 2018). Emission reduction mainly focuses on forestry and land-use issues by tackling deforestation.

Furthermore, in the proposed new and renewable energy bill (RUU EBT), new energy, which includes energy sources derived from the processing of fossil fuels using modern technology, is frequently regulated alongside renewable energy. For instance, coal gasification, coal liquefaction, and coal bed methane are new energy sources. Developing these energy sources may be detrimental because it diverts attention away from completely developing renewable energy while reducing low carbon emissions (Anindarini, 2020.).

The government recently pledged that no new coal-fired power facilities will be built between 2021 and 2030. However, they will continue to operate coal-fired power facilities that have begun construction or have reached a financial close (Umah, 2021). According to Greenpeace Indonesia, this choice could hinder the growth of renewable energy sources and result in significant carbon emissions while the power plant is still operating (Intan, 2022a). It could complicate efforts to comply with the Paris Agreement because research indicates that Indonesia's emissions should peak by 2025 (Institute for Essential Services Reform, 2021).

Moreover, the government is focusing more on attracting investment as a financial source for energy transition (Merdeka.com, 2022) because, without financial assistance, Indonesia's progress in transforming into renewable energy will be stagnant. The lack of international climate financing is a factor in

Indonesia's slow adoption of renewable energy. This can be seen from the speech act of the government officials. The administration has frequently stated the necessity for a considerable amount of money to shut down fossil fuel facilities and build the infrastructure for renewable energy sources. Luhut explained that Indonesia is ready to reduce its carbon emissions between 41% and 50%, but with a condition: Indonesia receives enough international funding (Primadhyta, 2021). The Indonesian Fiscal Policy Agency estimates that Indonesia requires Rp266.2 trillion annually to combat climate change but has only raised Rp89.6 trillion, or 34% (Ministry of Finance of Republic Indonesia, 2022). The government uses this speech act to emphasise that energy transition is costly and needs the budget to move from coal with funding from other sources.

But why is there a lack of climate financing? The main problem is a disparity between Global North commitments and financial transfer realisation. At the COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, rich nations promised to contribute $100 billion annually by 2020. (Kinley, 2016). This pledge was emphasised throughout the Paris Agreement.

Nevertheless, the goal still needs to be met. The total amount of the climate fund in 2018 was US$78.9 billion (OECD, 2020). Many developed countries boosted their climate finance commitments at COP 26 in Glasgow, even though countries such as the United States continue to fall short of their historical duty for emissions (Mitchell, 2021). However, there are a few things to remember regarding the climate fund. First, a large portion of the prior support came in the form of non-concessional loans and other non-grant instruments, increasing the debt of developing nations (Carty *et al.*, 2020). Second, developing countries will require as much climate money as feasible because funding will be allocated to different countries and challenges, such as mitigation and adaptation. The latter is essential for least-developed nations, which have already experienced a climate catastrophe and require immediate financial assistance (Carty *et al.*, 2020).

The lack of funding from international actors stems from the need for more justice in the international climate regime. Throughout the years, justice has emerged as one of the most critical factors to consider when developing global climate policy. This approach is driven by climate change predominantly triggered by wealthy nations while disproportionately hurting developing countries. According to Hickel (2020), the Global North—the United States, the G8 nations, and other industrialised nations—controls 92% of the world's excess carbon dioxide emissions. Hickel (2020) examined whether the national fair portions of the carbon budget were consistent with the planetary boundaries of 350 ppm using cumulative carbon dioxide emissions data from 1850 to 2015. This method demonstrated how the Global North bears greater responsibility for the climate crisis and, as a result, should assist the Global South in dealing with climate catastrophes in their countries.

This justice aspect is the background of the speech act by President Jokowi during the S20 High-Level Policy Webinar on Just

Energy Transition, which was held as part of Indonesia's G20 Presidency. He stated that countries with heavy burdens should be assisted, while countries with stronger capacities should aid other countries (Primadhyta, 2022). This speech act echoes the narratives usually used by Global South countries regarding energy transition. Global South countries–including Indonesia–call for just transition by highlighting the barriers, especially funding problems, that they face. Without help from international donors, it is difficult for them to transition their energy. Hence, the government tries to justify the status quo by appealing to the justice aspect of international funding.

To sum up, this section has discussed the concept of Indonesian energy security. We found that the Indonesian government is securitising energy due to economic considerations. In this case, Indonesia's economic growth will increase domestic energy needs. Thus, energy resource needs to be securitised due to the potential threat of insufficient energy resources to fulfil domestic needs. Consequently, the government suggests reducing coal exports and redirecting the use of coal towards the economic development agenda to meet the rising domestic energy demands. The justification for this decision is the belief that Indonesia has an abundant supply of cheap and affordable coal. Furthermore, Indonesia's lack of financial capability has also justified the perpetuation of the use of coal.

Discursive Struggle: Coal Dynamics in Indonesia

While the government argues in favour of coal's advantages over other energy sources, civil society discourse highlights various perspectives that expose the injustices resulting from dependence on coal. The Indonesian government believes that coal is seen as necessary for economic growth. Establishing coal power plants has also reduced local communities' income opportunities. According to Fünfgeld (2019), the proximity to coal mines has detrimental effects on crop yields and fish breeding, as it destroys farmland (sometimes through mudding), pollution of fish ponds, and water contamination. Moreover, the presence of large coastal areas designated for power plants also poses a threat to fishing communities, as they are restricted from accessing their traditional fishing grounds and experience altered water temperatures due to the cooling systems of the power plants.

Consequently, there is a decrease in the availability of fish in the area, which significantly impacts small-scale fishers who rely on shoreline fishing and seafood collection. Additionally, in the same community in West Java, the operation of the power plant has forced many salt-makers to cease production, causing a decline in their income (Fünfgeld, 2019). This aligns with Greenpeace Indonesia's findings in 2014 which state that coal development carries a trail of environmental destruction and local communities get little economic benefits (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2014).

At the same time, grassroots or community perspectives offer a contrasting outlook from the government's. They contend that the government's commitment to

advancing renewable energy in Indonesia needs to be improved, as evidenced by their continued operation of coal-based power plants until 2050. The proponents of energy transition in Indonesia also recognise the challenges that hinder the advancement of energy transition; lack of funding is one of them. However, Dila, a Climate and Energy Campaign Researcher at Greenpeace Indonesia, stated that the government's efforts to find support or alternative financing to develop renewable energy are still not optimal (Intan, 2022b). She argues that this is in contrast to the government's efforts in seeking funds and establishing a legal basis for the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund for the Ibu Kota Nusantara (IKN) or the Indonesian capital city project (Intan, 2022b).

On the other hand, the operation of coal-fired power plants is detrimental to the community because besides polluting the land—which serves as their livelihood, as mentioned above—the construction of power plants also negatively impacts public health. Data from Climate Council (2023) found that not only does coal contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, but coal combustion also releases harmful substances into the air, water, and land, posing risks to the health of miners, workers, and neighbouring communities. The harmful substance released in coal ash contains heavy metals, such as mercury, arsenic, and lead (Gokkon, 2021). A report from Greenpeace Indonesia estimates that coal power could harm the lives of 15.700 people every year in Indonesia (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2015).

Thus, it can be argued that energy exploitation in Indonesia has resulted in various injustices suffered by local communities, ranging from environmental destruction to health risks. Some cases have gained national coverage and public support, but only minimal reparative measures have been undertaken (Sekaringtias et al., 2023). This has caused certain community members to express their powerlessness compared to the influential energy institutions in Indonesia (Sekaringtias et al., 2023). Because when the local communities protest, they are frequently subjected to threats from both private and public entities, and in some cases, even criminalised by the government (Fünfgeld, 2019).

For example, in 2020, residents in Mekarsari Village, Indramayu, faced criminalisation for opposing a coal-fired power plant in their area as a struggle to live without coal smoke. The cases include criminal violence, desecration of the state flag, and land tenure issues, seen as attempts to silence the community (Rachmawati, 2020). While there are legal umbrellas for the community to object when their livelihoods and living space will be taken away, these cases are considered a means to suppress the voices of the community. Additionally, in 2023, a land conflict in South Kalimantan between a coal company and a landowner who protested by blocking the road tragically resulted in losing the landowner's life. The victim, Sabriansyah, an older man, lost his life by being slashed with a sharp weapon and shot in the head (Kurniawan, 2023). It was allegedly caused by PT Jaya Guna Abadi (JGA), who reportedly ordered beatings accompanied by shootings resulting in the victim's death (Kurniawan,

2023). In that case, the local police officers will summon the coal mining company for further investigation and have already arrested four suspected perpetrators (CNN Indonesia, 2023). The worst thing is that PT JGA is not even registered in the Lembaga Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi (LPJK) or the construction development agency under the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing. Also, it does not have a construction business entity certificate, which is vital for the company's legal basis for running a business (Micko, 2023). Therefore, it may provoke a question regarding the government's role in supervising the land concession and the government's actor who granted the permission. More importantly, this case also raises questions about the government's role in protecting the rights of citizens.

It can be argued that these cases reflect the absence of public participation in Indonesia's coal dynamics decision-making process. For instance, Walhi West Java discovered several irregularities in the construction plan of the Indramayu 2 Power Plant, including the need for more community involvement in the planning and formulation of licensing documents (Rachmawati, 2020). Therefore, it can be learned that discourses of energy security coming from local communities and NGOs are calling for an energy transition as a means to ensure social and economic prosperity for all that stems from inclusivity and equality, in which marginalised communities can participate in the decision-making processes and advocates their interests. In other words, it can be concluded that local communities and NGOs are calling for the government to stop the construction of more power plants and invest more in transitioning Indonesia's energy resources. As stated by Tata Mustasya, the Head of the Climate Campaign at Greenpeace Indonesia, a day prior to the G20 Summit in Bali,

"The process and mechanism for this [energy] transition must also involve public participation, adhere to democratic principles, and be just. FOR EXAMPLE, the G20 must be a solution to accelerate the energy transition through a financing platform. There is no just and sustainable energy transition without democracy." (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2022).

However, the current energy governance in Indonesia needs to reflect those arguments. Instead, due to the lack of public participation in decision-making, political elites and lobby interests successfully create dominant discourses influencing Indonesia's current energy governance. As aforementioned, one interesting example to illustrate and highlight the need for more public participation in Indonesia's policy formulation is the RUU EBT. While according to energy experts, creating and using gasified coal generates more emissions than just burning solid coal for the same amount of energy (Jong, 2022). In addition, energy experts have slammed the idea, saying it contradicts the Indonesian government's pledge to phase out coal use at the COP-26 climate summit in Glasgow in 2021 (Jong, 2022). Allowing for such a contradiction in that bill exposes the parliament's lack of comprehension of the need for energy development in the energy transition context. It indicates a lack of

inclusivity in which opinions from certain parties with less political power are ignored.

Therefore, this paper argues that the legitimacy of the Jokowi administration's securitising move for the energy sector through coal is a complex issue because Indonesia's coal industry has been politicised for so long. Even many politicians within the current government circle have a political interest in the coal sector. This aligns with the statement made by Agus Sari, an environmental expert and lecturer at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), who stated,

"There is a strong political power which does not like the development of renewable energy in Indonesia," "They do not want to lose the opportunities of securing profits from running the non-renewables." (Krismantari, 2021).

For instance, the powerful politician and a key supporter of Jokowi, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, who is also the Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs, holds significant assets in the coal mining business (Ordonez et al., 2021). Another influential figure in Indonesian politics, Aburizal Bakrie, owns the largest coal mining companies such as Bumi Resources, Kaltim Prima, and Arutmin. Furthermore, the coal sector plays a large role in elections as a source of funds or a means to attract popularity for the next election. For example, Jokowi's power plants development program and rural electrification program can be observed as means to meet his electoral promises to secure popularity for the 2019 election (Mietzner, 2015). Moreover, by imposing a price cap on fossil fuels, the government artificially keeps their prices low, posing a challenge for renewable energy producers to compete.

Consequently, this leads people to believe that specific influential entities with political power are against the progress of renewable energy in Indonesia because it could potentially disrupt their business interests. Thus, the coal dynamic in Indonesia—the rhetoric of energy security that leads to the decision to build more coal-fired power plants is being legitimised by and serving the lobby's interest in the coal industry. Thus, It is understandable how coal's role in Indonesia's energy security becomes dominant and weakens the government's commitment to energy transition.

Another critical factor that significantly influences Indonesia's energy policy is the state-owned electricity company, PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN). PLN has a role in shaping the future coal demand and, with its significant political power, has actively opposed the suggestions for expanding renewable energy (Atteridge et al., 2018). Atteridge et al. (2018) reflect this on the delay of the National General Energy Plan that was caused by the incompatibility between the plan's target share of renewables (23% by 2025) with the target in PLN's Electricity Supply Business Plan or RUPTL (less than 15% by 2025). Furthermore, PLN needs help regarding higher operational costs in transitioning to renewable energy. Therefore, PLN favours coal more than renewable energy as a source of running electricity.

This section highlights the contradiction between the Indonesian government's

justification for using coal and its harmful impacts on local communities, the environment, and health. The cases of criminalisation and violence against communities who oppose coal development further demonstrate the lack of public involvement and protection of citizens' rights. It undermines the government's commitment to renewable energy and marginalises the voices advocating for change. It also implies that the process of securitising is mainly done by the policymakers and, with the influence of the interested entities, through the government's National Development Plan, the National Energy Plan, and the government's official statement. In short, policymakers are trying to convince others that coal is central to Indonesia's energy security. Ironically, however, putting coal as the centre of energy self-sufficiency means that Indonesia will depend on coal in the long run. As a result, the call for Indonesia to prioritise renewable energy and move away from coal continues to face challenges.

Conclusion

Indonesia's commitment to transition its energy into renewables needs to be more ambitious, given that coal is still to become the primary energy source in the following years ahead, and renewable energy remains challenging to be developed. This paper has found that pro-coal discourses advocated mainly by the political elites and business interests successfully dominate Indonesia's energy dynamics, shaping Indonesia's concept of energy security, overshadowing other discourses that highlight many injustices local communities face and thus perpetuating Indonesia's reliance on coal. By entering discussions and conversations on energy dynamics from both political elites and grassroots communities, specifically regarding the current state of Indonesia's energy transition, we offer novelty in understanding the interplay between the discourses of those two entities. In this regard, power relations have played a crucial role in defining the interaction between the two camps of discourse–the entity closer to the political circle is the more powerful one. It has the privilege of influencing the securitisation of Indonesia's energy. When in fact, grassroots communities' discourses represent reality more accurately.

Opening more room for public participation, especially for the marginalised and vulnerable groups, is important to break away from coal dependency and ensure Indonesia's just energy transition. In this case, transitioning energy into renewables should take a holistic approach–not only about reducing carbon emissions but also ensuring that the rights of the people to prosperity and equality are guaranteed. This paper has discussed the impact of Indonesia's coal dependence on the community according to the NGO's findings. Departing on that fact, further research can analyse deeper what just transitions should be for those marginalised communities taking into account social, economic, and equality aspects–which lies beyond the scope of this paper. Discussing this matter is important to build a solid foundation and direction for Indonesia's energy transition.

References

Books

Hough, P., Moran, A., Pilbeam, B., & Stokes, W. (2015). *International security studies: theory and practice*. Routledge.

Fünfgeld, A. (2019). Just energy? Structures of energy (in)justice and the Indonesian coal sector. In T. Jafry, M. Mikulewicz, & K. Helwig (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice* (pp. 222–236). essay, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Wahyuni, E. (2022). Challenges in Facing Indonesia's Energy Commitment. In H. Ardiansyah (Ed.), *Indonesia Post-Pandemic Outlook: Challenges in Facing Indonesia's Energy Commitment* (pp. 23–40). essay, BRIN Publishing.

Report

Anindarini, G. (2020). *Problema Transisi Energi di Indonesia: Antara Energi Baru dan Energi Terbarukan.* Indonesian Center for Environmental Law. Retrieved from https://icel. or. id/wp-content/uploads/Seri-Analisis-Transisi-Energi-1-Problematika-Energi-Baru-dan-Energi-Terbarukan-ICEL_opt. pdf.

Atteridge, A., Aung, M. T., & Nugroho, A. (2018). *Contemporary coal dynamics in Indonesia*. Stockholm Environment Institute.

Greenpeace Indonesia. (2014). (publication). *How coal mining hurts the Indonesian economy* (pp. 1–13). Greenpeace Indonesia.

Greenpeace Indonesia. (2015). (rep.). *Human Cost of Coal Power: How Coal-Fired Power Plants Threatens the Health of Indonesians*. Jakarta, Indonesia: Greenpeace Indonesia.

Institute for Essential Services Reform. (2021). (rep.). *Indonesia Energy Transition Outlook 2022 Tracking Progress of Energy Transition in Indonesia: Aiming for Net-Zero Emissions by 2050*. Jakarta, Indonesia: Institute for Essential Services Reform.

Mietzner, M. (2015). *Reinventing Asian populism: Jokowi's rise, democracy, and political contestation in Indonesia*. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center.

Government Publication

Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Republic Indonesia. (2017). *Rencana Umum Energi Nasional*. Jakarta.

Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Republic Indonesia. (2019). *Inventarisasi Emisi GRK Bidang Energi.* Jakarta.

Ministry of National Development Planning of the Republic of Indonesia. (2015). *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN) 2015-2019*. Jakarta.

Journal Article (retrieved online, with DOI)

Carty, T., Kowalzig, J., & Zagema, B. (2020). Climate finance shadow report 2020: Assessing progress towards the $100 billion commitment. https://doi.org/10.21201/2020.6621

Elliott, L., & Setyowati, A. B. (2020). Toward a socially just transition to low carbon development: The case of Indonesia. *Asian Affairs*, *51*(4), 875–894. https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2020.1835000

Hickel, J. (2020). Quantifying national responsibility for climate breakdown: An equality-based attribution approach for carbon dioxide emissions in excess of the planetary boundary. *The Lancet Planetary Health, 4*(9), E399-E404. doi:10.1016/s2542-5196(20)30196-0

Kim, H. M., & Yoo, S. H. (2016). Coal consumption and economic growth in Indonesia. *Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy*, *11*(6), 547–552. https://doi.org/10.1080/1

5567249.2012.690503

Kinley, R. (2016). Climate change after Paris: From turning point to transformation. *Climate Policy*, *17*(1), 9–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1191009

Ordonez, J. A., Jakob, M., Steckel, J. C., & Fünfgeld, A. (2021). Coal, power and coal-powered politics in Indonesia. *Environmental Science & Policy, 123*, 44-57. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2021.05.007

Sekaringtias, A., Verrier, B., & Cronin, J. (2023). Untangling the socio-political knots: A systems view on Indonesia's Inclusive Energy Transitions. *Energy Research & Social Science*, *95*, 102911. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102911

Journal Article (retrieved online, without DOI or page numbers)

Fünfgeld, A. (2020). Coal vs Climate: Indonesia's Energy Policy Contradicts Its Climate Goals. Retrieved from https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/67640

Electronic source

Climate Council. (2023, May 30). *Killer coal: Just how bad are the health effects of coal?* Climate Council. Retrieved from https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/killer-coal-just-how-bad-are-the-health-effects-of-coal/

CNN Indonesia. (2023, April 4). *Polisi Tangkap Humas pt JGA Diduga Otak Pembunuhan Lansia di Tambang*. CNN Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230404205248-12-933621/polisi-tangkap-humas-pt-jga-diduga-otak-pembunuhan-lansia-di-tambang

Detik Finance. (2015). *Program Pembangkit Listrik Jokowi Butuh 100 Juta Ton Batu Bara Per Tahun*. Retrieved from https://finance.detik.com/energi/d-2854965/program-pembangkit-listrik-jokowi-butuh-100-juta-ton-batu-bara-per-tahun.

Esterman, I. (2021). *King Coal: How Indonesia became the fossil fuel's final frontier*. Mongabay Environmental News. Retrieved from https://news.mongabay.com/2021/03/king-coal-how-indonesia-became-the-fossil-fuels-final-frontier/.

Gokkun, B. (2021, March 11). *Never mind the Mercury: Indonesia says Coal Ash isn't hazardous*. Mongabay Environmental News. Retrieved from https://news.mongabay.com/2021/03/indonesia-coal-ash-hazardous-waste-pollution/

Greenpeace Indonesia. (2022, November 14). *G20 Harus Percepat Transisi Energi Dan Aksi Iklim Yang Ambisius*. Greenpeace Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers/55768/g20-harus-percepat-transisi-energi-dan-aksi-iklim-yang-ambisius/

Intan, G. (2022a, January 29). *Dorong Transisi Penggunaan EBT, Jokowi Janji pltu 5,5 GW Akan pensiun Dini*. VOA Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/dorong-transisi-penggunaan-ebt-jokowi-janji-pltu-5-5-gw-akan-pensiun-dini/6417863.html

Intan, G. (2022b, March 18). *Jokowi: Transisi Energi Adalah Hal Yang kompleks*. VOA Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/jokowi-transisi-energi-adalah-hal-yang-kompleks/6491012.html

Jong, H. (2022). Indonesian bill turns coal-derived fuels clean by ignoring the true scale of emissions. Mongabay Environmental News. Retrieved from https://news.mongabay.com/2022/03/indonesian-bill-turns-coal-derived-fuels-clean-by-ignoring-true-scale-of-emissions/.

Krismantari, I. (2022, September 15). *Politik*

Dan Pandemi buyarkan Mimpi Energi Terbarukan Indonesia. The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/politik-dan-pandemi-buyarkan-mimpi-energi-terbarukan-indonesia-153891

Kurniawan, M. B. (2023, April 5). *Kejam Humas perusahaan Tambang pt JGA Diduga Otaki pembunuhan Lansia Kalsel*. detiksulsel. Retrieved from https://www.detik.com/sulsel/hukum-dan-kriminal/d-6656316/kejam-humas-perusahaan-tambang-pt-jga-diduga-otaki-pembunuhan-lansia-kalsel

Liputan6.com. (2021). Melimpah, Cadangan Batu Bara di indonesia capai 38,8 Miliar Ton. Retrieved from https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/4714061/melimpah-cadangan-batu-bara-di-indonesia-capai-388-miliar-ton

Merdeka. (2022). *Menko Luhut Tak Batasi Jenis Pembiayaan Masuk ke Program Transisi Energi.* Retrieved from https://www.merdeka.com/uang/menko-luhut-tak-batasi-jenis-pembiayaan-masuk-ke-program-transisi-energi.html.

Micko, A. (2023, April 8). *Tragedi Pembunuhan Mengkauk, pt jga Juga Tak Ada di Kementerian*. apahabar.com. Retrieved from https://apahabar.com/post/tragedi-pembunuhan-mengkauk-pt-jga-juga-tak-ada-di-kementerian-lg7b4rnb

Ministry of Defence of Republic Indonesia. (2012). *Menhan : Gas Bumi, Batubara dan Minyak Bumi , Energi Primadona Sampai Tahun 2030*. Retrieved from https://www.kemhan.go.id/2012/07/02/menhan-gas-bumi-batubara-dan-minyak-bumi-energi-primadona-sampai-tahun-2030.html

Ministry of Finance of Republic Indonesia. (2022). *Energy Transition Mechanism Untuk Transisi Energi Bersih di Indonesia*. Retrieved from https://fiskal.kemenkeu.go.id/baca/2022/03/17/4340-energy-transition-mechanism-untuk-transisi-energi-bersih-di-indonesia

Mitchell Associate Fellow, I. (2021, November 5). *Climate finance is the elephant in the room at COP26*. Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. Retrieved from https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/climate-finance-elephant-room-cop26

OECD. (2020). *Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-18*. Retrieved from https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/f0773d55-en/1/2/3/index.html?itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fpublication%2Ff0773d55-en&_csp_=5026909c969925715cde6ea16f4854ee&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book

Primadhyta, S. (2022, March 17). *Jokowi Ungkap Tiga Tantangan Transisi Energi Terbarukan*. Retrieved from https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20220317210916-85-772867/jokowi-ungkap-tiga-tantangan-transisi-energi-terbarukan

Rachmawati. (2020, June 8). *Warga Dipidana Karena Tolak pltu, Walhi: Perlu Perlindungan Bagi Aktivis Lingkungan Hidup Halaman all*. Kompas.com. Retrieved from https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/06/08/09390001/warga-dipidana-karena-tolak-pltu-walhi-perlu-perlindungan-bagi-aktivis?page=all

Soesilo, I. (2014). *Climate change: Indonesia's adaptation and mitigation efforts*. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/04/26/climate-change-indonesia-s-adaptation-and-mitigation-efforts.html.

Umah, A. (2021, May 27). *Jokowi Haramkan Proyek pltu Baru Masuk di RUPTL*. CNBC Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20210527185535-4-248863/jokowi-haramkan-proyek-pltu-baru-

masuk-di-ruptl

Wahyudi, E. (2022). Luhut: Transisi Energi Tidak Boleh Ganggu pertumbuhan ekonomi Ri. Retrieved from https://www.fortuneidn.com/news/eko-wahyudi/luhut-transisi-energi-tidak-boleh-ganggu-pertumbuhan-ekonomi-ri

Bride Trafficking from Vietnam to China: The Critique of Socialist Feminism

Jessenia Destarini Asmoro
10.22146/globalsouth.85237

Department of International Relations
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia
destarini29@gmail.com

Bride trafficking is a phenomenon where women are sold for forced marriage. This phenomenon occurs in many Vietnamese women brought to China without their consent to marry. It has been claimed that there are 'supply and demand' factors in encouraging the development of bride trafficking from Vietnam to China, such as an imbalanced sex ratio in China and a lack of education. This research analyses the occurrence of bride trafficking from Vietnam to China through the lens of gender and politics. Using the narrative analysis method and literature study through the perspective of socialist feminism, this research found that bride trafficking from Vietnam to China embodies double oppression towards Vietnamese women. It results from the intersection between two oppressive structures: patriarchy and capitalism. Consequently, a practice of sexual economy is developed in the form of bride trafficking. This research also found that globalization significantly affects bride trafficking from Vietnam to China. Globalization paves the way for this phenomenon to happen. Thus, this article offers a perspective favouring women in analyzing transnational phenomena in international relations.

Keywords: *bride trafficking; globalization; patriarchy; capitalism; sexual objectification*

Introduction

This article discusses how bride trafficking from Vietnam to China develops in the social, economic structure and cultural structures that oppress women together at a time. The case from Vietnam to China is chosen, given its massive occurrence. Media reported that so many trafficked Vietnamese brides inhabit some villages in China that those villages are called "Vietnamese Bride Village" (Liu et al., 2021). Vietnam's Department of General Police recorded 2,700 cases involving 6000 victims from 2011-2017 (Duong, 2018). Wang (2015), as cited in Liu et al. (2021), mentioned that at least 100,000 Vietnamese women are trafficked as brides in China. However, the number of victims and cases can be higher, given its clandestine nature.

I shall clarify first the term of bride trafficking discussed here. The term refers to buying and selling women to be made as wives without the women's consent. What distinguishes bride trafficking from other types of women trafficking is that, in this case, victims are specifically trafficked to be married, that is, for the production of human sexual needs fulfilment. Moreover, bride trafficking from Vietnam to China is highly related to the demographic situation in China, which will be discussed later in this section. This differs from the cases where

Vietnamese women voluntarily migrate to China to look for a husband or get better economic conditions (Liu et al., 2021). Although these women come to China to get married, they can still be the victim of bride trafficking when forced to marry a man they do not want, to make money for someone else. The term used here also differs from the cultural practice of wife-pulling from the H'mong ethnicity in Vietnam (CNA, 2019).

Bride trafficking is an act of commodifying women's bodies and sexuality under capitalism. The capitalist structure encourages efforts to accumulate profit and wealth through any means, including making women's bodies and sexuality parts of the exchange system. Furthermore, women are not only an object of an economic system but also become the very object of gender-based oppression and inequality in power relations. Women, in this respect, experience oppression from two intertwined structures at a time, namely capitalism and patriarchy. The phenomenon of bride trafficking, or any women trafficking in general, is often seen as a matter of economic inequality and low level of education in rural areas. This way of understanding does not side with women and puts women's experience of oppression as the central issue. It ignores the voice and position of women. Therefore, it is important to analyze this phenomenon through the lens of feminism as a political theory.

Human trafficking from Vietnam to China increased in the late 1970s after China implemented its Reform and Opening Up policy (Stöckl et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2021). Specifically, bride trafficking from Vietnam to China started in the 1990s (Duong et al., 2007). Women who worked in carrying and transporting items from Vietnam to markets in China, as the result of the formation of markets along the countries' border, later on, became the victims of human trafficking, mostly as brides (Duong et al., 2007).

Vietnamese society expects women to marry, live with their husbands, and contribute financially to their parents (Duong et al., 2007). This expectation often led to parents 'selling' their daughter to be married to another man. On the other hand, China has an unbalanced ratio between males and females in their demography, which resulted in a 'deficit' of women and 'inflation in the market' of Chinese brides (Duong et al., 2007; Lhomme et al., 2021). This condition made 'buying' brides from Vietnam a cheaper option. In addition, economic development in China has made women in rural areas migrate to urban areas (Liu et al., 2021). Thus, rural parents often resort to paid matchmaking services where these brokers sell Vietnamese women without their consent (Liu et al., 2021). Besides that, poverty and limited economic opportunities have encouraged Vietnamese women to migrate to China for jobs. Unfortunately, they were deceived and became victims of bride trafficking (Liu et al., 20221).

Xia et al. (2020) and Liu et al. (2021) conducted research using cases recorded in the Chinese judicial system, respectively, with a time frame of 2014-2016. They found 120 and 536 victims, respectively, of Vietnamese women trafficked as brides. Liu et al. (2021, p. 324) also identify the tricks used to deceive

these victims.

The consequences of bride trafficking borne by the survivors are not simple. Stöckl et al. (2017) found that 43 of 51 survivors, as young as 14, experienced high levels of sexual violence. Many survivors suffer from mental disturbance after being trafficked, with 27 survivors possibly suffering from depression, anxiety, and PTSD, and 2 survivors have attempted suicide (Stöckl et al., 2017). 10 survivors said they became pregnant after being trafficked, and another 7 survivors were pregnant during the interview (Stöckl et al., 2017).

This article fills in the gap by analyzing bride trafficking from Vietnam to China as a feature of the capitalist patriarchy structure. Furthermore, this research contributes to the study of International Relations, especially Global South, by analyzing how the intertwining between capitalism and patriarchy works crossing state borders and impacts women in Global South countries.

Two questions are addressed here: (1) How is women's position in the social, economic, and cultural structure of Vietnamese society? (2) How do these two structures contribute to the development of bride trafficking from Vietnam to China? Two theoretical frameworks are used to answer the questions. First, socialist feminism argues that women's oppression is rooted in capitalist patriarchy—hence double oppression. Under this system, the class system and sexual hierarchy system work dependently and create a division of labour and society sexually, with women positioned as subordinate to men (Eisenstein, 1979). This social reality is formed through historical construction, the social practices of gender character acquisition—thus fluid and can change (Jaggar, 1983). Second, the feminization of survival refers to making a living, earning a profit, and securing government revenue that operates on the backs of women (Sassen, 2000). Sassen argues that this phenomenon is tightly related to economic globalization.

This research uses the method of narrative analysis, which is a method that uses narratives as the object of analysis (Lieblich et al., 1998, p. 2). Experiences told by the survivors in any form, such as investigation videos, interview videos, and journalism reports, are converted into transcripts. Then, these transcripts are coded using several categories relevant to the theoretical frameworks. The literature study method is also used in this research to contextualize the double oppression of Vietnamese women and the relationship between economic globalization with Vietnamese women.

Women's Position in Vietnamese Society

The patriarchal norm in Vietnamese society is sourced from Confucianism, which sees that woman, throughout her life, has to obey men (Frenier & Mancini, 1996; Pelzer, 1993; Werner, 2009; Rahm, 2019; Rydström, 2006; Wiegersma, 1998). Men are seen as kings in the family, and sons have been preferred over daughters (Khuat, 2016; Rahm, 2019). This preference shows male domination in society and becomes a burden for women as they are often blamed

for 'not being able to produce' sons (Khuat, 2016). Patriarchal norms are so firmed in Vietnamese society that Vietnam tradition regards women as inferior from birth (Frenier & Mancini, 1996).

Women's sexuality symbolized that their role is limited to their reproductive function, strictly defined as a mother carrying and rearing children (Rydström, 2006). Even when women are not regarded as 'birth machines,' they are seen as the care-taker of their husbands and the person beautiful to look at (B. T. K. Quy, 1996). Women are put as an object, as an actor without agency whose life is only destined to 'complement' men.

The French colonial government also held a role in the patriarchal system. The government schooled Vietnamese girls at school age to educate them about French nationality and cultural values (Lessard, 2002). The colonial government believed that the values of the French would be channelled to the next generation of Vietnam through their mother's nurturance (Lessard, 2002). This case also shows that patriarchy is an oppressive system that always benefits other oppressive systems—colonialism, in this case.

The Communist Revolution, an anti-colonialist movement in Vietnam, aimed to eradicate all forms of hierarchy in Vietnamese society, including gender hierarchy (Rahm, 2019). Women gained access to the public sphere, such as political institutions and important role in the anti-colonial struggle (Pelzer, 1993; Werner, 2009). However, such access did not automatically eliminate gender hierarchy in society, which will be discussed later.

The things mentioned above show that Vietnamese society is a patriarchal system. It is formed through political and ideological interpretations of biological differences between men and women (Eisenstein, 1979). Because women are seen as inferior, the social structure views women's natural roles as taboo and not supposed to be shown publicly. Rydström (2006) mentioned that in rural Vietnamese society, women's sexuality can only be practised in private or the family sphere. There is social control over every aspect of a woman—starting from her body, behaviour, and life choices.

Women's position in the Vietnamese culture created a political economy system that is inherently oppressive against women, as they can hardly access factors of production safely. At the family level, Confucianism teaches that women are not entitled to family inheritance and property (Rahm, 2019). This condition has at least two implications for women. It preserved the preference for sons in society and limited women's access to critical and needed resources to maintain their livelihood independently. At the societal level, women do not get the share of land distribution and the rights of control over land in the village (Wiegersma, 1998). After the end of the Chinese occupation, the regulation of property ownership still limited women's rights to property ownership (Wiegersma, 1998). Nowadays, the marginalization of Vietnamese women in the economic system still exists. The forms even changed, adjusting to the capitalist

industry structure today.

The end of the feudal family and society structure, followed by the introduction of the wage labour system under capitalism, granted women the opportunity to earn independent income (Wiegersma, 1998). Nevertheless, in the long term, capitalism and market liberalization in Vietnam do not improve women's position in the social structure. B. T. K. Quy (1996) even said that the so-called development put women at the bottom position of society and made women subject to layers of exploitation.

Under capitalism, women are exploited and bear double burdens from work at home and in society (Hong, 2016; Yarr, 1996). This is because women are still regarded to naturally belong in the private and domestic sphere (Hong, 2016; Werner, 2009). On the other hand, public workplaces are not sensitive to women's rights and needs because of the emphasis on productivity, even in those workplaces led by women (B. T. K. Quy, 1996; Yarr, 1996). Legislations that mandate women's rights do not consider significantly changing the condition. Some feminists view that those legislations, instead of protecting women in the workplace, isolate women further, put them in low-wage labour, and make companies regard employing women as too costly (Khuat, 2016; Yarr, 1996).

According to Barry (1996), the competitive climate of the economic system encourages companies not to hire women or to pay women low wages to preserve the companies' business. Newly industrialized countries that depend on exports generally pay women under the minimum wage to the extent that it is insufficient to meet life's ends (Barry, 1996). Meanwhile, in the informal sector, women do not receive social protection and security (Barry, 1996). However, B. T. K. Quy (1996) found that women are accounted for 51.7% of labour in rural areas, with almost all of those women working in hard jobs with low wages. Thus, in the formal and informal sectors, women face discrimination and oppression because of patriarchy. It can be understood that industrialization and economic development have gendered impacts (see Barry, 1996).

Women's low wages can also be attributed to their low level of education (Hong, 2016; Khuat, 2016; B. T. K. Quy, 1996). This can be caused by Confucianist teachings that allow only men to have formal education while women are sufficed to be educated at home with Four Virtues and Three Obediences (Wiegersma, 1998). Their double responsibilities can also cause women's limited access to education during the two Vietnam anti-colonial wars. Women were responsible for contributing to wars while fulfilling their responsibility in the production sphere of society (B. T. K. Quy, 1996).

In this respect, the state has been the point of inequality in power relations between women and men in Vietnam. MacKinnon (1983) states that the state regards sexuality as gendered and gender as sexualized. Interestingly, most of, if not all of them, the oppression by the government is done through channels that claim to promote gender equality. The important

factor here is the Women's Union, a part of the Communist Party of Vietnam that specifically works in the field of women empowerment. The Union can be credited with passing progressive legal instruments on the matter (Hoang, 2020). Nevertheless, the Women's Union, at the same time, also strengthens the patriarchal oppression in society.

The Women's Union gathered and mobilized all women in Vietnam to participate in the war against French colonialism and any nation-building efforts (Hoang, 2020). Their importance in achieving the state's independence is because women are believed to embody the finest traditions of the ethnic Vietnamese nation and are regarded as the symbol for awakening national consciousness and patriotism (Werner, 2009). Thus, women's responsibility expanded in the domestic sphere and the war against colonialism. According to Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Communist Party, gender equality is "not just an equal division of labour in the family, but included the right and responsibility of women to participate fully in national affairs" (Werner, 2009). This shows political institutions' control over women's roles.

After independence, the Women's Union still holds a significant position regulating Vietnamese women's role. It defines women's role and responsibility limited motherhood—taking care of the household, giving birth, and childrearing (Rydström, 2016). Motherhood responsibilities in Vietnam are seen as demands rather than life choices that women can make (Rydström, 2016). Thus, the state strengthens the gender role construction that inherently oppresses women and puts women as men's subordinate.

Marriage and Family Law 2000 states that the Women's Union is responsible for "educating and mobilizing… every citizen to build cultural families" (Rydström, 2016). The Union then campaigned for "women actively study, creatively work, and nurture happy families" as women's duty and roles, as well as other campaigns such as "Happy Family," "Cultured Family," and "Building Families of Five Withouts and Three Cleans" (Hoang, 2020; Rydström, 2016). It sends a message that policies encouraging family development are encouraged by an institution focused on women's empowerment. In addition, the Union also has an education program to support mothers with "breeding exemplary families" that do not suffer from poverty, law violation, and social evils (Rydström, 2016). Various pamphlets, billboards, courses, and recreational activities in Vietnam taught women about family planning, household management, and the emotional nurturance of husbands and children (Rydström, 2016). All of these campaigns and programs show how the Women's Union forms the understanding that in order to be good citizens, Vietnamese women have to fulfil the responsibility of housewives, no other than that.

In addition, the Women's Union had opposed policies that were aimed at protecting women, that is the idea of a shelter project for victims of domestic violence, because it is deemed to be inappropriate

for the Vietnamese society (Hardinghaus, 2009 in Pistor & L. T. Quy, 2014). This is ironic because the Union is supposed to be the one who can understand and side with women, especially the survivors of domestic violence. However, if we refer to the Marriage and Family Law mentioned above, the Union's duty only revolves around the matter of family development by women. In Vietnam, efforts to overcome and address discrimination against women are often regarded as "inappropriate" or "unsuitable" for Vietnamese society (Pistor & L. T. Quy, 2014). The state does not acknowledge that the sexualized construction of gender and the gendered perception of sexuality put women prone to violence.

The 1946 Constitution stated that "women enjoy full and equal rights with men under the Constitution in every respect," as stated in the next versions of the Constitution—1959, 1980, 1992, and 2013 (Hoang, 2020). However, discrimination against women can still be found in the legislation. The Gender Equality Law narrows the focus to social and family life. It puts other important issues, such as unequal wages, unequal economic opportunities, and equality in policy-making, as minors (Pistor & L. T. Quy, 2014). Lastly, the 1960 Labour Law stated that the retirement age for women is 55 while for men is 60, on the grounds that women need to take care of the household (Pistor & L. T. Quy, 2014). Indirectly, this means that women are allowed to work in public and at home only after domestic matters are handled. The Law indicates that women are not supposed to do work in public for too long, given their domestic responsibilities.

Vietnamese Women Under Capitalist Patriarchy

The discussion above indicates that Vietnamese women bear a double-oppression burden. This double oppression is sourced from patriarchal norms in Vietnamese culture and the capitalist economy system that is restrictive and exploitative against women. These two oppressive sources work in line and intertwine with each other, forming a power system that oppresses women in a specific way. This system is the capitalist patriarchy system (Eisenstein, 1979).

Socialist feminism underlines the importance of analyzing a power structure based on capital ownership status. For them, women are oppressed not only because of their gender identity but also because of their class status. In the context of Vietnam, we have seen how the society has a gender hierarchy. This social order then integrates with a new power structure, namely capitalism. Vietnamese women who possess low-class status thus face double oppression due to not having power in both structures. The oppression faced by Vietnamese women occurs in the hierarchical sexual relations AND exploitation of her labour (Eisenstein, 1979; emphasis added). This means that oppression against Vietnamese women is class-biased.

Some women benefit from capitalist patriarchy. In this case, women who hold high positions in the Union also benefit from the double oppression structure (Hoang,

2020). This is what socialist feminism calls the alienation of women: women, who are supposed to be connected under their gender identity, become alienated and opposed (Jaggar, 1983).

The state, thus, is a patriarchal actor—or, as MacKinnon (1983) said, "the state is male." The legislation and policy made by the Vietnam government are manifestations of the male perspective of women. As the only legitimate actor holding the highest power in the social order, the state using the male perspective in viewing and treating women indirectly legitimizes the perspective in society. The patriarchal perception of women then led to an illusion of women. This illusion lies in women's sexuality, representing women's identity as human beings. Women's sexuality defines women's identity, role, and standard behaviour.

This illusion can be called sexual objectification, defined as separating one's sexual part or sexual function from the person, then regarded as the only identity representing the person (Bartky, 1990). When a woman is sexually objectified, she is understood as a mere body that exists for others' pleasure (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). As Jaggar (1983) has said, human beings have three needs: food and shelter needs, sexual needs, and emotional nurturance. In this respect, the woman's body becomes the fulfilment instrument for sexual needs.

Capitalist Patriarchy in Bride Trafficking

Bride trafficking in Vietnam occurs because of another dimension of sexual objectification against women. The intersection of patriarchy and capitalism found in bride trafficking is as follows. This sexual objectification, as a feature of patriarchy, became the foundation of the political economy in Vietnam. Women's sexuality holds the illusion of goods that can be exchanged. Socialist feminism views that the social order created by patriarchy is needed for capitalism to work and that the division of labour created by capitalism is needed by patriarchy (Eisenstein, 1979; Jaggar, 1983). Thus, bride trafficking from Vietnam to China manifests sexual objectification against women that occurs on a massive scale and as a means to accumulate capital.

How does the political economy system work in bride trafficking? Jaggar (1983) wrote that as long as human needs are fulfilled by using the works of others, the system formed to fulfil the needs is a production system. Furthermore, if the fulfilling means are done through distribution and exchange, fulfilling the human needs system is an economic system (Jaggar, 1983). We can find these two features in bride trafficking. In addition, this practice is an economic practice because there is an act of commodification that always involves purchasing someone (Overall, 1992 in Connor, 2019).

More specifically, bride trafficking in Vietnam is a form of sexual economy, an economic practice that uses women's sexuality as a commodity. Only in the system of the sexual economy, a woman's body becomes a commodity that can be treated freely by the consumer (O'Connor, 2019).

This happens in bride trafficking, where the women survivor loses their control over their reproductive work. Davidson (1998) in O'Connor (2019) called this economic practice "an institution that allows the use of power over someone's body." In bride trafficking, women are exploited because another party controls and benefits from women's work (Jaggar, 1983), as commonly found in a capitalist economy.

Bride trafficking is systematic violence against women. In assessing the occurrence of violence in contracts in the sexual market, O'Connor (2019) asked, "Is the contract between the buyer and women in prostitution an exchange in a normal market, where the seller can maintain clear boundaries between their body and themselves?" In bride trafficking, the victims cannot maintain clear boundaries between their bodies and who they are. Their bodies, with feminine sexual parts, became the only judgement of who they are. An economic system—a system to maintain human survival—works using a sexuality model based on the subordination and degradation of women (O'Connor, 2019). Thus, we can conclude that bride trafficking is an oppressive social practice against women.

Bride Trafficking from Vietnam to China as Globalization Phenomenon

The Impact of Globalization on Women in Rural Vietnam

Under the reformation of Doi Moi in 1986, Vietnam began adopting a liberal economic system (Turley, 2019). Vietnam changed its economic system from a centralized one into "a socialist-oriented market economy" with the "emergence of private and market sector, decentralization of management, and expansion of economic relations with the non-socialist world" (Turley, 2019). Although this reform is argued to be successful in improving the Vietnamese people's condition, the said improvement does not happen to Vietnamese women. Social and economic changes brought about by globalization put women in rural Vietnam in the most disadvantaged condition (Fahey, 2002; Packard, 2006).

Economic globalization is a transferring process of "wealth, raw materials, commodities, and other assets" from new developing countries to developed and rich countries (Kara, 2017). In Vietnam, commodities produced in rural areas—such as rice and coffee—cannot compete in the domestic market due to imports of similar commodities at lower prices (Le et al., 2016). Big domestic companies also monopolized the market, which led the Vietnam agricultural farmers to difficulty obtaining profit and incentives (Le et al., 2016). Consequently, Vietnamese people in rural areas are hindered from undergoing economic improvement and growth.

The lack of development in rural Vietnam increases the burden already borne by women in rural areas (Fahey, 2002; Packard, 2006). Initially oppressed by patriarchy, they now experience another social injustice and burden because of poverty and lack of capital ownership. Globalization becomes the catalyst that worsen oppression against women in rural Vietnam.

Under poverty, it is natural for someone to look for a job. Unfortunately, women in rural Vietnam have limited job opportunities, in contrast to their urban counterparts, due to discrimination in the social rule that does not allow them to work in the public sphere (Fahey, 2002). It is still common to find gender inequality due to patriarchy and Confucianist culture in rural Vietnam. Women in rural Vietnam are assigned to motherhood and domestic roles, such as "maintaining the human race" and managing the household (Rydström, 2006). Furthermore, oppression and discrimination caused them to lack experience and education, thus obstructing them from accessing jobs and safe, productive spaces (Fahey, 2002; Tran, 2013).

There are two specific implications of economic globalization towards women in rural Vietnam. First, they are deceived using the promise of a job, only to be trafficked afterwards. Survivors of bride trafficking, with limited economic conditions and low status, are offered jobs with high wages in the city or China (Hodal, 2017; Vaughan & Tran, 2018; Liu et al., 2021). Given their lack of capital and the discrimination they frequently face in finding jobs, they view those offers as opportunities that cannot be missed. Second, poverty and economic crisis due to globalization also drive the people around women survivors to look for easy ways to earn income, including by being a broker or an intermediary for brokers in trafficking women (CNA, 2019). Liu et al. (2021) found that most brokers, who trafficked Vietnamese women for forced marriage in China, have low levels and no education. This means they have difficulty earning income and obeying the standard imposed by capitalist industry. Their limited economic condition also encouraged the intermediaries to deceive and traffic women through promises of luxury goods (Hodal, 2017).

Survivors' Experiences

Giang: [The narrator mentioned that the kidnapper is someone she just met at the market]. That day, I was still at school. He then called me and told me there was an event at the market. He invited me to go with him to the market, so we hung out. When we left the market to go home, they took me straight to China. When I realised what was going on, I was already in China. They probably drugged me the day we met. When I realised that I was sold to China, I felt scared and uneasy because I had been deceived by the kidnappers. It would be difficult for me to return home. At the time I thought I would never see my home again. When I was there, they threatened to dissect me for my organs if I had refused to get married. Many people asked me to marry them and I just cried in response. They probably took my crying as a refusal for me to get married. So they let me be, I cried everyday. One day I met a guy from Vietnam and he rescued me. I cried so much that he sympathized with me. So he sold his motorbike to pay for the ransom. The whole thing was over after five days, including the trip to China and back again. When I was close to the Vietnamese border, I called my parents and said I needed money. So my parents brought the money and I was able to return home. Now here (at Pacific Links Foundation's Compassion House), I met another girl who survived the same ordeal and we always confide in each other. [...]

Linh: [The narrator mentioned that the kidnapper was someone she knew, a family friend]. That friend lived in Muong Khuong while I was studying at Lao Cai City High School. I knew him through a family's acquaintance. I knew nothing when they sneaked me across the border. I knew nothing until I arrived in some district and saw Chinese letters. It was then, that I realized I was trafficked. [...] I was beaten there like the others. [...] When I was sold, the trafficking ring in China, bought me for a family. They kept moving me around, and I never really knew where I was. Until they moved me to a particular house, and I was sold to the family there. I became a wife there. They beat me up without any fear because I am not Chinese. I was beaten all the time because I couldn't speak Chinese. I had to be completely obedient when I was there. They told me that if I give birth to at least two children, they would return me to Vietnam. If you are trafficked, of course, you will be raped. Probably everyone was raped. [...] When I returned, many people believed that I wanted to go in the first place. But they should know that I was forced against my will. [...] I did not go to school for a year because of that. [...]

Source: CNA (2019)

Ly San May: I was born and grew up in a village in the northern mountainous area of Vietnam. I survived human trafficking. I was sold to China in 2010. I returned home in 2014. […] The day I was tricked and sold to China, my friend tan and I went to have dental treatment. It was at a place 60 km from my village. We met a woman. The woman was accompanied by a man. She complimented me for having nice clothes. She was a stranger but I had a sense of trust in her. […] She enticed me by saying we could learn how to grow pineapples to sell. Where I'm from, pineapples can't be grown. Pineapples sell for a lot of money. I wanted to follow her to learn how to grow pineapples. We first went by motorbike, then we talked. I remember having to wade across a stream, and then crossing a short bridge. […] We had to wade another stream before getting into a car. After that, I fell asleep and wasn't aware of anything. When I woke up, Tan told me, "sister, we have been tricked and sold to China." I was so worried and felt uncertain. […] It was already dark when we reached a village. When I got there, I saw a thin, old man, about 60 years old. The woman told me to marry that man. […] Eventually we were able to sneak out and not have to stay in that house anymore. When we escaped, we met a Vietnamese Woman, […] I cried and told her I was tricked to come here. […] I asked the woman, "can your husband help to take us back to Vietnam?" She said, "we can take you home." So, we followed her. But then we were sold again. […] When the car arrived at the village, they took us to a house, closed the door and didn't let us out. Tan and I stayed there and cried all night. […] I stayed with them for about one month. They took me to Guangxi and a man came to buy me. They said I must marry that Tay (north Vietnamese ethnic group) man. If I refused, they wouldn't let me live. It took three nights and three days to get to that man's house in Hunan. He kept all the money. He just gave me foot but no money. The Chinese husband didn't hit me. He just treated me normally. […] (The video shows that she found a way to call the police after three years). I asked for help as I was tricked and sold in China. I wanted to go back to Vietnam. "Can you save me?" I asked. They said, "yes" and after a while they arrived. I thought I would be sent back to Vietnam but I was not. They sent me to prison. […] They said that even though I was tricked and sold, I had to go to jail since I had no ID card. I ended up staying in prison for more than five months. […]

Source: VICE Asia (2022)

Neng: The first time I went to China, I went to Bac Ha market with my uncle's daughter. They asked me if I wanted something to eat. I said yes. After eating, I fell unconscious and didn't wake up until 7 AM the next morning. They said my cousin went back to Lao Cai already. They had found me a husband. I said that I didn't want to marry him. Then they said, "what would you prefer? To get married to him or to be a whore?" So I agreed to be the old man's wife. [...] My Chinese husband was a farmer. He was 29 years old. I didn't like him because he was old.

Source: Radio Free Asia (2013)

Kiab: My brother is no longer a human being in my eyes, because he sold me, his own sister, to China.

Lang: It's mostly women who live in mountainous and isolated areas who are being trafficked across the border. Because there is no information for us. That's why we … are sold across the border, to the next-door country.

Source: AFP News Agency (2014)

Tien: I gave her all of my money and my ID card. She told me, "we're going to find work. You said you wanted to leave that village so I'm taking you." [Her cousin had promised to take her to the big cities in the south, but instead they headed north, to the capital Hanoi. They switched vehicles in the capital and Tien fell asleep. When she woke, she was in China, where her cousin abandoned her after selling her to a trafficking broker. Tien soon learned the broker had already matched her with a husband. She put up a fight, refusing to leave the broker's house for four months, but eventually gave in, having met a fellow Vietnamese who told her the only way to escape the country would be to learn Chinese – and that the best way to do so would be to marry. So she let her broker find her a new match.] (Source: Duong, 2018)

*Sentences inside the brackets are written by the respective author

Source: Duong (2018)

Cẩm: […living in Sapa, an impoverished rural district in Vietnam's mountainous north-west… She met Long on Facebook after he messaged her one day, out of the blue. … Instead, she had a friend request and message from his younger brother Binh, asking if she was in Sapa. "I'm coming up there and don't really know my way around, are you free to meet up?" the message read. They'd never met before, but she arranged for him to come and pick her up. Long's brother bought a friend as well, and they stopped to collect Cẩm's best friend, too. The four sat down at a café and, as the boys orders beers for everyone,… All Cẩm remembers next is getting sandwiched between the two boys on to a motorbike, feeling so dizzy she could barely keep her eyes open. It was the bouncing that finally woke her up: they were hurtling down a lone dirt road in a thick forest. A street sign in Chinese character came into view, and the bike stopped. Panicking, she dug into her pockets for her mobile phone and started screaming as fast as she could to her sister that she'd been trafficked, she was somewhere on the border with China. An older man emerged from the trees and grabbed the phone. Then he put a knife to Cẩm's throat. "You're already in China – you can't go home now," he snarled. "I hope you're ready to get married, because that's what you're going to be." Cẩm was in the process of being sold to a H'mong couple at a hotel overlooking a river, when she realised the river was the Vietnamese border and the buildings the skyline of Lào Cai. Screaming that she demanded to go home, Cẩm was suddenly protected by a Chinese-Vietnamese couple, who gave her their mobile to phone home and helped Phượng arrange a boat to rescue her daughter the next morning.] The woman was so kind. She was H'mong, too, and had been sold herself to the Chinese man, so she understood my situation. […] And now I think my 'boyfriend' was just luring girls like me on Facebook into relationships, only for his brother to traffic over the border.

*Sentences inside the brackets are written by the respective author

Source: Hodal (2017)

Double Oppression in Bride Trafficking from Vietnam to China

Narrations told by survivors in the previous section have been coded based on six categories. These categories are aspects considered can describe survivors' experiences regarding the two theoretical frameworks of this research.

	Relations with abductor	Tricks used by abductor	Survivor's motive	Migration to China	Survivor's place of origin	Treatment and remarks to the survivor
Giang	New acquaintance	Going to an event	Coming to an event	-	-	Threats to marry
Linh	Family's acquaintance	-	-	-	Lao Cai	Physical violence; Emotional violence; Sexual violence
Neng	Cousin	Going to the market	-	-	Lao Cai	Threats to marry; Sexual violence
Ly San	New acquaintance	Teaching to do business; Promise of rescue	Earning income; Intention of going home	Road; river; bridge	Village in northern mountainous Vietnam	Threats to marry
Kiab	Sibling	-	-	-	-	-
Lang	-	-	Implicitly stated deception	-	Mountainous and isolated area	-
Tien	Cousin	Promise of job	Looking for a job	Road	-	Threats to marry
Cẩm	New acquaintance	Going to the cafe	Merely hanging out	Road	Sapa	Threats to marry

(1) *Relations with the abductor.* Four survivors said they were persuaded, abducted, and trafficked by someone they already knew. Three of them are trafficked by their family members. Although this data does not statistically represent the reality, this data shows that the perpetrator of bride trafficking can be anyone, including one's family member.

(2) *Tricks used by the abductor.* All eight survivors received different tricks—no certain pattern was found. Nevertheless, using tricks shows a power relations gap between the abductor and the survivor. The abductors viewed the survivors as an object that could be used for profit, as the objects of capitalist patriarchy.

(3) *Survivor's motive.* All survivors have different motives, with no certain pattern found. However, it should be underlined that this motive aspect emphasizes that each survivor has agency and autonomy in making decisions. On the other hand, the perpetrators viewed them as subhuman, with no agency and autonomy.

(4) *Migration to China.* Only three survivors explained the way they were taken to China. They all were taken by road crossing the border between Vietnam and China. This accessibility results from an agreement between the two countries regarding economic globalization.

(5) *Survivor's place of origin.* Two survivors said they are from "isolated" and "mountainous" rural Vietnam. The other three explicitly said that they are from Lao Cai and Sapa. According to the Vietnam Ministry of Industry and Trade website, Lao Cai is a wide province with rural and urban areas. Meanwhile, Sapa or Sa Pa is a part of Lao Cai province. This cannot be the base of the conclusion that bride trafficking survivors are always or a majority of them are from rural areas. However, given that the majority of survivors coming from rural areas in this research, it proves the thesis of this research that women in rural Vietnam are prone to be the victim of bride trafficking to China.

(6) *Treatment and remarks to the survivor.* All eight survivors in this research received various violence and threats. The use of violence and threats are manifestations of the power relations gap between perpetrators and survivors. It shows how the perpetrators had power over the survivors. Moreover, this power relations gap is formed through the illusion of women's sexuality, that is, the illusion that women are an object that can be treated in certain ways instead of a subject with autonomy.

From the above analysis, we can find double oppression in the case of bride trafficking from Vietnam to China. First, patriarchal oppression can be seen in sexual objectification against the women survivors. Whatever the justification or reason for men to 'buy' women as their wives, this act is a form of sexual objectification. Women's sexual identity is translated as women's life purpose to fulfil men's sexual needs. Sexual objectification against women also indicates fragile masculinity. Men's masculinity is so fragile that they need to 'own' women as their wives to protect and maintain their masculinity. No survivors above mentioned that bride trafficking occurred because of patriarchy, but some of them mentioned that they experienced this because they are women. One of the survivors even explicitly said that this practice often targets women.

Second, oppression by capitalism is manifested in the efforts to accumulate capital and profit through objectifying women. In cases where the perpetrators have low economic status, their marginal position in economic order drives them to do anything to earn income. One intermediary in abducting the victims mentioned that he had limited economic conditions, and he did this because he had been promised a luxury cell phone. This condition shows that women can be treated freely to obtain luxury goods, money, and other material things. Furthermore, as the coding table above only found two survivors deceived for economic purposes, it proves that the basic problem is not on women as survivors. Instead, the basic problem of bride trafficking is capitalist patriarchy that systematically objectifies women sexually and exploits women for profit.

Feminization of Survival through Bride Trafficking

Poverty and marginalization of certain society groups in Vietnam is a phenomenon called the counter-geography of globalization. This refers to various setbacks of globalization (Sassen, 2000). Counter-geography of globalization creates various circuits of income-making in developing countries that are not integrated with the conventional economic system, hence classified as shadow economy (Sassen, 2000).

Bride trafficking is a counter-geography of globalization because its emergence is related to two of three things found in globalization: the formation of the global market and the intensification of transnational or trans-local networks (Sassen, 2000). Markets started forming along the border of Vietnam and China in the early 1990s after the two countries normalized their relations (Duong et al., 2007; Xiaosong & Womack, 2000). As the markets formed, so did the transnational and trans-local network of the people. Duong et al. (2007) even mentioned that bide trafficking from Vietnam to China happened through this market.

Furthermore, economic globalization facilitated bride trafficking from Vietnam to China. Globalization encouraged the two countries to open their shared border. In 1991, Vietnam and China agreed to normalize

their relations and to begin cooperation in various fields, such as development, economic reformation, and open access for foreigners (Xiaosong & Womack, 2000). This is considered globalization because the boundaries between the two countries seemed to disappear. One of the significant changes from this normalization is the restoration of transportation infrastructure between Vietnam and China, such as national and province harbours, railways, roads, and river transportation (Xiaosong & Womack, 2000). This easy access, accompanied by weak security, made human smuggling possible (AFP News Agency, 2014; Hodal, 2017; Vaughan & Tran, 2018).

In addition, the opening up between Vietnam and China opened the information door to Vietnam people about job opportunities in China. China is a relatively richer country than Vietnam. Thus, a job opportunity in China is an interesting alternative, given the limited economic condition in rural Vietnam. Liu et al. (2021) and CNA (2019) found that some of the survivors of bride trafficking from Vietnam to China were initially promised job opportunities. They surely would only get interested if they had known that China is more developed than Vietnam.

One matter that should be noted is that these income-earning circuits operate on women's shoulders. The changes in economic institutions due to globalization do not work gender-neutral (Sassen, 2000). Without women's presence, society would not survive and make a profit. The government would not be able to 'secure' or minimalize its expenditure (Sassen, 2000). This economic practice works by monetizing the role women are assigned to by patriarchy. Reduction of women's agency and autonomy becomes an act that generates money.

The sexual economy works by treating women and their sexuality as commodities. Here, patriarchy and capitalism meet and strengthen each other. At the same time, accumulation of capital and wealth obtained by the oppressor encourages them to maintain the gender hierarchy order. Women, as the controlled group, face two different oppressions simultaneously. As a labour, a woman's sexuality is exploited for work considered women's 'nature.' As a commodity, women are sold like goods, inanimate goods with no agency.

Bride trafficking from Vietnam to China is a practice of sexual economy. The perpetrators earn money by trading women's sexuality as a symbol. The price for one woman ranges from ¥23,725 to ¥88,946 (Liu et al., 2021). Poverty and the underdevelopment of the economy made this 'business' a significant source of income. The setback of globalization resulted in human needs being fulfilled by using power over women's bodies. The government benefits from this practice as well. The people's capability to survive through this economic system, through bride trafficking, saves the government from spending money on helping their welfare. The survival of the Vietnam government as an institution, along with the individuals within it, depends on power instrumentalization over women's bodies.

The connection between globalization and the economic gap is found in research by Liu et al. (2021) and Xia et al. (2020). Both studies found that most perpetrators of bride trafficking from Vietnam to China are farmers. Xia et al. (2020) even used the term "peasant," which shows that those farmers have low economic status. This can be related to the fact that 70% of Vietnam's workforce worked in agriculture in the 1990s (Le, 2013), and now the formation of a global market has suppressed the chance for farmers to earn income and profit due to monopoly by big companies in agriculture (Le et al., 2016).

Conclusion

Bride trafficking from Vietnam to China is a form of double oppression against women. The oppression occurs as two oppressive structures meet and strengthen each other, namely patriarchy and capitalism, thus creating the capitalist patriarchy structure. Globalization then helps this oppressive structure in the development of bride trafficking from Vietnam to China. The subordination of women encouraged the commodification of women's sexuality as an alternative to life survival. Globalization also paves the way for bride trafficking through the ease of mobility and access between Vietnam and China.

This research proves that bride trafficking, and women trafficking in general, are not merely caused by poverty or lack of education. It is capitalist patriarchy that forces the objectification of women as a trade commodity. This research also proves that oppression against women is always class-biased. Regarding the economic aspects, women in the middle and lower classes are more prone to oppression than women in the upper class. Therefore, the fight against patriarchy to liberate and free women shall not use the one-fits-all approach because oppression against women works in the context of certain economic classes.

References

E-Book

Bartky, S. L. (1990). *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression*. Routledge.

Jaggar, A. M. (1988). *Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Philosophy and Society)*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Kara, S. (2017). *Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery*. Columbia University Press.

Le, M. S., Singh, T., & Nguyen, D.-T. (2016). *Trade Liberalisation and Poverty: Vietnam Now and Beyond*. Routledge.

Lieblich, A., Liybliyk, ʿAmiyah, Tuval-Mashiach, R., & Zilber, T. (1998). *Narrative Research: Reading, Analysis, and Interpretation*. SAGE.

O'Connor, M. (2019). *The Sex Economy*. Agenda Publishing.

Rahm, L. (2019). *Gender-biased Sex Selection in South Korea, India and Vietnam: Assessing the Influence of Public Policy*. Springer.

Werner, J. (2009). *Gender, Household and State in Post-revolutionary Vietnam*. Routledge.

Wiegersma, N. (1988). *Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution: Patriarchy and Collectivity in the Rural Economy*. Springer.

Book Chapters

Barry, K. (1996). Industrialization and Economic Development: The Costs to Women. In K. Barry (Ed.), *Vietnam's Women in Transition* (pp. 144–156). Macmillan Press LTD.

Duong, L. B., Belanger, D., & Hong, K. T. (2007). Transnational Migration, Marriage and Trafficking at the China-Vietnam Border. In I. Attane & C. Guilmoto (Eds.), *Watering the Neighbour's Garden: The Growing Demographic Female Deficit in Asia* (pp. 393–426). Committee for International Cooperation in National Research in Demography.

Eisenstein, Z. R. (1979). Developing a theory of capitalist patriarchy and socialist feminism. In *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism* (pp. 5–40). Monthly Review Press.

Frenier, M., & Mancini, K. (1996). Vietnamese Women in a Confucian Setting: The Causes of the Initial Decline in the Status of East Asian Women. In K. Barry (Ed.), *Vietnam's Women in Transition* (pp. 21–37). Macmillan Press LTD.

Le, H. H. (2013). Labour and Employment in Transition to a Market Economy in the 1990s. In I. Nørlund, C. Gates, & C. D. Vu (Eds.), *Vietnam in a Changing World* (pp. 181–186). Routledge.

Lessard, M. (2002). Civilizing Women: French Colonial Perceptions of Vietnamese Womanhood and Motherhood. In T. Hunt & M. Lessard (Eds.), *Women and the Colonial Gaze* (pp. 148–161). Palgrave.

Pelzer, K. (1993). Socio-Cultural Dimensions of Renovation in Vietnam: Doi Moi as Dialogue and Transformation in Gender Relations. In W. Turley & M. Selden (Eds.), *Reinventing Vietnamese Socialism: Doi Moi In Comparative Perspective* (pp. 309–336). Routledge.

Pistor, N., & Quy, L. T. (2014). Enclosing women's rights in the kitchen cabinet? Interactions between the Vietnam Women's Union, civil society and the state on gender equality. In G. Waibel, J. Ehlert, & H. N. Feuer (Eds.), *Southeast Asia and the Civil Society Gaze: Scoping a Contested Concept in Cambodia and Vietnam* (pp. 93–112). Routledge.

Quy, B. T. K. (1996). The Vietnamese Women in Vietnam's Process of Change. In K. Barry (Ed.), *Vietnam's Women in Transition* (pp. 159–166). Macmillan Press LTD.

Rydström, H. (2016). Vietnam Women's Union and the Politics of Representation: Hegemonic Solidarity and a Heterosexual Family Regime. In H. Danielsen, K. Jegerstedt, R. Muriaas, & B. Yte-Arne (Eds.), *Gendered Citizenship and the Politics of Representation* (pp. 209–234). Palgrave Macmillan.

Tran, T. Q. (2013). Gender Issues in Vietnam's Development. In I. Nørlund, C. Gates & C. D. Vu (Eds.), *Vietnam in a Changing World* (pp. 187–206). Routledge.

Turley, W. S. (2019). Introduction. In W. S. Turley & M. Selden (Eds.), *Reinventing Vietnamese Socialism: Doi Moi In Comparative Perspective* (pp. 1–15). Routledge.

Yarr, L. J. (1996). Gender and the Allocation of Time: Impact on the Household Economy. In K. Barry (Ed.), *Vietnam's Women in Transition* (pp. 110–122). Macmillan Press LTD.

Secondary Source

Davidson, J. O. (1998). *Prostitution, Power, and Freedom*. Polity. Quoted in: O'Connor, M. (2019). *The Sex Economy*. Agenda Publishing.

Hardinghaus, B. (2009). Das Haus der Madame Thuy. *Der Spiegel, 8*, 92–6. www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-64197243.html. Quoted in: Pistor, N., & Quy, L. T. (2014). Enclosing women's rights in

the kitchen cabinet? Interactions between the Vietnam Women's Union, civil society and the state on gender equality. In G. Waibel, J. Ehlert, & H. N. Feuer (Eds.), *Southeast Asia and the Civil Society Gaze: Scoping a Contested Concept in Cambodia and Vietnam* (pp. 93–112). Routledge.

Overall, C. (1992). "What's wrong with prostitution? Evaluating sex work". *Signs 17*(4), 705–24. Quoted in: O'Connor, M. (2019). *The Sex Economy*. Agenda Publishing.

Wang, Y. (2015). *Over 100,000 Vietnamese brides in China*. Accessed December 29 2019. https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20150722000845. Quoted in: Liu, W., Qiu, G., & Zhang, S. X. (2021). Easy prey: Illicit enterprising activities and the trafficking of Vietnamese women in China. *Asian Journal of Criminology, 16*(4), 319–335. doi: 10.1007/s11417-020-09327-y

Report

Fahey, S. (2002). *Women in Viet Nam*. Working Report. Asian Development Bank. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/32605/women-viet-nam.pdf

Packard, L. A. T. (2006). Gender dimensions of Viet Nam's comprehensive macroeconomic and structural reform policies. Working Paper. *UNRISD Occasional Paper, 14*. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148817

Journal Article (retrieved online, with DOI)

Fredrickson, B. L., & Roberts, T.-A. (1997). Objectification theory: Toward understanding women's lived experiences and mental health risks. *Psychology of Women Quarterly, 21*(2), 173–206. doi: 10.1111/j.1471-6402.1997.tb00108.x

Hoang, L. A. (2020). The Vietnam women's union and the contradictions of a socialist gender regime. *Asian Studies Review, 44*(2), 297–314. doi: 10.1080/10357823.2019.1699023

Liu, W., Qiu, G., & Zhang, S. X. (2021). Easy prey: Illicit enterprising activities and the trafficking of Vietnamese women in China. *Asian Journal of Criminology, 16*(4), 319–335. doi: 10.1007/s11417-020-09327-y

MacKinnon, C. A. (1983). Feminism, marxism, method, and the state: Toward feminist jurisprudence. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 8*(4), 635–658. doi: 10.1086/494000

Rydström, H. (2006). Sexual Desires and 'Social Evils': Young women in rural Vietnam. *Gender, Place & Culture, 13*(3), 283–301. doi: 10.1080/09663690600701053

Stöckl, H., Kiss, L., Koehler, J., Dong, D. T., & Zimmerman, C. (2017). Trafficking of Vietnamese women and girls for marriage in China. *Global Health Research and Policy, 2*(1). doi: 10.1186/s41256-017-0049-4

Xia, Y., Zhou, Y., Du, L., & Cai, T. (2020). Mapping trafficking of women in China: Evidence from court sentences. *Journal of Contemporary China, 29*(122), 238–252. doi: 10.1080/10670564.2019.1637564

Xiaosong, G., & Womack, B. (2000). Border cooperation between China and Vietnam in the 1990s. *Asian Survey, 40*(6), 1042–1058. doi: 10.2307/3021201

Journal Article (retrieved online, without DOI)

Khuat, T. H. (2016). Women and development in Vietnam: Caught between social tradition and economic globalization. *Regions & Cohesion, 6*(2), 110–119. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/26661904

Lhomme, L., Zhong, S., & Du, B. (2021). Demi bride trafficking: A unique trend of human trafficking from South-East Asia to China. *Journal of International Women's Studies, 22*(3), 28–39. Retrieved from https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol22/iss3/4

Sassen, S. (2000). Women's burden: Counter-Geographies of globalization and the feminization of survival. *Journal of International Affairs, 53*(2), 503–524. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357763

Audiovisual Media (videos, music recordings, podcasts, etc.)

AFP News Agency. (2014). *Brides for sale: Vietnamese women trafficked to China* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-os1em48BQ

CNA. (2019). *Vietnam's trafficked brides* [Video]. CNA. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/watch/vietnams-trafficked-brides-1502971

Radio Free Asia. (2013). *The survivors: Trafficked women and girls of Vietnam* [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/itqBEEirHEI

VICE Asia. (2022). *I was trafficked from Vietnam to marry a Chinese man* [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/vzPjfx_dMqw

Electronic source

Duong, Y. (2018, June 17). *From Vietnam, without love: The child brides of China*. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/society/article/2151075/vietnam-without-love-child-brides-china

Hodal, K. (2017, August 26). *"I hope you're ready to get married": In search of Vietnam's kidnapped brides*. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/aug/26/ready-married-kidnapped-brides-vietnam-china

Ministry of Industry and Trade Vietnam. (2021, April 19). *Lao Cai province*. ASEM Connect Vietnam. Retrieved from http://asemconnectvietnam.gov.vn/default.aspx?ZID1=12&ID8=12335&ID1=2

Vaughan, J., & Tran, T. M. H. (2018, December 12). *Mothers of the Missing: Anguished search for Vietnam's kidnapped brides*. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2018/12/12/mothers-of-the-missing-anguished-search-for-vietnams-kidnapped-brides.html

The Opportunity to Achieve Net Zero Emissions in Indonesia Through Green Economy Implementation to Address Climate Change

Aulia Sabila Syarifa Qalbie; Rahmaniah
10.22146/globalsouth.86381

International Relations
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia
auliasabilasq18@gmail.com

This research discusses Indonesia's potential and challenges in implementing a green economy to achieve net zero emissions and address climate change. Global climate change poses a significant challenge to many countries, including Indonesia. To tackle this issue, implementing a green economy has been acknowledged as a practical approach to achieve substantial emission reductions and promote sustainable development. This research explores the potential of implementing a green economy in Indonesia to attain zero emissions and effectively address climate change. This research adopts a qualitative approach, utilizing a literature review, policy analysis, and case studies of green economy implementation in crucial sectors of the Indonesian economy. The analysis reveals that Indonesia possesses immense potential to adopt a green economy. However, several challenges hinder Indonesia's successful implementation of a green economy. This research provides valuable insights into Indonesia's potential, challenges, and efforts to achieve net zero Emissions. The Indonesian government has engaged in several collaborative partnerships involving various ministries of the Republic of Indonesia, domestic stakeholders, and international actors.

Keywords: *climate change; green economics; Indonesia; net zero emission*

Introduction

The issue of climate change has become a global focus, from shifting weather patterns that threaten food production to rising sea levels that increase the risk of catastrophic flooding and other disasters that threaten the lives of living things. The impact of climate change has a global scope and an unprecedented scale, so it has become an international focus. With drastic action today, adapting to those impacts in the future will be more accessible and more affordable (United Nations, 2015). Indonesia, along with the international community, is actively collaborating to achieve the goal of reducing global temperatures following the Paris Agreement. The agreement, established at the Conference of the Parties (COP-21) in Paris, encourages countries to limit the maximum global temperature increase to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, with further efforts to strive for a limit of 1.5°C (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional,

2022).

As one of the countries committed to the Paris Agreement, Indonesia has taken steps to address the threat of climate change caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This is shown in Indonesia's ratification of the Paris Agreement through Law No. 16 of 2016 and the elaboration of actions in the Enhanced Nationally Determined Contribution (ENDC) document. In the ENDC, Indonesia targets a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 31.89% through national efforts, with a potential reduction of up to 43.20% with international assistance by 2030 (Kemenkeu RI, 2022).

Indonesia's commitment was further strengthened at COP-26 in Glasgow on October 31 - November 12, 2021, by setting the target of achieving Net-Zero Emissions by 2060 or earlier (Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR), 2021). Following COP-26, Indonesia submitted a long-term draft to the UNFCCC titled "Indonesia Long-Term Strategy for Low Carbon and Climate Resilience (LTS-LCCR)." This document outlines Indonesia's climate change targets and plans until 2050, including reaching peak GHG emissions in 2030 and achieving Net-Zero Emissions by 2060 or earlier (waste4change, 2022).

Net-zero emissions refers to a state where the amount of carbon emissions released into the atmosphere does not exceed the amount that can be absorbed by the Earth (waste4change, 2022). Transitioning from the current energy system to a clean one is necessary to achieve this goal. Therefore, a balance between human activities and the natural environment can be pursued.

On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic that hit in early 2020 caused widespread economic disruptions worldwide due to social and economic restrictions implemented to control the spread of the virus. COVID-19 has significantly impacted the economies of several countries, including Indonesia. The Indonesian economy contracted 2.07 percent (year-on-year) in 2020 compared to 2019 (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2021). The economic setback caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has prompted the government to maximize economic activities to improve the welfare of the people, reduce poverty, create more jobs, and revive a declining economy.

The importance of economic growth and the challenges of climate change put Indonesia in a dilemma. On the one hand, Indonesia possesses abundant natural resources and significant economic sectors, such as agriculture, plantations, mining, and energy. Sustainable economic growth in these sectors is crucial for reducing poverty, improving the welfare of society, and achieving economic development. However, on the other hand, Indonesia is also highly vulnerable to significant climate change impacts, such as flooding in several regions of Indonesia, decreased rainfall in several areas, increasing air temperature, and rising seawater (Julismin, 2013). Indonesia is at risk due to rising sea levels, changes in weather patterns, ecosystem damage, and decreased biodiversity.

Climate change can potentially disrupt food production, harm infrastructure, jeopardize the sustainability of natural re-

sources, and negatively impact public health and welfare. The dilemma between economic growth and environmental conservation is an interconnected challenge that cannot be resolved independently. Therefore, there is a need for a financial system that can effectively balance the objectives of economic development and environmental preservation (Skha, 2022).

The current economic system must solve major societal and environmental problems (Fiscal Policy Office, 2009). The Indonesian government regards the green economy as an alternative vision for growth and development to improve people's lives consistent with sustainable development. The green economy promotes a more sustainable, low-carbon economy (Skha, 2022). The green economy is vital to long-term economic transformation (Dianjaya & Epira, 2020). The green economy is also a focus of the government's policies to support inclusive and sustainable economic development in the country (Limanseto, 2022).

If the implementation of the green economy in Indonesia can be carried out properly, it will contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, conserving natural resources, and transitioning to renewable energy. The Indonesian government has planned the Low Carbon Development Initiative to realize the green economy. The Low Carbon Development Initiative aims to explicitly incorporate environmental considerations, such as greenhouse gas reduction targets and carrying capacity, into the framework of development planning (Daryono, 2022a).

Based on the background above, the research question is, "What are the opportunities and the challenges for Indonesia to successfully implement a green economy in achieving Net Zero emissions to address climate change?" This research aims to analyze the opportunities available to identify the potential and strategies that can be used to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve the net zero emissions target in Indonesia, to determine the challenges and barriers in implementing a green economy in Indonesia, to identify the factors that hinder the transition from conventional economy to a green economy, including policies, regulations, technology, human resources, and social and cultural aspects and to provide insights into the challenges that need to be addressed for successful implementation.

Literature Review

Indonesia is a country rich in natural resources, but it also faces significant environmental degradation. Environmental degradation is a condition where the quality of the environment decreases due to the damage that has occurred and reduces the function of the ecological components as they should (Arifah, 2022). Indonesia is faced with environmental degradation caused by humans, such as deforestation, over-exploitation of natural resources, and pollution from industries and motor vehicles, which then drive domino impacts such as disasters in the form of landslides, floods, droughts, erosion, animal deaths, loss of people's livelihoods and those caused by nature such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. These activities will cause severe, widespread,

and possibly irreversible changes to people, assets, economies, and ecosystems worldwide and even have implications for climate change (European Commission, 2022). Climate change has become a prominent issue widely discussed recently, as its impacts are felt in various aspects of human life. Climate change has several consequences, such as rising temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, and other adverse effects (Julismin, 2013).

According to Aprilianto & Ariefianto (2021), climate change that has attracted global attention brings up the concept of the Net Zero Emissions (NZE) program since the signing of the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015. The program aims to reduce environmental pollution that can cause climate change. Indonesia also needs to start preparing its Long-Term Development Plan (RPJP), aligning it with its plan to achieve NZE, ideally by around 2060 or earlier (Indonesia Research Institution Decarbonization, 2022).

Based on UNEP (2013), As per the UNEP's operational definition, a green economy is characterized by enhancing human well-being and social fairness alongside substantially reducing environmental hazards and scarcities in the ecosystem. This explanation has been employed to create and evaluate different investment scenarios through economic models and applied policy analysis within the GER. Despite a compelling economic rationale for investing in environmentally friendly trade, many significant challenges persist. These challenges predominantly stem from constraints in financial and human resources, inadequate regulatory structures, deficient implementation and enforcement mechanisms, and insufficient economic infrastructure. Obstacles like illiteracy and limited access to energy hinder sustainable and certified trade advancement. These concerns necessitate focused endeavors at the global, regional, national, and local levels to be effectively addressed (UNEP, 2013)

Based on the research by Khor (2013), the "green economy" is not a concept that has yet to enjoy widespread agreement (among economists or environmentalists) or an international consensus. It is a highly complex concept, and there is unlikely to be a consensus on its meaning, usefulness, and policy implications in the short term. In implementing a green economy, developing countries face many challenges and obstacles in moving their economies to more environmentally friendly paths. On the one hand, this should ensure the attempt to urgently incorporate environmental elements into economic development. On the other hand, the various obstacles should be identified and recognized, and international cooperation measures should be taken to enable and support sustainable development efforts (Khor, 2013)

Based on research by Maran (2017), the green economy enables the realization of sustainable development. Various approaches exist for enacting a more green economy. Initiatives have been initiated in numerous nations towards adopting a green economy. This progress is positive, yet obstacles endure. The ultimate goal of the greener economy is to attain sustainable development. However, the green economy encounters numerous

challenges. Among these, finance and technology pose the most significant challenges. Both national economic policies and global strategies experience difficulties, especially during global financial crises (Maran, 2017).

Based on the study by Dianjaya and Epira (2020), UNEP proposes a new concept to combat global warming and climate change through economic activities known as the "Green Economy." Indonesia embraces this opportunity by incorporating green economy principles into its national policies (Dianjaya & Epira, 2020). The federal constitution and the 2020-2024 development plan have included the transition to a green economy. However, the research by Martawardana et al. (2022) suggests that economic recovery programs still need to address environmental issues, indicating a need for more consistency between planning and implementation despite the ongoing pandemic. The country's economy relies heavily on extractive sectors and primary commodities that negatively impact the environment. The opportunities to strengthen the green economy, including substantial government stimulus, have yet to be fully utilized.

Methodology

The methodology used in this research is a qualitative approach with a literature study. This approach is employed to gather data by analyzing relevant literature about the opportunities for achieving net-zero emissions in Indonesia through implementing a green economy in response to climate change.

Indonesia is one of the developed countries trying to implement a green economy (Kemenkeu RI, 2022). The qualitative approach and literature study utilized include scholarly journals, books, research reports, public policies, and other information sources, allowing for in-depth and precise studies on implementing a green economy, efforts to reduce emissions in Indonesia, and their impact on climate change. All literature used in this study will be adequately cited and referenced. The sources used will be listed in the reference list to maintain the integrity and accuracy of the research.

Discussion

Indonesia's Potential to Implement a Green Economy

A green economy, also known as a sustainable economy or environmentally friendly economy, is an economic approach that focuses on sustainable economic growth and environmental consciousness. The concept of a green economy acknowledges that economic activities and human well-being must be balanced with protecting and restoring the natural environment (Yulianti, 2015). Essentially, a green economy aims to achieve sustainable development by considering three interconnected dimensions: the economy, the environment, and society (Ferzi, 2021).

Indonesia is a country that has the potential to implement a green economy, considering that Indonesia is a country whose economy is heavily supported by a wealth of natural resources (Yusuf, 2021). Energy, mining, agriculture, and forestry are prom-

ising commodities for Indonesia's economic growth. Unfortunately, economic growth in Indonesia is not always accompanied by alleviating social and environmental problems. Natural resources, especially forests, are often in danger of being depleted because they are used to support the economy.

In this context, applying green economy principles emerges as a potential solution to balance Indonesia's sustainable economic growth, environmental protection, and social aspects (Kalimasada, 2022). As a country with a large population, vast territory, abundant natural resources, and significant environmental challenges, Indonesia has excellent opportunities to develop a sustainable and environmentally friendly economy. Indonesia has natural resources and various economic sectors that can be directed to support environmentally friendly economic growth, which include:

1. Renewable Energy

   The potential of renewable energy in Indonesia can be one of the main pillars in supporting the implementation of a green economy. Indonesia has abundant natural resources, such as sunlight, wind, water, biomass, and geothermal heat, which can be utilized as renewable energy sources.

   Renewable energy can reduce dependence on fossil fuels, contributing to greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, it also has positive impacts on the economy and the environment. Some potential applications of renewable energy in Indonesia include:

   - Solar Energy

Indonesia has abundant sunlight throughout the year, making it an ideal location for solar energy development. Solar energy can be used in various sectors, such as solar power plants, solar water heaters, and street lighting. According to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) in press release number 303. Pers/04/SJI/2021, Indonesia has a solar energy potential of 200,000 Megawatts (MW) (Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE, 2021). However, the current solar energy utilization is only around 150 MW, approximately 0.08% of its potential (Laily, 2022).

- Wind Energy

Wind energy in Indonesia has tremendous potential to be developed as a renewable energy source. According to research conducted by the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN), out of 166 studied locations, there are 35 locations with excellent wind potential, with wind speeds above 5 meters per second at a height of 50 meters (Sekretariat Kabinet RI, 2017). Some regions with good wind speeds include West Nusa Tenggara (NTB), East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), the south coast of Java, and the south coast of Sulawesi. Additionally, LAPAN has identified 34 locations with sufficient wind speeds ranging from 4 to 5 meters per second. Indonesia has significant wind energy potential (Sekretariat Kabinet RI, 2017). As reported in the Energy Outlook of

Indonesia 2022 released by the National Energy Council (DEN), Indonesia has a wind energy potential of up to 154.9 gigawatts (GW) (Dewan Energi Nasional, 2022). According to DEN's Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics of Indonesia 2021, wind energy is considered a renewable, abundant, widely distributed, and clean energy alternative (Dewan Energi Nasional, 2022). Using wind energy through wind power plants (PLTB) does not generate greenhouse gas emissions during operation and requires minimal land use. Wind energy can be harnessed to generate electricity through wind power plants (PLTB) (Pristiadaru, 2023).

- Water Energy

Indonesia has numerous rivers and a significant potential for water resources that can be utilized for hydropower generation. The development of Hydropower Plants (PLTA) can reduce reliance on fossil fuels to meet the country's electricity needs. Indonesia's water energy potential is substantial, reaching 75,000 Megawatts (MW). However, the current utilization through the national electricity supply only amounts to 10% of its total potential (Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE, 2014a). According to data from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), the distributed potential of water energy resources is as follows: 15,600 MW (20.8%) in Sumatra, 4,200 MW (5.6%) in Java and Kalimantan, 21,600 MW (28.8%) in Sulawesi, 10,200 MW (13.6%) in Bali, NTT, NTB, 620 MW (0.8%) in Maluku 430 MW (0.6%) and in Papua contributing to a total water energy potential of 22,350 MW or 29.8% of the national potential (Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE, 2014). The overall water energy potential of Indonesia is 75,000 MW, but the current utilization stands at a mere 10.1%, equivalent to 7,572 MW (Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE, 2014)

- Biomass

In the agricultural sector, biomass waste such as palm oil waste, coconut waste, and other agricultural residues can be utilized as a source of biomass energy. Biomass can be used for power generation, industrial heating, and bioenergy production. The biomass used as an energy source (fuel) in Indonesia generally has low economic value or consists of waste after extracting primary products. Biomass can be derived from plants, trees, grasses, tubers, agricultural waste, forest waste, sewage, and animal manure. The potential biomass resources in Indonesia are estimated to be around 49,810 MW, derived from plants and debris. The significant biomass potential for energy currently lies in plantation waste such as palm oil, coconut, and sugarcane, as well as forest residues such as sawdust and wood production waste (Hermawati et al., 2014).

- Geothermal Energy

> Indonesia has significant geothermal potential in various regions, especially Java, Sumatra, and Nusa Tenggara. Geothermal energy can be harnessed for geothermal power generation, a clean and sustainable energy source. Indonesia is located in the Ring of Fire, holding 40% of the world's geothermal reserves. According to data from the Geological Agency of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources in 2020, Indonesia's total geothermal energy potential is estimated to reach 23.7 GW (Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE, 2020a). From this potential, the government has designated Geothermal Working Areas (WKP) and Preliminary Survey and Exploration Assignment Areas (WP-SPE) that are ready for development (Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE, 2020a).

Indonesia's renewable energy potential can help support a green economy that does not generate carbon dioxide emissions towards the environment and achieves net zero carbon. Implementing renewable energy in Indonesia can reduce the risk of dependence on fossil fuels, which can cause significant environmental damage and vulnerability to international price fluctuations.

2. Sustainable Agriculture

The agricultural sector strategically develops Indonesia's economy, contributing 13.70% to Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2020(Anugrah, 2022). However, this sector has been experiencing a declining contribution. The agricultural sector in Indonesia also contributes to environmental pollution due to the excessive use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers (Anugrah, 2022). Some pesticides can contaminate surface and groundwater sources. For instance, organophosphate and pyrethroid pesticides are frequently identified in rivers, lakes, and water wells at levels potentially harming aquatic organisms and humans. The extended use of specific pesticides can lead to their accumulation in the soil, which diminishes soil fertility and quality. This accumulation can disrupt plant growth and nutrient cycles. Additionally, certain pesticides can disturb soil microorganisms that play a crucial role in ecological processes and maintaining ecosystem balance (Supriatna et al., 2021).

The agricultural sector in Indonesia also has significant potential to adopt sustainable farming practices. By embracing organic farming techniques, efficient water management, and organic fertilizers, the farm sector can reduce harmful pesticides and excessive water consumption and maintain soil fertility. The development of organic farming can be a crucial component of Indonesia's green economy. Organic agriculture can preserve the environment and reduce the risk of carbon accumulation by using organic fertilizers, pesticides, and other chemicals, and the natural properties of agricultural plants that can absorb carbon dioxide. Organic farming will produce organic food, which avoids using pesticides and chemical fertilizers and can preserve soil health and product quality while adding value to agricultural products (Arista, 2021). Moreover, sustainable farming practices in Indonesia can significantly

contribute to achieving a sustainable and environmentally friendly green economy (Andri, 2022).

The role of agriculture in the economy is unquestionable. The creation of employment opportunities in various agricultural processes can help improve the welfare of society. The green economy in agriculture has great potential to provide broad benefits. Sustainable agriculture geared towards green economy principles can provide farmers and agricultural workers with better and safer job opportunities. Sustainable practices such as organic farming, crop rotation, and reduced use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers can increase land productivity and extend the harvest period. This means more stable incomes and better welfare for farming communities.

Green economy agricultural practices focusing on sustainability and crop diversity can sustainably increase food production. Crop diversification and agroforestry approaches can reduce the risk of crop failure due to natural disasters or climate change. This means that people's food security is higher, their dependence on imports is reduced, and food price stability is maintained. Sustainable agricultural practices help maintain soil fertility, preserve water quality, and reduce environmental pollution due to excessive use of chemicals. Green economy agriculture encourages the use of renewable energy and better waste management. This contributes to preserving nature and ecosystems, which is essential for long-term sustainability.

Sustainable agriculture will also create new jobs in rural areas. This will have a positive impact on the economic progress of the community. From farm laborers, agricultural product processors, and product distributors to agricultural waste managers, all these roles can be filled by people who need jobs (Kalimasada, 2022).

3. Sustainable Tourism

Indonesia has a tremendous potential for sustainable tourism. The country is rich in natural beauty, cultural diversity, and captivating historical heritage. This potential can be utilized to build environmentally friendly tourism, preserve the environment, and empower local communities (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika, 2015). One of the critical assets of sustainable tourism in Indonesia is its natural wealth. The country boasts several national parks, conservation areas, mountains, and stunning beaches. With proper management, such as implementing strict measures to protect endemic flora and fauna in national parks and conservation areas, active monitoring, surveillance, and rigorous enforcement against illegal practices like poaching and timber theft, environmental sustainability can be ensured and biodiversity conserved. These places can become attractive tourist destinations for travelers seeking authentic nature experiences. Conservation and ecological preservation efforts must be a priority in developing tourism in Indonesia.

Sustainable tourism in Indonesia should also prioritize the well-being of local communities. Tourism development should

create economic opportunities for local communities by establishing accommodations, restaurants, and other micro and small businesses. Participatory and inclusive approaches must be employed in the planning and development of tourism to ensure that the sector's economic benefits are distributed fairly among local communities (Limanseto, 2022).

Currently, the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy is no longer solely focused on increasing tourist arrivals in Indonesia but is more focused on promoting sustainable tourism (Kemenparekraf RI, 2021). In short, sustainable tourism is the development of a tourism concept that can have long-term impacts on the environment, society, culture, and economy for the present and future of both local communities and visiting tourists (Kemenparekraf RI, 2021).

In efforts to develop sustainable tourism, four main pillars are emphasized. These include sustainable management of tourism businesses, long-term socioeconomic sustainability, the preservation and development of sustainable culture, and environmental sustainability (Kemenparekraf RI, 2021). With these four pillars as a foundation, sustainable tourism will attract many tourists. Travelers will seek leisure and adhere to tourism protocols related to health, safety, comfort, and environmental preservation (Kemenparekraf RI, 2021).

Optimizing Indonesia's potential for sustainable tourism will enable the country to build a sustainable green economy, reduce negative environmental impacts, and provide broad economic and social benefits to local communities (Kemenparekraf RI, 2023). Sustainable tourism in Indonesia is founded on the primary principle of conserving nature and culture. In addition to offering invaluable environmental and cultural values, sustainable tourism also yields noteworthy economic advantages. By generating employment and income for the local population, the sector directly contributes to alleviating poverty. Through the engagement of local communities in the management and benefits of tourism, their participation is enhanced, and welfare becomes more equitable. This encompasses employment opportunities, training, and support for small and medium enterprises, fostering positive and enduring change within local communities. The government, tourism stakeholders, and the community must collaborate in developing sustainable tourism that considers economic, environmental, and social aspects in a balanced manner (Puandria, 2023).

Green Economy Challenges in Indonesia

In practice, the green economy that Indonesia aspires to face challenges. This is a challenge because it is outside the potential and the efforts that Indonesia has made. Despite having various possibilities for implementing a green economy, Indonesia also needs help. The following are some of the challenges faced by Indonesia in its efforts to implement a green economy:

1. <u>The conventional economic paradigm in society</u>

   One of the primary challenges faced by Indonesia in implementing a green economy is the prevailing

conventional economic paradigm, as emphasized by Prof. Arief Anshory Yusuf, S.E, M.Sc., Ph.D., a Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Padjadjaran. In the "Meet The Expert #2" at an event organized by the Microeconomics Dashboard Study Section of the Faculty of Economics and Business, Gadjah Mada University (FEB UGM), he highlighted that the conventional economic paradigm still holds strong (Nayottama, 2022). Traditional economics is based on behavior that occurs in monetary units characterized by the absence of certain boundaries (Abdullah, 2012).

Society is still firmly attached to the conventional economic paradigm. The Capital Investment Coordinating Board of Indonesia stated that there needs to be more public literacy regarding green energy (Tusin, 2022). These two realities are interconnected, as the lack of general literacy leads to limited knowledge and understanding of the community about the green economy, thereby perpetuating conventional economic thinking. This condition challenges the government, making it difficult to encourage public participation in creating a green economy when people need more knowledge about it. The limited general understanding of the green economy is likewise predicated upon the populace's diminished inclination toward engaging in reading (Tahmidaten & Krismanto, 2020).

This challenge is closely related to Indonesia's Human Resources (HR) quality, which needs to give more attention to the natural environment. Many Indonesians remain insensitive to the declining environmental conditions caused by their activities, such as burning forests for illegal land clearing and logging of trees (Hefriyenni, 2022). However, the deteriorating state of Indonesia's natural capital will significantly impact people's welfare. Public awareness of climate change is essential for achieving environmental sustainability. By raising public awareness of the negative externalities resulting from economic activities, the government can formulate and implement policies to address these issues (Bram et al., 2013).

2. Institutional Design and Government Regulation

Institutional design and government regulation challenges are difficult to solve as they involve various stakeholders. Institutions in Indonesia can be considered inefficient due to high transaction costs, asymmetric information, and overlapping regulations or policies, which hinder the green economy program (Kementerian PPN/Bappenas, 2018).

Furthermore, regulations play a central role in the development of the green economy in Indonesia, par-

ticularly in the energy transition process. Laws should serve as the foundation and legal framework for all business and other activities, providing support and certainty to all stakeholders. However, the rules issued by the Indonesian government have yet to effectively enhance the competitiveness of the Green Economy sector, resulting in continued support for environmentally unfriendly economic industries such as unsustainable energy subsidies (Global Green Growth Institute, 2015). This is because the Indonesian government is still in the transitional stage, implementing a green economy, and has yet to fully meet the demand for renewable energy (Dewan Energi Nasional, 2022).

As a result, industries and economic activities still rely heavily on fossil fuels, such as coal production and consumption, which remain Indonesia's primary energy source. Addressing this imbalance requires attention from the government and a regulatory transition from a reliance on non-renewable commodities to renewable ones (Keliat et al., 2022).

Reassessment of regulations related to the Green Economy and energy transition is crucial. In particular, mainstreaming regulations at the upstream level can accelerate the output of research and innovation in the Green Economy, such as creating indigenous green technology patents in Indonesia. Additionally, improving the quality of education should also be supported by regulations to encourage the creation of skilled workers in the Green Economy and renewable energy sector as a whole (Maximum, 2016).

Regulations that support the capacity-building of policymakers in understanding implementation issues and solutions are also essential in overcoming these regulatory challenges. Enhanced capacity for mainstreaming is expected to drive political commitment from the government and increase awareness among all stakeholders to contribute to creating high-quality green jobs and technologies in Indonesia (Keliat et al., 2022).

Regulatory uncertainty has also hindered the developing of supporting instruments for the Green Economy. For instance, the carbon tax policy needs more clarity regarding fixation, especially concerning the selection of subjects and carbon tax allocation, aligning the carbon tax with carbon emissions trading schemes, and the roadmap for carbon tax implementation. Delayed implementation of the carbon tax can result in a lack of incentives and pressure for businesses to participate in the energy transition in production processes and other economic activities. Therefore, the participation of all stakeholders, including companies, is crucial for large-scale transi-

tion steps (Makmun, 2016).

Another institutional challenge is a clear legal framework for managing a Green Economy. The draft New and Renewable Energy Law in Indonesia is currently being discussed at the legislative and executive levels so that no final decision has been made (Sekretariat Kabinet RI, 2017). This condition poses a significant challenge in the energy transition process. Completing the draft New and Renewable Energy Law becomes increasingly essential, considering that the government has implemented various technical regulations to promote energy industry development, such as regulations related to geothermal energy development, without alignment with the ongoing legislative framework. Suppose the draft New and Renewable Energy Law is passed, and the regulatory content is inconsistent with the existing regulations and the objectives of renewable energy industry development. In that case, it may lead to a resurgence of distrust and threaten the sustainability of the renewable energy industry (Sekretariat Kabinet RI, 2017).

At least three issues may require adjustments when there is a divergence in the direction of discussions between the legislative and executive branches, namely, business permits, purchase prices, and incentives. These three issues already have established regulations, including Law Number 11 of 2020 governing business permits, Presidential Regulation Number 112 of 2022 governing the purchase price of electricity from new and renewable energy by PLN, Government Regulation Number 9 of 2021, and Minister of Finance Regulation Number 188 of 2015 governing fiscal and non-fiscal incentives for businesses (Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE, 2014a). Therefore, costs will be involved when these established regulations need to be readjusted if the substance of the draft law on new and renewable energy (RUU EBT) to be passed is significantly different.

Another challenge is the level of political commitment from the government and relevant institutions in enforcing the issued regulations. Although the government has administered several rules to manage and oversee the national Green Economy, they must be supported by accountable and integrity-based supervision to ensure that the regulations do not lead to green paradox practices. Furthermore, most issued regulations only serve as guidelines without accompanying punitive measures that have a deterrent effect. Thus, enforcing violations of unsustainable economic activities cannot be optimally carried out (Asian Development Bank, 2005).

According to the World Bank, there are two reasons why In-

donesia still faces challenges in addressing environmental degradation and achieving balanced economic growth (World Bank, 2014). First, there needs to be a more substantial commitment to implementing policies that have been established to address and reduce environmental degradation. Second, there needs to be more integration in considering the environmental impacts of development planning. This indicates that institutional design deficiencies pose a challenge for the Indonesian government in addressing environmental degradation issues (Beyene & Kotosz, 2020).

3. Financing and fiscal capacity of the state

If the NZE 2045 and 2050 scenarios are chosen, it will require significant costs, exceptionally compensating for the termination of Power Purchasing Agreements. This program requires funds amounting to Rp28,223 trillion. Most of the funds necessary, amounting to Rp26,602 trillion, come from the transportation and energy sectors (Tusin, 2022).

The investment cost to build Indonesia's green economic infrastructure until 2030 reaches Rp3,799 trillion (Tusin, 2022). However, achieving this figure is challenging, considering that investments in New and Renewable Energy have not met the set targets recently. In 2020, the target investment in new renewable energy was US$2.02 billion, but only realized US$1.36 billion, or around 70%. In 2021, the government targeted new renewable energy investments of US$2.04 billion, but once again, it still needs to be achieved and only realized US$1.51 billion, or 74%. In 2022, the government increased the target investment in new renewable energy to US$3.93 billion but only realized US$0.67 billion, or 16.9%, by June 2022 (Keliat et al., 2022).

To face funding challenges, the Indonesian government is conducting promotions related to green investment. Green investment focuses on generating more excellent value for money in the future and pays attention to the environmental, social, and promising governance sectors. This is the scope of Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) (Ramadhani, 2023). In the green growth program, Green Investment aims to create business opportunities that generate profits while being responsible for environmental mitigation (Rany et al., 2020).

To support the green growth program, adequate technology is needed to address the impacts of industrialization. Based on Schumpeter's theory and concept of innovation (1928), research and development (R&D) is a form of innovation creation that produces adequate technology to avoid the negative impacts of

industrialization (Schumpeter, 2017). Therefore, the government's role in providing accessible and affordable public services such as education and research can accelerate innovation.

Fiscal policies implemented by the Ministry of Finance, such as budget allocations, serve as tools to stabilize and promote economic growth by providing facilities to the public. With the principle of Value for Money, the planning and budgeting conducted by the government aim to achieve three essential elements: efficiency, effectiveness, and economic growth. In this regard, planning and budget utilization should yield the desired results and impacts, ensuring that financial budgets are used efficiently (BKF Kemenkeu, 2018).

4. The risk of stranded assets

Indonesia faces significant stranded asset risks in the implementation of a green economy. These risks are associated with assets operating in conventional patterns, such as fossil fuel-based power plants, fossil fuel-based transportation infrastructure, and other industrial sectors that still rely on non-renewable energy sources (Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR), 2021).

In the transition to a green economy, these assets have the potential to become valueless or obsolete as they need to align with the new paradigm that prioritizes renewable and sustainable energy sources. Policy and regulatory changes that support greenhouse gas emission reduction and environmental protection can result in decreased demand or a decline in the value of these assets (Keliat et al., 2022).

For example, with the policy to cease the operation of fossil fuel power plants, these power plants can become stranded assets if no appropriate measures are taken to repurpose them within the context of renewable energy. The same applies to fossil fuel-based motor vehicles in the transportation industry (Makower & Pike, 2008).

To mitigate stranded asset risks, careful planning is required to transition to a green economy, including effective management of affected assets. The government needs to implement policies that encourage the conversion of these assets into forms that align with the green economy, such as repurposing fossil fuel power plants into renewable energy power plants or replacing conventional transportation fleets with environmentally friendly vehicles (Maximum, 2016). Collaboration between the government, private sector, and society is necessary to identify stranded asset risks, find innovative solutions, and develop sustainable business models. These steps will help reduce risks and maximize opportunities in the transition to a sustainable green economy

(Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, 2022).

Careful preparation is required in energy transition strategies, including how the government manages "brown assets" that have been built and have the potential to become stranded assets. One of the steps is through Presidential Regulation Number 12 of 2022 on the Acceleration of Renewable Energy Development for Electricity Supply. The government will retire Coal-Fired Power Plants (PLTU) through this regulation. Article 3, paragraph 1 states that the Minister is responsible for developing a roadmap to accelerate the cessation of PLTU operations. The roadmap includes reducing greenhouse gas emissions from PLTUs, accelerating the demise of PLTU operations, and aligning with other policies (Daryono, 2022).

Indonesia's Efforts to Achieve Net-Zero Emissions Through a Green Economy

The Indonesian government has engaged in several collaborative partnerships to achieve net zero Emissions. Achieving net zero emissions is one of realizing global goals, so collaboration between state, non-state, and private actors is needed. These collaborations involve various ministries of the Republic of Indonesia, domestic stakeholders, and international actors. Here are some of the collaborations initiated by the Indonesian government with different parties that affected the realize Net-Zero Emissions:

Cooperation with the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia

Minister of Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto, in his interview in January 2023, revealed that the Indonesian government had increased the target for the composition of New and Renewable Energy (NRE) in the energy mix to 23% by 2025 and 31% by 2050 (Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian, 2023). The Indonesian Government and the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs are working to harness the potential of NRE sources.

The potential sources of NRE are scattered throughout Indonesia. For example, the Green Industrial Park in North Kalimantan utilizes energy from the Kayan River. The estimated hydroelectric potential of the Kayan River is around 11-13 gigawatts. In addition, Indonesia also has significant geothermal potential. The geothermal potential in Indonesia is one of the largest in the world, with hundreds of locations spread across the country (Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE, 2020b). According to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Indonesia's geothermal potential is approximately 23.4 gigawatts, with the installed capacity of Geothermal Power Plants (PLTP) reaching 2.3 gigawatts (Kementerian ESDM, 2018). This geothermal potential makes Indonesia the world's second-largest user of geothermal energy after the United States (Pertamina, 2023).

Geothermal energy utilization aligns with one of the principles of the Bali Compact agreed upon during the Indonesian G20

Presidency in 2022, which emphasizes diversifying energy systems and reducing emissions from all energy sources. To observe the energy transition firsthand in Indonesia, Assistant Deputy of Multilateral Economic Cooperation at the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, Ferry Ardiyanto, as the Co-Sous Sherpa for G20 Indonesia, along with the G20 Sherpa Secretariat Team at the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, visited a geothermal power plant unit in Dieng, Central Java, operated by PT Geo Dipa Energi (GDE). PT Geo Dipa explores and exploits geothermal energy for electricity generation, contributing to the distribution of electricity produced by GDE's Geothermal Power Plants.

Collaboration with the Ministry of Finance

The Ministry of Finance, particularly the Fiscal Policy Office (BKF), has developed, evaluated, and implemented fiscal policies and funding instruments that contribute to Indonesia's efforts in climate control through the net-zero emission program (Fiscal Policy Office, 2009). The Fiscal Policy Office with the World Bank, the Australian Government, Japan, and Germany has produced several reports on strategic options to address mitigation issues in various sectors (Makmun, 2016).

The Fiscal Policy Office has also partnered with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). This partnership includes researching fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to accelerate geothermal energy development. Furthermore, BKF has implemented several fiscal policies to support the green economy, including 1) policies to promote geothermal and renewable energy, 2) policies to improve forest yields and access REDD carbon, 3) fiscal policies and income issues in the forestry sector, and 4) regional forestry incentive mechanisms (Rustam et al., 2023).

Active and collaborating in international forums

Indonesia is one of the countries that has ratified the Paris Agreement, an international agreement aimed at addressing climate change. Through the Paris Agreement, Indonesia is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and taking necessary adaptation measures.

As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia is also involved in collaborative efforts with ASEAN countries to reduce emissions and address climate change. Through the ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change (AWGCC), Indonesia shares experiences, knowledge, and technology with other ASEAN countries. Fabby Tumiwa, Executive Director of the Institute of Essential Services Reform, said that utilizing its leadership in ASEAN, Indonesia can encourage and embrace civil society organizations in ASEAN to focus on the energy transition, as well as initiate concrete collaborations and together can contribute to accelerating the energy transition in place and tackling climate change (Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR), 2021).

Furthermore, Indonesia also participates in the United Nations Climate Change

Conference (COP) held annually. Through COP, Indonesia can interact with other countries, share experiences, and strengthen collective commitments to reduce emissions and address climate change. On the other hand, Indonesia is also involved in the Partnership for Market Readiness, a global initiative to accelerate and strengthen emission reduction efforts in relevant sectors, including energy, transportation, and industry. Through PMR, Indonesia receives technical and financial support for implementing climate change policies.

Indonesia is also involved in the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) initiative, which aims to reduce deforestation and forest degradation emissions. Through REDD+, Indonesia collaborates with other countries and receives financial and technical support to protect forests and manage natural resources sustainably.

Make Indonesian domestic policy.

The Indonesian government formulates and implements national policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and promote the transition to clean energy. The National Action Plan on Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction is one of the implemented policies that cover various sectors such as industry, agriculture, energy, transportation, and others (JDIH Bappenas, 2011).

The Indonesian government has also increased its commitment to achieving the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) by 2030, with a target of reducing emissions by 31.89% (previously 29%) unconditionally and 43.20% (once 41%) conditionally as of September 23, 2022. With various government programs and investments, it is hoped that Indonesia will have the opportunity to achieve the net-zero emissions target by 2060 or earlier, in line with the Paris Agreement (Gembira et al., 2019). All forms of collaboration are crucial in accelerating Indonesia's efforts to achieve the net-zero emission target and address climate change globally.

Conclusion

There are substantial potential and several challenges in implementing a green economy to achieve net zero emissions and tackle the climate crisis. Based on the above explanation, Indonesia does have abundant resources that have the potential to implement a green economy. These resources include renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, and sustainable tourism. However, it is essential to note that Indonesia also faces complex obstacles in addition to having potential. These obstacles include the conventional economic paradigm in society, institutional design and government regulation, financing and fiscal capacity of the state, and the risk of stranded assets.

In addition, the Indonesian government has made several efforts to achieve net zero emissions through a green economy. The government of Indonesia has cooperated with the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, collaborated with the Ministry of Finance, actively participated and collaborated in international forums, and formulated domestic policies. However, these efforts by the Indo-

nesian government have yet to yield significant results in achieving net zero emissions.

References

Books

Bram, D., Muhajur, M., & Setiawati, M. (2013). *Dinamika wacana perubahan iklim dan keterkaitannya dengan hukum dan tenurial di Indonesia: sebuah kajian kepustakaan.* Epistema Institute.

Fiscal Policy Office. (2009). *Climate Change & Fiscal Policy Issue*. Initiatives.

Gembira, H., Puspita, H. I., Utomo, E. T., Sekar, H., Paputungan, M. S., & Safitri, R. (2019). *Laporan Implementas : Perencanaan Pembangunan Rendah Karbon.*

Global Green Growth Institute. (2015). *Mewujudkan Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Hijau untuk Indonesia yang Sejahtera.*

Makower, J., & Pike, C. (2008). *Strategies for the Green Economy: Opportunities and Challenges in The New World of Business.* McGraw-Hill Education.

Schumpeter, J. A. (2017). *The Theory of Economic Development.* Taylor & Francis.

Thesis/Dissertation

Hefriyenni, R. (2022). Tinjauan Kriminologis Pembukaan Lahan Dengan Cara Dibakar Di Wilayah Hukum Pengadilan Negeri Pasir Pengaraian.

Journal article (retrieved online, with DOI)

Abdullah, M. (2012). Perbedaan Paradigma Ekonomi Konvensional dan Ekonomi Islam Dalam Teori dan Realita. *Jurnal Studi Ekonomi, 3*(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.18592/taradhi.v3i1.576

Aprilianto, R. A., & Ariefianto, R. M. (2021). Peluang dan Tantangan Menuju Net Zero Emission (NZE) Menggunakan Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) pada Sistem Ketenagalistrikan di Indonesia. *Jurnal Multidisipliner Mahasiswa Pascasarjana, 2*(2). https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22146/jpmmpi.v2i2.70198

Demissew Beyene, S., & Kotosz, B. (2020). Testing the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis: an empirical study for East African countries. *International Journal of Environmental Studies, 77*(4), 636–654. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207233.2019.1695445

Dianjaya, A. R., & Epira, P. (2020). Indonesia Green Economy Implementation Readiness of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction. *Journal of Contemporary Governance and Public Policy, 1*(1), 27–40. https://doi.org/10.46507/jcgpp.v1i1.5

Makmun, M. (2016). Green Economy: Konsep, Impelentasi dan Peran Kementerian Keuangan. *Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Pembangunan*, *19*(2), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.14203/JEP.19.2.2011.1-15

Martawardana, B., Rakatama, A., Junifta, D. Y., & Maharani, D. A. (2022). Green economy post COVID-19: insights from Indonesia. *Development in Practice, 32*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2021.2002817

Rany, A. P., Farhani, S. A., Nurina, V. R., & Pimada, L. M. (2020). Tantangan Indonesia Dalam Mewujudkan Pertumbuhan Ekonomi yang Kuat dan Pembangunan Ekonomi Berkelanjutan Melalui Indonesia Green Growth Program Oleh Bappenas. *Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi dan Pembangunan, 20*(1). https://doi.org/10.20961/jiep.v20i1.38229

Rustam, I., Sabilla Kinanti Rizsa, & Anam, S. (2023). Climate Change Adaptation Assistance to a Number of Environmental Communities in Mataram City in Supporting NTB's Commitment to Net Zero Emission. *Jurnal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, 2*(1). https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.55381/jpm.v2i1.88

Supriatna, S., Siahaan, S., & Restiaty, I.

(2021). Pencemaran Tanah Oleh Pestisida Di Perkebunan Sayur Kelurahan Eka Jaya Kecamatan Jambi Selatan Kota Jambi (Studi Keberadaan Jamur Makroza dan Cacing Tanah). *Jurnal Ilmiah Universitas Batanghari Jambi, 21*(1), 460. https://doi.org/10.33087/jiubj.v21i1.1348

Tahmidaten, L., & Krismanto, W. (2020). ermasalahan Budaya Membaca di INdonesia (Studi Pustaka Tentang Problematika & Solusinya). *Jurnal Pendidikan Dan Kebudayaan, 10*(1). https://doi.org/10.24246/j.js.2020.v10.i1.p22-33

Journal Article (retrieved online, without DOI or page numbers)

Maran, M. (2017). Green Economy: Challenges And Opportunities. *Eco Forum, 6*(3). Retrieved from https://econpapers.repec.org/article/scmecofrm/v_3a6_3ay_3a2017_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a2.htm

Electronic source

Andri, K. B. (2022, September 3). Peta Jalan Green Agriculture. Tempo Majala Berita Mingguan. Retrieved from https://majalah.tempo.co/read/info-tempo/166862/peta-jalan-green-agriculture

Anugrah, D. F. (2022, September 23). Penggunaan Produk Eco-label Untuk Mendukung Ekonomi Hijau. BI Institute. Retrieved from https://www.bi.go.id/id/bi-institute/BI-Epsilon/Pages/Penggunaan-Produk-Eco-label-Untuk-Mendukung-Ekonomi-Hijau.aspx

Arifah, J. R. (2022, September 8). Degradasi Lingkungan: Pengertian, Penyebab, Dampak, Bentuk dan Cara Mengatasinya (2022). Lindungihutan. Retrieved from https://lindungihutan.com/blog/pengertian-degradasi-lingkungan/

Arista, A. C. (2021, October 29). Mengenal Pertanian Organik dan Potensinya di Indonesia. Neurafarm. Retrieved from https://www.neurafarm.com/blog/InfoTania/Budidaya%20Tanaman/mengenal-pertanian-organik-dan-potensinya-di-indonesia

Asian Development Bank. (2005). Indonesia : Country Environmental Analysis. Retrieved from https://www.adb.org/documents/country-environmental-analysis-indonesia

Badan Pusat Statistik. (2021). Ekonomi Indonesia 2020 Turun sebesar 2,07 Persen (c-to-c) UNDUH BRS INI. Retrieved from https://www.bps.go.id/pressrelease/2021/02/05/1811/ekonomi-indonesia-2020-turun-sebesar-2-07-persen--c-to-c-.html

Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional. (2022a, October 23). Indonesia Targetkan Pencapain Net-Zero Emission Pada 2060. Badan Riset Dan Inovasi Nasional. Retrieved from https://www.brin.go.id/news/110603/indonesia-targetkan-pencapain-net-zero-emission-pada-2060

Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional. (2022b, October 23). Indonesia Targetkan Pencapain Net-Zero Emission Pada 2060. Badan Riset Dan Inovasi Nasional. Retrieved from https://www.brin.go.id/news/110603/indonesia-targetkan-pencapain-net-zero-emission-pada-2060

BKF Kemenkeu. (2018). Tunjukkan Komitmen Serius Terhadap Lingkungan, OECD dan Pemerintah Indonesia Luncurkan Tinjauan Kebijakan Pertumbuhan HIjau. Retrieved from https://fiskal.kemenkeu.go.id/dw-konten-view.asp?id=2019071513075052

Daryono, A. M. (2022a, May 23). Sudah Sejauh Mana Penerapan Green Economy di Indonesia? ALAMI. Retrieved from https://alamisharia.co.id/blogs/green-economy-di-indonesia/

Dewan Energi Nasional. (2022). Outlook

Energi Indonesia 2022. Retrieved from https://den.go.id/index.php/publikasi/documentread?doc=Buku_Energi_Outlook_2022_Versi_Bhs_Indonesia.pdf

Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE. (2014). Kebijakan Pengembangan Tenaga Air. Retrieved from https://ebtke.esdm.go.id/post/2014/07/02/628/kebijakan.pengembangantenagaair

Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE. (2020). Sektor Panas Bumi. Retrieved from https://ebtke.esdm.go.id/lintas/id/investasi-ebtke/sektor-panas-bumi/potensi

Direktorat Jenderal EBTKE. (2021). SIARAN PERS : Indonesia Kaya Energi Surya, Pemanfaatan Listrik Tenaga Surya oleh Masyarakat Tidak Boleh Ditunda. Retrieved from https://ebtke.esdm.go.id/post/2021/09/02/2952/indonesia.kaya.energi.surya.pemanfaatan.listrik.tenaga.surya.oleh.masyarakat.tidak.boleh.ditunda

European Commission. (2022). Climate change and environmental degradation. Retrieved from https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/climate-change-environmental-degradation_en

Ferzi, N. (2021, December 20). Potensi Ekonomi Hijau di Indonesia. Jamberita.Com. Retrieved from https://jamberita.com/read/2021/12/30/5971550/potensi-ekonomi-hijau-di-indonesia/

Hermawati, W., Mahmudin, Rosaira, I. M. I., & Alamsyah, P. (2014). Sumber Daya Biomassa Potensi Energi Indonesia Yang Terabaikan. Retrieved from http://lipi.go.id/publikasi/sumber-daya-biomassa-potensi-energi-indonesia-yang-terabaikan/16374

Indonesia Research Institution Decarbonization. (2022). Mengenal Net Zero Emission. Indonesia Research Institution Decarbonization. Retrieved from https://irid.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/2022.04.01-Dasar-Dasar-Net-Zero-Emission_SPREADS.pdf

Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR). (2021). Pembangunan Rendah Karbon Indonesia dan Net-Zero Emission Menuju Ekonomi Hijau. Retrieved from https://iesr.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Final-Dir-LH-IESR-Net-Zero-Emission_V1.pdf

JDIH Bappenas. (2011). Peraturan Presiden Nomor 61 Tahun 2011 tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Penurunan Emisi Gas Rumah Kaca. Retrieved from https://jdih.bappenas.go.id/peraturan/detailperaturan/158

Julismin. (2013). DAMPAK DAN PERUBAHAN IKLIM DI INDONESIA. Retrieved from https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24114/jg.v5i1.8083

Kalimasada, B. (2022, January 4). Pertanian yang Menghijaukan Perekonomian Indonesia. AMF. Retrieved from https://amf.or.id/pertanian-yang-menghijaukan-perekonomian-indonesia/

Keliat, M., Hirawan, F. B., Lestari, I., Farizi, O., Xu, N., Noor, R., Fauzi, S., Arreta, J., Daulay, N., Fariz, D., & Marzuki, R. (2022). Ekonomi Hijau dalam Visi Indonesia 2045. Retrieved from https://www.csis.or.id/publication/ekonomi-hijau-dalam-visi-indonesia-2045/

Kemenkeu RI. (2022). Ini Komitmen Indonesia Mencapai Net Zero Emission. Retrieved from https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/informasi-publik/publikasi/berita-utama/Ini-Komitmen-Indonesia-Mencapai-Net-Zero-Emission

Kemenparekraf RI. (2021). Destinasi Wisata Berbasis Sustainable Tourism di Indonesia. Retrieved from https://kemenparekraf.go.id/ragam-pariwisata/Destinasi-Wisata-Berbasis-Sustainable-Tourism-di-Indonesia

Kemenparekraf RI. (2023). Gerakan “Kita

Mulai Sekarang": Upaya Mendukung Sustainable Tourism. Retrieved from https://kemenparekraf.go.id/kebijakan/gerakan-kita-mulai-sekarang-upaya-mendukung-sustainable-tourism

Kementerian ESDM. (2018). Ini Dia Sebaran Pembangkit Listrik Panas Bumi di Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.esdm.go.id/id/media-center/arsip-berita/ini-dia-sebaran-pembangkit-listrik-panas-bumi-di-indonesia

Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika. (2015). Saatnya Kembangkan Potensi Pariwisata Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/5640/saatnya-kembangkan-potensi-pariwisata-indonesia/0/infografis

Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian. (2023). Pemerintah Terus Mendorong Percepatan Transisi Energi di Dalam Negeri Guna Mencapai Target Net Zero Emission pada 2060. Retrieved from https://www.ekon.go.id/publikasi/detail/4996/pemerintah-terus-mendorong-percepatan-transisi-energi-di-dalam-negeri-guna-mencapai-target-net-zero-emission-pada-2060

Kementerian PPN/Bappenas. (2018). Laporan Kajian; Background Study RPJMN 2020-2024. Retrieved from http://aparatur.bappenas.go.id/assets/img/3_%20Laporan%20Kajian%20Background%20Study%20RPJMN%202020-2024%20Bidang%20Aparatur%20Negara%20-%202018.pdf

Khor, M. (2013). Challenges of the Green Economy Concept and Policies in the Context of Sustainable Development, Poverty and Equity. Retrieved from http://purochioe.rrojasdatabank.info/transition-4.pdf

Laily, I. N. (2022). Energi Alternatif adalah Pengganti Bahan Bakar Fosil, Ini Contohnya. Retrieved from https://katadata.co.id/safrezi/berita/61e130d2ccaae/energi-alternatif-adalah-pengganti-bahan-bakar-fosil-ini-contohnya

Limanseto, H. (2022a). Green Economy Mendorong Terciptanya Pembangunan Ekonomi yang Inklusif dan Berkelanjutan. Retrieved from https://ekon.go.id/publikasi/detail/4024/green-economy-mendorong-terciptanya-pembangunan-ekonomi-yang-inklusif-dan-berkelanjutan

Limanseto, H. (2022b). Kembangkan Pariwisata Berkelanjutan, Menko Airlangga Dorong Upaya Melestarikan Warisan Budaya. Retrieved from https://ekon.go.id/publikasi/detail/4465/kembangkan-pariwisata-berkelanjutan-menko-airlangga-dorong-upaya-melestarikan-warisan-budaya

Nayottama, H. (2022). Retrieved from Mengupas Tuntas Peluang dan Tantangan Ekonomi Hijau. https://feb.ugm.ac.id/id/berita/3721-mengupas-tuntas-peluang-dan-tantangan-ekonomi-hijau

Pertamin. (2023, March 21). Sambut Prospek Cerah Pengembangan Panas Bumi, PGE Punya Fundamental Keuangan Kuat. Pertamina. Pertamina. Retrieved from https://www.pertamina.com/id/news-room/news-release/sambut-prospek-cerah-pengembangan-panas-bumi-pge-punya-fundamental-keuangan-kuat

Pristiadaru, D. L. (2023, June 28). Potensi Energi Angin di Indonesia, Tersebar Luas di Berbagai Wilayah. Kompas. Retrieved from https://lestari.kompas.com/read/2023/05/10/100302486/potensi-energi-angin-di-indonesia-tersebar-luas-di-berbagai-wilayah

Puandria. (2023). Mengenal Lebih Dekat Potensi Ekowisata di Indonesia. Retrieved from https://phinemo.com/mengenal-lebih-dekat-potensi-ekowisata-di-indonesia/

Ramadhani, N. (2023, April 2). Investasi

Berkelanjutan dan Dampak Positif Bagi Lingkungan. Akseleran. Retrieved from https://www.akseleran.co.id/blog/investasi-berkelanjutan/

Sekretariat Kabinet RI. (2017). Potensi Pengembangan PLTB di Indonesia. Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia. Retrieved from https://setkab.go.id/potensi-pengembangan-pltb-di-indonesia/

Skha. (2022, November 8). Mengintip Potensi Green Economy di Indonesia dan Kebijakannya. Skha. Retrieved from https://skha.co.id/id/artikel/sektor-publik/energi-utilitas-pertambangan/potensi-green-economy-dan-kebijakannya-di-indonesia/

Tusin, U. (2022, November 15). Penerapan Green Economy di Indonesia: Tantangan dan Perkembangan. LandX. Retrieved from https://landx.id/blog/penerapan-green-economy-di-indonesia-tantangan-dan-perkembangan/

UNEP. (2013). Green Economy and Trade - Trends, Challenges and Opportunities. UNEP. Retrieved from https://www.unep.org/resources/report/green-economy-and-trade-trends-challenges-and-opportunities

United Nations. (2015). Climate Change. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/climate-change

waste4change. (2022, August 29). Net Zero Emission Indonesia 2060: Langkah Menuju Ekonomi Sirkular. . Waste4change.Com. Retrieved from https://waste4change.com/blog/net-zero-emission-indonesia-2060-menuju-ekonomi-sirkular/

World Bank. (2014). Bank Dunia dan lingkungan di Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/in/country/indonesia/brief/world-bank-and-environment-in-indonesia

Yulianti, A. (2015). Ekonomi Hijau (Green Economy) Untuk Mendukung Pembangunan Berkelanjutan di Provinsi Kepulauan Bangka Belitung. Retrieved from https://bappeda.babelprov.go.id/content/ekonomi-hijau-green-economy-untuk-mendukung-pembangunan-berkelanjutan-di-provinsi-kepulauan

Yusuf. (2021). Potensi Besar Indonesia pada Ekonomi Hijau dan Digital. Retrieved from https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/38192/potensi-besar-indonesia-pada-ekonomi-hijau-dan-digital/0/berita

Authors Biography

Global South Review
Vol. 5, No.1, January 2023

Tsabita Afifah Khoirunnisa is a recent graduate from the International Relations Department of Brawijaya University. Her scholarly pursuits in International Relations studies encompass the intricacies of Global South and Critical Linguistics. Email: tsabitta@gmail.com

Yusli Effendi is a lecturer at the International Relations Department of Brawijaya University. His research interests encompass Global Politics and Islam, and Critical Global Studies. For inquiries and further engagement with his work, you can reach him at y.effendi@ub.ac.id.

Aldi Haydar Mulia is a fourth-year International Relations undergraduate student at the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Gadjah Mada, and an upcoming mobility student at Universiti Malaya. He is minoring in International Political Economy and Development, which has become the primary subject of his writings and research. He was the Research and Development Division Coordinator at the faculty's student press, Sintesa, in 2022 and is a Research and Development Team member at the university's student press, Balairung. Some of his articles can be found at the respective student press's website. He is currently working on his undergraduate thesis on the political economy of the ongoing Yogyakarta's Philosophical Axis (Sumbu Filosofi) proposal as a UNESCO World Heritage. The topic's selection exemplifies his interest in the entanglement of cultural, political, and economic facets of International Relations. Aldi can be contacted via email at aldihaydar02@mail.ugm.ac.id or aldihaydarmulia@gmail.com.

Sekarini Wukirasih is a student-writer based in Yogyakarta. Her interests cover gender, peace, social movements, and environmental studies, about which she has been writing op-eds since her first year of college. Her passion for writing led her to intern at Kontekstual—an independent national media focused on international issues—for a semester, followed by a year as an editorial staff member (February 2022–July 2023). With FPCI UGM, she had been a co-writer of a published policy brief titled "Posisi Masyarakat Adat dalam Kerja Sama Utara-Selatan terkait Perubahan Iklim di Indonesia," which was presented at the national forum Muda Bersuara 2021. Aside from that, she also assisted the Institute of International Studies UGM's research project on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in 2022. She is a final-year International Relations undergraduate student at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada. You can find a compilation of her work at buttercup-rants.carrd.co or contact her via email at sekarini.w@mail.ugm.ac.id.

Widhi Hanantyo Suryadinata, an undergraduate student in International Relations at Universitas Gadjah Mada, is a multidisciplinary researcher. His research interests include the Green Economy, Vehicle Electrification, and the critique of the Green Economy story as "Business As Usual." Beyond these topics, Widhi is devoted to researching the dynamics of the switch to green energy and energy security. He acknowledges the challenges and opportunities of this shift and works to untangle the complexities of how Green Economy projects might challenge pre-existing economic paradigms and promote environmental sustainability. His dedication to the study of vehicle electrification also emphasizes how urgent it is to switch to environmentally friendly transportation options. He believes electric cars will be crucial in lowering emissions and improving urban sustainability. Exploring the nuances of the switch to green energy in the constantly changing global energy landscape. Widhi is positioned as a forward-thinking academic ready to influence conversations and policies concerning sustainability, energy, and the economy, thanks to his broad research interests and political economics. He can be reached via email at widhihanantyo@mail.ugm.ac.id or widhihanantyo@gmail.com.

Amira Hasna Febriyanti holds a Bachelor of Political Science in International Relations from Universitas Gadjah Mada. Her undergraduate thesis discussed Indonesia's middle-power diplomacy in maintaining ASEAN's centrality amidst US-China rivalry by analyzing Indonesia's involvement in establishing the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP). During her undergraduate study, she was involved in several student-led organizations such as the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) Universitas Gadjah Mada as Head of Event and Program, AIESEC Universitas Gadjah Mada, and ASEAN Youth Organization. She was also an awardee of the Indonesian International Student Mobility Awards (IISMA) at the University of Pennsylvania in 2021. In her final year, she interned at various institutions, such as the Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia. Her interests are Indonesian foreign policy, development studies, and environmental studies. Amira can be contacted via email: ahasnaaf@gmail.com

Sayyid Al Murtadho is a Bachelor of Political Science in International Relations from Universitas Gadjah Mada. His undergraduate thesis analysed the securitisation of migration discourses utilised by right-wing parties in Spain to boost their voters. During his undergraduate study, he was involved in several student organisations, including the Lembaga Pers and Penerbitan Sintesa (Student Press) of the Faculty of Social and Political Science Universitas Gadjah Mada. He was also awarded the Indonesian International Student Mobility Awards from the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture at the University of Sussex in 2021. As an aspiring researcher, he has one year of experience in three think tanks, including the

Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies, the Center for Digital Society, and the Institute of International Studies. His research interests are international development, environmental politics, migration, and social policy through the lens of social justice & critical theory while also emphasising the Global South experience. Sayyid can be contacted via email: sayyidam12@gmail.com

Yassriani Almattushyva Yassriani Almattushyva obtained a Bachelor of Political Science in International Relations, from Universitas Gadjah Mada. Her undergraduate thesis explored Indonesia's role as a middle power in promoting the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda through multilateral diplomacy at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Throughout her undergraduate years, Yassriani was involved in several student organizations including Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) Chapter Universitas Gadjah Mada, and Majelis Permusyawaratan Mahasiswa (Student Assembly) of the Department of International Relations Universitas Gadjah Mada. Additionally, she has completed an internship at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, attended international conferences focused on the Global South, and achieved finalist status in a national essay competition supported by the Indonesian Ministry of Environment and Forestry and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Her interests encompass environmental politics, international peace and security, and development studies. Yassriani can be contacted via email: yassrianialma@gmail.com

Jessenia Destarini Asmoro completed her Bachelor's degree in International Relations from Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) in 2023. She has deep passion for gender and politics, human rights, politics of development, human security, and Global South. Previously, she has worked as a Research Assistant at the Social Development Studies Center, under the Department of Social Development and Welfare, Universitas Gadjah Mada. Throughout her undergraduate study, she was involved in several students-led research organizations, such as UGM ASEAN Society as a Research Staff (2020-2021) and Vice President (2021-2022), Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) Chapter UGM as a Research Staff (2020-2021), and Sintesa Student Press as an Editorial Staff (2020) and Deputy Chief Executive Officer (2021). Her writings have been published in several platforms, such as Megashift FISIPOL UGM, Institute of International Studies (IIS) UGM, and IR Review under IR UGM Students Association. She can be reached through her email destarini29@gmail.com.

Aulia Sabila Syarifa Qalbie is currently pursuing an undergraduate degree in International Relations at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, with a specific focus on diplomatic studies. Beyond her academic persuits, Aulia's fervor lies in addressing critical global issues. She exhibits particular enthusiasm for sustainable development, renewable energy, climate

change, negotiation, conflict resolution, economic cooperation, as well as intricate subjects like China's policies and the Middle East situation. Aulia is on the verge of embarking on her inaugural publication, an experience that has already been immensely enriching. This experience has ignited a passion for writing within her, and she eagerly anticipates further opportunities to contribute to the world of literature and knowledge dissemination. To her, writing represents an essential foundation for positive change, offering the means to deepen understanding, broaden horizons, and refine the ability to articulate creative and critical ideas in written form. In addition to her academic pursuits, Aulia is an active participant in various activities and organizations, including her engagement with the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI), as well as her dedication to volunteer work.

Rahmaniah was born on September 2, 2002, in Mamuju, a small town located on the west coast of Sulawesi, Indonesia. She began her education at SD 20 Inpres Somba, continued to SMPN 4 Topoyo, and then to SMKN Topoyo. She pursued her undergraduate degree in International Relations at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, with a focus on diplomacy. From the beginning of her college years, Rahmaniah showed a strong interest in global issues that affect the world today. Although she chose to focus on diplomacy, her interest in these global issues is not limited to one topic. Rahmaniah has diverse interests, especially related to security, environment, human rights, and gender. Her interest in the environment and environmental sustainability, as well as the current environmental issues, motivated her to almost complete her first publication, which discusses the environmental issues that are currently in the global spotlight. With her extraordinary spirit and passion for understanding and solving complex global issues, Rahmaniah is ready to contribute to making the world a better place for everyone.

Author Guidelines
Global South Review

Even pages: Author (edited by editor)

Title
Must be brief and informative, between 15-20 words (16pt, bold, single pharagraph spacing, 0 before-after)

First Author; Next Author; Last Author – without academic title (12pt, bold)
First Author's Affiliation (Department, University, Country) (12pt);
Second Author's Affiliation;
Third Author's Affiliation;
email@writer.ac.id (only write email for the corresponding author)

Abstract (13pt, bold)

Abstract should be typed in italic, font size 10pt, single-spacing format and justified. The abstract should briefly summarize the aim, findings, or purposes of the article. Authors encouraged to write clear explanation on methodology or conceptual framework used in the article, followed by short summary of the research findings. The end part of the abstract should give conclusion that indicates how this paper contributes to fill the gap in previous studies, or any practical implication that might occurs. The abstract should be written in one concise paragraph of no more than 250 words.

Keywords*: contains; three to five; relevant keywords; separated by semicolon; written in lower case, italic 10pt*

Guidelines (13pt, Bold, Title Case)

The manuscript should be written in English on A4-sized papers (21x29.7 cm), with custom margins as follows: left 2.5 cm, right 2 cm, bottom 2 cm, and top 2 cm. The manuscript should use Callisto MT, 12pt font size, 1.5 line spacing. Manuscript should consist of 4,000—7,000 words (research article) and 3,000—4,000 words (book review). Referencing and citing technique used is APA 6th edition, with in-text citation format

Guidelines - Introduction

All sources quoted or paraphrased should be listed in the reference list. Cite source using APA in-text citation format, by writing author's last name followed by the publication year, for example: (Hudson, 2014). Direct quotations, tables, or figures referred should include the page number, for example: (Hudson, 2010, p. 44).

The introduction part should explore these elements: (1) Explanation about the research background and the general theme or topic; (2) Provide clear and convincing answer to the question: Why is this article is important? (3) A concise literature review of available literature or research. Please cite the most imperative part, theories, or debates from existing studies; (4) Indicate how your article will contribute to fill the gap to the current studies. This is also important to show that your idea is original; (5) Offer explanation on specific problem or question[1] and hypothesis

that will be the main point(s) of the article.[2] We encourage authors to bring only one or two questions.

Author should also describe objectives of the research and offer the brief structure of the article.

Guidelines - Methodology

Author is encouraged to describe methodology clearly. Put it in a dedicated subchapter if necessary. This part should contain a brief justification for the research methods used.

This part should contain enough detail to enable the reader to evaluate the appropriateness of your methods and the reliability and validity of your findings.

How To Write Your Subchapters

[This is an example text] Vivamus quis nisi ut diam vehicula mollis rhoncus et massa. Sed in sem felis. Nulla facilisi. Fusce lobortis vel nisl non viverra. Phasellus id molestie nunc.

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nunc nunc ligula, volutpat et nibh sed, hendrerit tincidunt eros. Nam scelerisque rutrum nulla, nec tempus purus ultrices et. Maecenas lacus ligula, pharetra sit amet nibh eu, pellentesque efficitur ex. Integer varius leo eget eros dapibus, a venenatis nulla consectetur. Fusce finibus nisi maximus lorem cursus, a bibendum sem euismod. Vivamus ac tempor odio, in porta orci. Phasellus scelerisque est ac elementum ullamcorper. Duis ut lectus non nibh dictum malesuada. Quisque convallis lectus non justo posuere venenatis. Nam bibendum sem et nibh eleifend placerat sit amet a nibh. Vestibulum quis varius purus.

[1] Fewer question or hypothesis is better, we encourage author to bring only 1-2 questions

[2] Footnote may be used to provide additional description (terms, concept, specific event, etc.) that might be too excessive to be included in-text.

If You Have 2nd Level Subchapters, Use 12pt, Underline, Title Case

[This is an example text] Proin non consequat justo. Praesent tempor aliquam nibh vitae venenatis. Praesent pulvinar nulla ut ligula ultricies, bibendum pretium mi hendrerit. Quisque luctus, purus in tincidunt consequat, nibh metus laoreet ex, at rutrum nisi metus ut lacus. Integer commodo purus orci, non pharetra nisi iaculis non. Aenean eget rutrum risus, eu egestas erat. Sed lobortis diam dolor, at porttitor dolor consequat tempus. Etiam erat felis, porttitor sed enim a, aliquam commodo elit. Cras ac posuere est, eu interdum mi. Maecenas posuere lacus vitae nisi efficitur, sed malesuada erat tincidunt. Nullam a dignissim massa. Fusce molestie finibus augue id lacinia. Integer tincidunt at metus ac pharetra. Vivamus hendrerit, mauris quis pharetra fringilla, orci ipsum interdum lacus, et imperdiet massa mauris quis lorem. Pellentesque placerat fermentum imperdiet. Fusce scelerisque purus eget suscipit semper.

If You Have 3rd Level Subchapters, Use 12pt, Italic, Title Case. Run the text on after a punctuation mark. **[This is an example text]** In hac habitasse platea dictumst. Nunc in euismod libero, vel interdum lacus. Proin ut dignissim risus. Nunc faucibus libero sed eleifend bibendum. Nam mattis, odio ac placerat euismod, mauris felis consequat nunc, ut porttitor ligula risus ac nisl. Nulla ullamcorper sapien non quam gravida, nec dignissim ligula

dignissim. Curabitur congue nunc sed eros luctus, sed dapibus arcu elementum. Mauris venenatis odio leo, ut placerat augue congue at.

Curabitur convallis nulla leo, sit amet auctor est vestibulum nec. Aenean ut neque vel quam egestas accumsan eu in elit.

Nullam lobortis faucibus lectus posuere consequat.

- Duis convallis nulla ligula, ac congue ipsum cursus sed.
- Sed ut dolor eleifend, malesuada sem vitae, mollis risus.
- Sed sit amet massa felis. [This is an example te xt for 2nd level subchapter]

Guidelines - Conclusion

Conclusion is a brief summary of findings and discussion. It is strongly recommended to avoid mere repetitive statements or phrase from the previous section. Author may also discuss implication of the findings and point out prospect for further research.

Conclusion should followed by reference list format. Reference list is based on American Psychological Association (APA) style. Reference list should appear at the end of the article and include only literatures actually cited in the manuscript. Citation should be sorted alphabetically and chronologically, written in single spacing and 0pt before-after spacing format.

References

Books

Hudson, V.M. (2014). Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (2nd ed.). Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.

Spence, B. ed. (1993). Secondary school management in the 1990s: challenge and change. Aspects of Education Series, 48 London: Independent Publishers.

UNESCO. (1993). General information programme and UNISIST. Paris: Unesco, PGI-93/S/22.

Secondary source (books)

Confederation of British Industry. (1989). Towards a skills revolution: a youth charter. London: CBI. Quoted in: Bluck, R. Ailton, A., & Noon, P. (1994). Information skills in academic libraries: a teaching and learning role in higher education. SEDA Paper 82. Birmingham: Staff and Educational Development Asscociation, p. 39.

Conference Proceeding

Yuana, S.L. ed. (2013). Proceeding Workshop on Humanitarian Law and Diplomacy: From Perspective and Practice. Yogyakarta: Institute of International Studies UGM.

Conference Paper

Umar, A.R.M. (2014). Normative Power or Global Governmentality? A Critical Analysis of European Union's Civil Society Strengthening Programs in Post-New Order Indonesia. In Sugiono M. (ed.), Proceedings of the 3rd Convention of European Studies 2014 (pp.254-278). Yogyakarta: Institute of International Studies UGM

Report

Darvasi, P. (2016). Empathy, Perspective, and Complicity: How Digital Games Can Support Peace Education and Conflict Resolution. Working Report. New Delhi: UNESCO MGIEP.

Thesis/Dissertation

Page, S. (1999). Information technology impact: a survey of leading UK companies (Master's thesis, Leeds Metropolitan University). Retrieved from: http://stevepageacademic.webs.com/Journal%20Articles/INFORMATION%20TECHNOLOGY%20IMPACT%20-%20A%20SURVEY%20OF%20LEADING%20UK%20ORGANISATIONS.doc

Journal Article (retrieved online, with DOI)

Sisler, V. (2008). Digital Arabs Representation in Video Games. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 11(2), 203-219. doi: 10.1177/1367549407088333

Journal Article (retrieved online, without DOI or page numbers)

Fennel, V.L. (2015). "Easternization" of Post-Western International Order: Appertaining Confucianism into Bandung Conference Legacy. IJIS (Indonesian Journal of International Studies), 2(2), 115-132. Retrieved from: https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/IJIS/article/view/26538

Höglund, J. (2008). Electronic Empire: Orientalism Revisited in the Military Shooter. The International Journal of Computer Game Research, 8(1). Retrieved from: http://gamestudies.org/0801/articles/hoeglund

Newspaper Article

Sadli, M. (2005, November). Akan timbul krisis atau resesi?. Kompas. p. 6.

Audiovisual media (videos, music recordings, podcasts, etc.)

Gladu, A. (Producer), & Brodeur. M. (Director). (2001). Dance of the warrior [Motion picture]. Canada: National Film Board.

Kemlu TV. (2017, May 5). Laporan Pemajuan Ham Indonesia di PBB [Video file]. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VLRyuLX3uw

In press

Tian D., Araki, H., Stahl, E. Bergelson, J. & Kreitman, M. (2002). Signature of balancing selection in Arabidopsis. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. In press

Electronic source

Barr, M. (2013). Chinese Soft Power 2.0: The Politics of Fashion. Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/2013/04/10/chinese-soft-power-2-0-the-politics-of-fashion/

GLOBAL SOUTH
REVIEW

Institute of International Studies
DEPT. OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITAS GADJAH MADA

ISSN Online 2685-7790